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Abstract
This dissertation is devoted to developing modal logical tools that can
be used in the field of proof theory and ordinal analysis. More precisely, we
focus on the relation between strictly positive modal logics and both Turing
progressions and ordinal notation systems.
With respect to the former one, we introduce the system TSC that is
tailored to generate exactly all relations that hold between different Tur-
ing progressions given a particular set of natural consistency notions. We
also present an arithmetical interpretation for this modal system, named
the Formalized Turing progressions interpretation. The logic is proven to be
arithmetically sound and complete with respect to this interpretation.
After exploring the arithmetical semantics of TSC, we investigate the
relational semantics of this system. For this purpose, we make use of the
universal model of the closed fragment of Go¨del-Lo¨b’s Polymodal Logic (GLP),
namely Ignatiev’s universal frame. By slightly modifying the relations defined
in this model, we obtain a new frame which is proven to be a universal
model for TSC. Moreover, we show how the domain of this frame can be
reduced to sequences with finite support while keeping the completeness of
the system.
As for ordinal notations systems, we present the logic BC (for Bracket
Calculus). Unlike other provability logics, BC is based on a purely modal
signature that gives rise to an ordinal notation system instead of modalities
indexed by some ordinal given a priori. Moreover, since the order between
these notations can be established in terms of derivability within the cal-
culus, the inferences in this system can be carried out without using any
external property of ordinals. The presented logic is proven to be equiva-
lent to Reflection Calculus (RCΓ0), that is, to the strictly positive fragment of
GLPΓ0 .
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Resumen
El objetivo de esta tesis es desarrollar herramientas de lo´gica modal que
puedan ser utilizadas en el campo de la teorı´a de la demostracio´n y el ana´li-
sis ordinal. Ma´s precisamente, nos centramos en la relacio´n entre las lo´gicas
modales estrictamente positivas y las progresiones de Turing, y entre dichas
lo´gicas y los sistemas de notacio´n ordinal que surgen de ellas.
Con respecto a la primera parte, hemos introducido el sistema TSC, di-
sen˜ado para generar exactamente todas las relaciones va´lidas entre las dife-
rentes progresiones de Turing, dado un conjunto particular de nociones de
consistencia naturales. Tambie´n presentamos una interpretacio´n aritme´tica
para este sistema modal, denominada interpretacio´n de las Progresiones de Tu-
ring formalizadas. Demostramos que la lo´gica es aritme´ticamente correcta y
completa con respecto a esta interpretacio´n.
Tras de estudiar la sema´ntica aritme´tica de TSC, investigamos la sema´nti-
ca relacional de este sistema. Para este propo´sito, hacemos uso del modelo
universal para el fragmento cerrado de Go¨del-Lo¨b’s Polymodal Logic (GLP),
a saber, el marco universal de Ignatiev. Modificando ligeramente las relacio-
nes definidas en este modelo, obtenemos un nuevo marco. Demostramos
que e´ste es un modelo universal para TSC. Asimismo, mostramos co´mo
el dominio de este marco puede reducirse a secuencias con soporte finito
manteniendo la completud del sistema.
Respecto a los sistemas de notacio´n ordinal, presentamos la lo´gica BC
(por Bracket Calculus). A diferencia de otras lo´gicas de la demostrabilidad,
BC se basa en un lenguaje puramente modal que da lugar a un sistema
de notacio´n ordinal, en lugar de estar construido mediante modalidades
indexadas por algu´n ordinal dado a priori. Adema´s, ya que el orden entre
estas notaciones puede establecerse en te´rminos de derivabilidad dentro del
ca´lculo, las inferencias en este sistema pueden llevarse a cabo sin usar nin-
guna propiedad externa de los ordinales. Demostramos que la lo´gica pre-
sentada es equivalente al Reflection Calculus (RCΓ0), es decir, al fragmento
estrictamente positivo de GLPΓ0 .
vii

Introduction
Among other interesting features, modal logic provides us with a tool to
study different mathematical phenomena. Usually, a modal system presents
two modal operators,  and ♦, that are intended to be read as It is neces-
sary that and It is possible that, respectively. However, there is an extensive
range of interpretations for these modal operators that yields a wide family
of modal systems. According to these interpretations we can speak about
temporal logic, deontic logic, doxastic logic, etc.
One of the key ingredients of this dissertations is provability logic. In these
modal systems the regular modalities are interpreted as provability predi-
cates and consistency statements for arithmetical theories such as Peano
Arithmetic (PA). The best known provability logic is GL (Go¨del-Lo¨b), ob-
tained by extending the smallest normal modal logic K with a modal version
of a formalization of Lo¨b’s theorem. This system was later generalized by
Japaridze with GLPω; a polymodal version of GL in which we have modal
operators for each n ∈ ω, and later on extended to a class-sized logic by
Beklemishev where we have modalities for each ordinal.
The main aspect of this line of research is that we can use simple tools
like these modal systems to perform complex analyses of arithmetical the-
ories. In particular, Beklemishev showed that the closed fragment of GLPω
was enough to perform a Π01-ordinal analysis of PA and similar arithmetical
theories. The present dissertation is in the context of this line of research.
The aim of this work is to contribute to the field of provability logic by pro-
viding new modal systems that can be used as tools in the area of ordinal
analysis.
The first goal of this investigation is related to Turing progressions. In his
PhD dissertation, Alan Turing introduced what he called systems of log-
ics based on ordinals as a way to deal with Go¨del’s incompleteness results.
Roughly speaking, the systems of logics were obtained by iteratedly extend-
ing a formal system L with one of these non-provable statements, such as
the consistency of L. This hierarchy of theories is what we now call Tur-
ing progressions and can be defined (given an ordinal representation over
which our ordinals range) by the following three clauses:
ix
Introduction
T1. (T)0 := T where T is an initial or base theory;
T2. (T)α+1 := (T)α ∪ {Con((T)α)};
T3. (T)λ :=
⋃
β<λ(T)β, for λ a limit ordinal.
This construction can be extended to different consistency notions that can
be naturally defined in weak fragments of arithmetic. This yields different
progressions that, in turn, can be used as the base theory of a new hierarchy
based on a different consistency notion, and so on. Facing this situation, it
is therefore natural to ask which principles govern the interactions between
these different Turing progressions. The contribution of our work with re-
spect to this question is to provide a modal system capable of generating
all possible relations that hold between different Turing progressions and
where each modal formula can be used to directly denote one of these the-
ories.
Steps in this direction were already taken from both arithmetical and
provability logic perspectives. From the arithmetical point view, a corner-
stone in this investigation is the fine-structure formula theorem proven by
Schmerl and later generalized by Beklemishev. This result contains two con-
servativity principles:
S1 ∀α  0
(
(T)αn+m ≡n (T)e
m(α)
n
)
;
S2 ∀β  0
((
(T)βn+m
)α
n ≡n (T)
em(β)·(1+α)
n
)
.
Item S1 is commonly known as the reduction property and states that the
progression built from theory T using n + m-consistency up to level α has
the same Π0n+1-consequences as the progression obtained by iterating n-
consistency over the same base theory up to the ω-exponential tower
ωω
···
ωα
of height m.
The system GLPω provides us with a complete characterization of the n-
consistency notions, and so, we can give an approximation to the reduction
property and analogous principles by using (the arithmetical interpretation
of) modal formulas in this setting (see [32]) . For example, by a simple
application of S1 we know that
(PA)11 ≡0 (PA)ω0 .
Therefore, by considering the corresponding arithmetical interpretation, we
can express this result in the language of GLPω by
{〈 1 〉PA>} ≡0 {〈 0 〉k+1PA > : k<ω} = {〈 0 〉PA>, 〈 0 〉PA〈 0 〉PA>, . . .}.
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Figure 1: Graphical representations of some instances of S1 and S2, respec-
tively.
While 〈 1 〉> and each 〈 0 〉m> for m<ω are formulas in the signature of
GLPω, 〈 0 〉ω> is not. Thus, we cannot directly denote (PA)ω0 with a single
modal formula but with an infinite set of them. This way, results like the
fine-structure formula can be approximated by using GLPω but cannot be
formulated as such within this modal system.
In Chapter 2 we present a way of dealing with this issue. We introduce
ordinal modalities, modal operators of the form 〈 nα 〉 where n<ω and α<Λ
for Λ a fixed recursive ε-number. The underlying idea of this operator is to
encapsulate the iteration of the n-consistency notion up to level α. Thus, our
previous example can be expressed in this setting by:
〈 11 〉PA> ≡0 〈 0ω 〉PA>.
Moreover, the signature we define in this chapter is a strictly positive lan-
guage (with no propositional variables), that is, we only consider formulas
obtained by the following grammar: >, conjunction and ordinal modali-
ties. In this sense, the approach we follow is influenced by recent works
papers by Dashkov and Beklemishev where they introduced the logic Reflec-
tion Calculus (RC). This system is weaker than GLP, yet expressive enough
to maintain its main proof-theoretic applications. More precisely, RC con-
xi
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sists of the fragment of GLP containing all implications of the form ϕ → ψ
where ϕ and ψ are strictly positive formulas.
In general, by going to a strictly positive language, we gain a broader
range of arithmetical interpretations. More precisely, the use of strictly posi-
tive formulas allows us to interpret modal formulas as arithmetical theories
rather than individual arithmetical sentences. Therefore, in our setting, the
modal operators are no longer conceived as consistency statements but the-
ories that might be infinitely axiomatized.
With this handy signature, we also use Chapter 2 to introduce the sys-
tem TSC for Turing-Schmerl Calculus. The derivable objects of this system
are sequents of the form ϕ ` ψ where ϕ and ψ are formulas in the above
signature.
With all these ingredients, one can easily conjecture how the arithmeti-
cal semantics of this system are defined. First, we identified modal formulas
with Turing progressions built by iterating different consistency notions over
a weak fragment of arithmetic. In particular, we consider the conjunction of
two formulas as the union of the respective theories. After this, the arith-
metical interpretation of the sequents is defined as the (formalized) entail-
ment between these theories. Thus, sequents are translated into arithmeti-
cal formulas expressing such entailment. This arithmetical interpretation is
what we name the Formalized Turing progressions (FTP) interpretation. The
details of this construction and the corresponding results of soundness and
completeness are collected in Chapter 3.
Chapter 4 is devoted to study the relational semantics of TSC. To this
end, we consider Ignatiev’s universal frame for the variable-free fragment of
GLP. The main drawback of GLPω or any of its polymodal fragments is that
it is incomplete with respect to its relational semantics. However, Ignatiev
built a relational model for the closed fragment of the signature in which
every consistent formula of variable-free GLPω is satisfied [30]. This frame
consists of a domain based on certain decreasing sequences of ordinals (`-
sequences) and a family of relations {Tn}n<ω.
In this chapter we define a modal model J which is universal for our
logic in the sense that any derivable sequent holds everywhere in the model
whereas any non-derivable sequent is refuted by some point in the frame.
This new frame is defined by preserving the domain given in Ignatiev’s
frame but consider a slightly different family of relations {Rn}n<ω. Apart
from this, we define the auxiliary relations Rαn to naturally model the be-
havior of the ordinal modalities 〈 nα 〉. After defining J and these auxiliary
relations, we use the remainder of the chapter to show the soundness and
completeness results together with some useful tools about the definable
sets in the frame and the characterization of the Rαn-relations.
In the presence of ε-numbers, we can define a `-sequence of the form
xii
〈 α0, α1, . . . , αn, . . . 〉 where for each αi we have that αi > 0. On the one hand,
these kind of sequences are not definable by means of any modal formula
but, on the other hand, the branch of the frame where all these sequences
live does not contain any additional information that is not present in any
other part of the frame. Thus, by restricting our frame to sequences with
finite support, that is, those such that eventually reach 0, we obtain a new
frame for which we show that TSC is complete with respect to. In this new
frame, every world becomes modally definable. The relevance of this fea-
ture with respect to the main aim of TSC is that we can use the frame as a
road map of Turing progressions. Thanks to the modal definability, any se-
quence with finite support x can be translated to modal formula ψx and this
formula itself can be translated into Turing progressions Thψx . Furthermore,
by checking whether two sequences are related in the frame, we can derive
an entailment principle between their corresponding Turing progressions.
These results are collected in Chapter 5.
In view of Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem, we know that the
consistency of any sufficiently powerful formal theory cannot be established
using purely ‘finitary’ means. Since then, the field of proof theory, and
more specifically of ordinal analysis, has been successful in measuring the
non-finitary assumptions required to prove consistency assertions via com-
putable ordinals. Among the benefits of this work is the ability to linearly or-
der natural theories of arithmetic with respect to notions such as their ‘con-
sistency strength’ (e.g., their Π01 ordinal) or their ‘computational strength’
(their Π02 ordinal).
Nevertheless, the assignment of these proof-theoretic ordinals to formal
theories depends on a choice of a ‘natural’ presentation for such ordinals,
with well-known pathological examples having been presented by Kreisel
[33] and Beklemishev [3]. These representation systems are what we know
as ordinal notation systems. During my research stay in IRIT, Ferna´ndez-
Duque suggested several questions regarding provability logics and the or-
dinal notation systems that arise from them. One of these problems is suc-
cessfully solved in Chapter 6.
Some connections between ordinal notation systems and provability log-
ics are already known and have been intensively studied (see [20], [7]).
Within the closed fragment of GLPω, there are some special formulas that
are commonly known as worms; formulas obtained by iterating different di-
amonds over top. Thus, worms are formulas of the form 〈 no 〉 . . . 〈 nk 〉>.
These formulas can be well ordered (modulo equivalence in GLPω) accord-
ing to their consistency strength, that is, given two worms A and B:
A <0 B :⇐⇒ B ` 〈 0 〉A
Hence, it is possible to associate an ordinal o(A) to any worm A. The
set of GLPω-worms provide us with an ordinal notation system for ε0 =
xiii
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sup{ω,ωω,ωωω , . . .} = ϕ1(0) which measures the precise proof-theoretical
strength of PA. We can go further by considering bigger fragments of GLP in
which diamonds with transfinite ordinal entries are available. Extensions of
GLPω, denoted GLPΛ, have been considered in cases where Λ is an ordinal
[7, 19, 24] or even an arbitrary linear order [12]. Proof-theoretic interpreta-
tions for GLPΛ have been developed by Ferna´ndez-Duque and Joosten [25]
for the case where Λ is a computable well-order.
In such cases, we are in need of a system of notation that can represent
an ordinal λ<Λ. Fortunately we may ‘borrow’ this notation from finitary
worms and represent λ itself as a worm. Iterating this process we obtain
the autonomous worms, whose order types are exactly the ordinals below
the Feferman-Schu¨tte ordinal Γ0, that is, the smallest fixpoint of the Veblen
functions.
() 〈0〉> 1
(()) 〈1〉> ω
(()) (()()) 〈1〉〈2〉> ωω+1
((())) 〈ω〉> ε0
(()) () ((())) 〈1〉〈0〉〈ω〉> ε0 +ω
Table 1: Some correspondences between brackets expressions, worms and
ordinals.
By iterating this process we obtain a notation system for worms which
uses only parentheses, as ordinals (including natural numbers) can be iter-
atively represented in this fashion. Thus a balanced brackets expression a
can be used to denote an ordinal by fist translating a into a worm A and
then computing o(A) (see Table 1). This is Beklemishev’s brackets notation
system, introduced in [7], which provides a notation system for Γ0 without
any reference to an externally given ordinal.
The drawback of Beklemishev’s brackets system is that the actual com-
putation of the ordering between different expressions is achieved via a
translation into a traditional ordinal notation system. The goal of this in-
vestigation is to remove the need for such an intermediate step by providing
an autonomous calculus for determining the ordering relation and, more
generally, the logical consequence relation between bracket notations. To
this end in Chapter 6 we present the Bracket Calculus (BC).
The signature of BC is obtained by extending the balanced brackets
grammar to a strictly positive modal signature in which we use the brackets
expressions as modal operators. Therefore, the set of formulas is built from
> and propositional variables using conjunctions ∧ and modalities of the
xiv
form (a) where a is a balanced brackets expression. The main feature of
this system is that, unlike other provability logics, BC is based on a purely
modal signature that gives rise to an ordinal notation system instead of us-
ing modalities indexed by some ordinal given a priori. Moreover, since the
order between these notations can be established in terms of derivability
within the calculus, the inferences in this system can be carried out without
using any external property of ordinals. To the best of our knowledge, this
yields the first ordinal notation system presented as a purely modal deduc-
tive system. We prove that our calculus is sound and complete with respect
to a natural translation into RCΓ0 .
Lastly, we would like to point out that the results contained in this dis-
sertation have led to the following publications:
1. E. Hermo-Reyes and J. J. Joosten. The logic of Turing progressions.
Accepted for publication in Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic;
2. E. Hermo-Reyes and J. J. Joosten. Relational semantics for the Turing
Schmerl calculus. In Advances in Modal Logic, volume 12, pages 327-
346. College Publications, 2018;
3. D. Fernndez-Duque and E. Hermo-Reyes. A self-contained provabil-
ity calculus for Γ0. In Logic, Language, Information, and Computation -
WoLLIC 2019, volume 11541 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
195-207. Springer, 2019
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CHAPTER1
Preliminaries
1.1. The Language of Arithmetic
Throughout this dissertation LN will denote the first-order language of
arithmetic, that is, a first-order language whose non-logical symbols are the
following: two binary function symbols + and · for addition and multiplica-
tion; two unary function symbols S and exp, for the successor function and
binary exponentiation; two binary relation symbols = and ≤, for equality
and “less than or equal to”; and a constant symbol 0. The standard model of
arithmetic is the LN-structure whose domain is the set of natural numbers
N and where the symbols of LN are given by their obvious interpretation.
Terms in LN are defined as usual. An occurrence of a quantifier is said
to be bounded if it is of the form ∀x≤ t ϕ(x) or ∃x≤ t ϕ(x), where t is a
term not containing x. These expressions are abbreviations for the formulas
∀x (x≤ t → ϕ(x)) and ∃x (x≤ t ∧ ϕ(x)), respectively. Those formulas all
of whose quantifiers are bounded are called elementary formulas. The set of
elementary formulas is denoted by ∆00(exp).
The following definition allows us to classify arithmetical formulas ac-
cording to their logical complexity. This classification is called the arithmeti-
cal hierarchy.
Definition 1.1.1. For n≥ 0, the classes of Σ0n- and Π0n-formulas are inductively
defined as follows:
i) Σ00 = Π
0
0 = ∆
0
0;
ii) Σ0n+1-formulas are of the form ∃x1 . . . ∃xm ϕ(x1, . . . , xm) where ϕ is a Π0n-
formula. Analogously, a formula is in Π0n+1 if it is of the form
∀x1 . . . ∀xm ϕ(x1, . . . , xm) where ϕ is a Σ0n-formula.
1
1. Preliminaries
Notice that, by the prenex normal form theorem, every formula is equiv-
alent to a formula of the form Qx1 . . . Qxm ϕ(x1, . . . , xm) where ϕ is quantifier-
free, and so an elementary formula, and Q is either ∀ or ∃ for each i. There-
fore, every formula is equivalent to some Σ0n- or Π0n-formula for some n.
Naturally, theses equivalences take place in some fixed theory T. Usually, T
will be clear from the context. We shall sometimes call Σ0n (Π0n) any formula
that is logically equivalent to a Σ0n-formula (Π0n-formula).
0n+1
0n 
0
n
0n
03 
0
3
03
02 
0
2
02
01 
0
1
01
00 = 
0
0 = 
0
0
1
Figure 1.1: The arithmetical hierarchy.
We say that a formula is ∆0n iff it is equivalent to both a Σ0n-formula
and a Π0n-formula. As before, the theory T where these equivalences occur
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will be clear. Since we might have empty blocks of quantifiers in the above
definition, we obtain some obvious inclusions between these classes: Σ0n ⊆
∆0n+1 ⊆ Σ0n+1 and Π0n ⊆ ∆0n+1 ⊆ Π0n+1 (see Figure 1.1). Moreover, we have
that Σ0n ∪Π0n ⊆ ∆0n+1 ⊆ Σ0n+1 ∩Π0n+1.
The classes Σ0n and Π0n are closed under ∧ and ∨. With respect to nega-
tion, if ϕ(x) is a Σ0n-formula, ¬ϕ(x) is equivalent (in the predicate calculus)
to a Π0n-formula and vice-versa, ¬ϕ(x) with ϕ(x) ∈ Π0n is equivalent to a
Σ0n-formula. Hence, ∆0n-formulas are closed under ∧ and ∨, but also under
¬.
It is worth mentioning that, from a computational perspective, the bot-
tom of the hierarchy is particularly relevant. A set on N is definable by a
Σ01-formula iff it is recursively enumerable (r.e.). Thus, since the negation of a
Σ01-formula is equivalent to a Π
0
1 formula, the Π
0
1 definable sets are the co-r.e.
sets. The ∆01 sets correspond exactly to the recursive sets (rec), and so, any
∆00 definable set is decidable. Moreover, every ∆
0
0 definable set is primitive
recursive (p.r.). In Figure 1.2 we can find a diagram of the bottom of the
arithmetical hierarchy from a computational point of view.
01 
0
1
01
rec. sets
00
r.e. sets co-r.e. sets
1
Figure 1.2: The bottom of the arithmetical hierarchy from a computational
point of view.
Arithmetical theories
The need for a formal development of arithmetic was outlined during the
second half of the nineteenth century in the work of Hermann Grassmann,
Charles Sanders Peirce and Richard Dedekind among others. However, it
was not until 1889, with the publication of Arithmetices principia, nova methodo
exposita by Giuseppe Peano, that formal arithmetic began to take its current
shape.
3
1. Preliminaries
In his seminal work, Peano introduced his collection of principles for
natural-number arithmetic that we nowadays know as Peano Arithmetic PA.
In this subsection we shall introduce the axioms of PA together with some
other weaker theories, all of them formulated in the arithmetical language
LN.
By PA we denote the theory containing all classical axioms of first order
logic along with the following mathematical axioms:
P1. ¬S(a) = 0;
P2. S(a) = S(b)→ a = b;
P3. a + 0 = a;
P4. a + S(b) = S(a + b);
P5. a · 0 = 0;
P6. a · S(b) = a · b + a;
P7. exp(0) = S(0);
P8. exp
(
S(a)
)
= exp(a) + exp(a);
P9. a ≤ 0↔ a = 0;
P10. a ≤ S(b)↔ (a ≤ b ∨ a = S(b)).
Apart from these axioms, PA also contains the induction axiom for all
arithmetical formulas ϕ(x):
Iϕ : ϕ(0) ∧ ∀x
(
ϕ(x)→ ϕ(S(x)))→ ∀x ϕ(x).
By restricting the induction scheme we can obtain different fragments of
PA. Of special interest is Elementary Arithmetic EA. This fragment of PA is
obtained by restricting the induction axiom to ∆00-formulas and considering
the axioms P1 to P10.
A natural extension of EA is EA+. This theory can be obtained by
constructing a predicate Supexp which represents the graph of the super-
exponential function (x, y) 7→ 2xy defined by 2x0 := x and 2xy+1 := 22
x
y .
Therefore, we will not introduce the function symbol but only work with
the predicate. We define EA+ as EA+ Sup-exp where Sup-exp is the axiom
that states the totality of the super-exponential function using the predicate
Supexp, that is, Sup-exp := ∀xy ∃z Supexp(x, y, z).
We can consider an equivalent formulation with a lower complexity by
extending our arithmetical language by a function symbol supexp and thus,
extending EA by adding to the set of axioms the corresponding recursive
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defining equations for this super-exponential function. The totality of super-
exponentiation can be easily proven by using induction for ∆00-formulas.
This way, we obtain a Π01-conservative extension of EA
+ (see [32]). However,
in this case, the notion of ∆0- presentable would not coincide with the more
standard one from the literature.
The standard arithmetization of syntax of first order theories can be per-
formed in EA+. Hence, arithmetical formulas can be one-to-one encoded by
numbers. Given an expression e, we refer to such a code as the Go¨del num-
ber of e, that will be denoted by peq. Different natural syntactical relations
can be elementarily defined by using this encoding: we can code finite se-
quences of numbers and many of their basic properties like the length of the
sequence, the i-st element of the sequence, concatenation, etc. Furthermore,
we can also code properties about arithmetical formulas like being an arith-
metical sentence, being a Π0n-formula, being a logical axiom or that a certain
formula can be obtained by the rules of generalization or modus ponens. All
this machinery combined provide us with two important applications. First,
with the help of the arithmetization of syntax, theories can be represented
within weak fragments of arithmetic by elementary formulas numbering
their axioms. These theories are the so-called elementarily presented theories:
Definition 1.1.2 (Elementarily presented theories). A theory U is elementarily
presented iff there is a bounded arithmetical formula σU(x) that defines the sets of
Go¨del numbers coding the axioms of U in the standard model of arithmetic. Given
elementary presented theories T and U, by T +U we denote the theory whose set of
axioms is defined by the formula σT(x) ∨ σU(x). By e(x) we denote the canonical
presentation of EA+.
EA+ and its extensions will be important throughout this thesis. How-
ever, we shall focus on extensions we can discuss from our base theory.
Thus, by a theory we shall mean an elementary presented first order theory
(with equality), formulated in LN and containing EA+. Via Craig’s trick, any
r.e. theory has an equivalent elementary presentation.
Another feature of the arithmetization of syntax is that allows us to de-
fine the predicate PrfT(x, y) meaning “x codes a proof of a formula y in
the theory T”. Moreover, this predicate can be expressed by an elementary
formula.
Go¨del’s provability predicate T(x) is defined as ∃yPrfT(y, x); an arith-
metical Σ01-formula expressing that there is x such that x codes a proof in T
of a formula with code y. By n we denote the numeral S(S(. . . S(0) . . .)) (n
times). Often, we writeT(ϕ(x˙)) instead ofT(pϕ(x˙)q), where pϕ(x˙1, . . . , x˙j)q
denotes the map sending n1, . . . , nk to the Go¨del number pϕ(n1, . . . , nj)q.
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The following proposition collects Lo¨b’s derivability conditions that pro-
vides an analysis of the basic properties of the provability predicate:
Proposition 1.1.3 (Lo¨b’s derivability conditions). For any sentences ϕ,ψ and
theory T:
L1. T ` ϕ =⇒ EA ` Tϕ;
L2. EA ` T
(
ϕ→ ψ)→ (Tϕ→ Tψ);
L3. EA ` Tϕ→ TTϕ.
Analogous conditions hold for formulas with free variables:
L′1. T ` ϕ(x) =⇒ EA ` Tϕ(x˙);
L′2. EA ` T
(
ϕ(x˙)→ ψ(x˙))→ (Tϕ(x˙)→ Tψ(x˙));
L′3. EA ` Tϕ(x˙)→ TTϕ(x˙);
L′4. EA ` T∀x ϕ(x)→ ∀xTϕ(x˙).
The following generalization of Go¨del’s famous second incompleteness
theorem is known as Lo¨b’s theorem.
Theorem 1.1.4 (Lo¨b’s theorem). For any elementarily presented theory T con-
taining EA and any sentence ϕ:
T ` Tϕ→ ϕ ⇐⇒ T ` ϕ.
Moreover, Lo¨b’s theorem can be formalized within EA. This formalized
version can be inferred from the non-formalized version:
Corollary 1.1.5 (Formalized Lo¨b’s theorem). For any sentence ϕ:
EA ` T
(
Tϕ→ ϕ
)→ Tϕ.
Proof. Let χ := T
(
Tϕ→ ϕ
)→ Tϕ. We reason as follows:
EA `
(
Tχ ∧T
(
Tϕ→ ϕ
))→ TT(Tϕ→ ϕ);
`
(
Tχ ∧T
(
Tϕ→ ϕ
))→ (TTϕ ∧ (TTϕ→ Tϕ));
`
(
Tχ ∧T
(
Tϕ→ ϕ
))→ Tϕ.
Thus, we have that
EA ` Tχ→ χ.
By monotonicity we get that T ` Tχ → χ. Hence, by Lo¨b’s theorem T ` χ
and so, EA ` Tχ. Thus, EA ` χ.
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By Con(T) we denote the formula expressing the consistency of the the-
ory T. This formula can be defined as Con(T) := ¬T0 = 1 or equivalently,
Con(T) := T0 = 1 → 0 = 1. Therefore, by substituting 0 = 1 for ϕ in
Lo¨b’s theorem, we obtain Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem as a corollary
(see [26]).
Theorem 1.1.6 (Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem). For any elementar-
ily presented theory T containing EA:
If T is consistent, then T 6` Con(T).
Moreover, if, in addition, T is Σ01-sound i.e. all Σ
0
1 theorems are true in
the standard model of arithmetic, then T 6` ¬Con(T).
Up to this point, we have seen that provability and consistency have their
own predicates that can be formalized within EA. This is not the case when
it comes to truth. By the Go¨del-Tarski undefinability theorem we know that
there is no formula Tr(x) such that for all sentences ϕ we have that:
EA ` ϕ↔ Tr(ϕ).
However, it is well known that for the classes Σ0n and Π0n-formulas we can
provide truth-definitions within EA.
Proposition 1.1.7 (Partial truth predicates). For any n<ω, there is an arith-
metical Σ0n-formula TrΣ0n(x) such that for all Σ
0
n-formulas ϕ(x1, . . . , xn):
EA ` ϕ(x1, . . . , xn)↔ TrΣ0n
(
ϕ(x˙1, . . . , x˙n)
)
.
The analogous result holds for Π0n-formulas.
With this partial truth definitions, we can talk about n-consistency and
so, about n-provability. For n≥ 1, by TrΠ0n(N) we denote the set of all true
arithmetical Π0n-sentences. For any arithmetical theory T, we shall say that
T is n-consistent iff T + TrΠ0n(N) is consistent. Furthermore, this notion can
be formalized within EA by the following Π0n+1-formula:
Conn(T) := ∀x
(
TrΠ0n(x)→ ¬T¬TrΠ0n(x)
)
.
The n-consistency of the theory T can equivalently (in EA) be expressed
(see e.g. [6]) by the arithmetical formula:
Conn(T) := ∀x ∈ Π0n+1
(
T(x)→ TrΠ0n+1(x)
)
where x ∈ Π0n+1 expresses that x is the Go¨del number of a Π0n+1 sentence.
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The dual n-provability formula:[
n
]
Tϕ := ¬Conn(T + ¬ϕ)
expresses the provability of ϕ in T with the help of all true Π0n-formulas.
For these new provability predicates we have the analogus properties of the
usual one. Thus, we have Lo¨b’s conditions and Lo¨b’s (formalized) theorem
for
[
n
]
T (see [6]). As we shall see, the notion of n-consistency will be the
key to graded Turing progressions and to introduce the motivation for the
Go¨del-Lo¨b’s polymodal logic (GLP).
1.2. Ordinals
In this section we shall introduce some basic features about ordinal num-
bers which are one of the key elements of this dissertation. Ordinal num-
bers are canonical representatives of well-orders. We can see ordinals as a
generalization of the natural numbers into the transfinite, used to describe
ordered collections of objects. In this sense, we can say that ordinal numbers
measure the length of well-ordered sets.
Let us start by recalling the notion of well-order. Given a set X, a preorder
on X is a reflexive and transitive relation on X. Moreover, a linear order is an
antisymmetric and total preorder. A total preorder where every non-empty
Y ⊆ X has a minimal element is a pre-well-order. We say that 〈X,4〉 is a
well-order if 4 is a linear pre-well-order.
The following definition introduces ordinal numbers as a particular case
of a well-ordered set.
Definition 1.2.1. We say that a set A is transitive if whenever B ∈ A, it follows
that B ⊆ A. Then, a set ξ is an ordinal if ξ is transitive and 〈ξ,∈〉 is a well-order.
From now on, we shall adopt the following notation: by Ord we denote
the class of ordinal numbers. Furthermore, given ordinals α, β, we shall
equally use α< β for α ∈ β and α≤ β if α< β or α = β.
The class of all ordinals, Ord , is well-ordered by ∈. Thus, for any ordinal
α, we have that α = {β ∈ Ord : β < ξ}, and 0 = ∅ is the least ordinal. There
are two basic operations that we can define on Ord . For α ∈ Ord by α+ 1 we
denote α ∪ {α}; that is the least ordinal greater than α. Therefore, starting
by 0 and iterating this operation, we can observe that any natural number is
an ordinal. Moreover, new ordinals can be formed by taking unions. Hence,
given Θ a set of ordinals, we have that λ =
⋃
Θ is an ordinal as well. Thus,
we also have infinite ordinals; the union of the set of natural numbers is
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itself an ordinal greater that each natural number. We denote this ordinal by
ω.
The following lemma summarizes these observations:
Lemma 1.2.2. For any α ∈ Ord exactly one of the following occurs:
1. α = 0;
2. there exists β such that α = β+ 1, in which case we say that α is a successor;
or
3. α =
⋃
β< α β, in which case we say that α is a limit.
By Succ we shall denote the class of successor ordinals and analogously,
Lim denotes the class of limit ordinals.
This generalization of the natural numbers also extends to the induc-
tion schema. Transfinite induction is an extension of regular mathematical
induction to well-ordered sets, and so, it can be applied to ordinal numbers.
Definition 1.2.3 (Transfinite induction). Let P be a property and X a well-
ordered set. We define the transfinite induction axiom for P by
∀α ∈ X (∀β< α P(β)→ P(α)) =⇒ ∀α ∈ X P(α).
It is worth mentioning that the principle of transfinite induction also
holds when considering the class Ord instead of X.
Order-types
As we have mentioned, a well-order X = 〈X,4〉 can be canonically rep-
resented by using an ordinal. To do this, we define o : X → Ord such that:
o(x) =
⋃
y≺x
(o(y) + 1).
We say that o(x) is order-type of x.The rank of X is then defined as supx∈X(o(x)+
1).
The following lemma is useful in characterizing the rank function [20].
Lemma 1.2.4. Let 〈X,4〉 be a well-order. Then o : X → Ord is the unique function
such that
1. x ≺ y implies that o(x) < o(y),
2. if ξ < o(x) then ξ = o(y) for some y ∈ X.
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Ordinal arithmetic
In the previous section we showed how to define the successor of any
given ordinal α. In this section we shall see how we can define the basic
arithmetic operations and outline some of their properties.
We shall start defining the addition function for ordinals. We do this by
transfinite recursion. As we can observe, this definition is analogous to the
one for the natural numbers, with the exception that now we consider an
extra step for limit ordinals.
Definition 1.2.5 (Ordinal addition). Given ordinals α, β, we define α + β by
recursion on β as follows:
1. α+ 0 = α;
2. α+ (β+ 1) = (α+ β) + 1;
3. α+ β =
⋃
δ< β
(α+ δ), for β ∈ Lim.
In a similar fashion we can define the product (α · β) and the exponenti-
ation (αβ).
The following lemma collects some observations about these arithmetic
operations.
Lemma 1.2.6. For any α, β, δ ∈ Ord:
1. (α+ β) + δ = α+ (β+ δ);
2. if α+ β = α+ δ, then β = δ;
3. α · (β+ δ) = α · β+ α · δ;
4. αβ · αδ = α(β+δ);
5. (αβ)δ = αβ·δ.
As a particular case of the exponentiation function, we have the mapping
α 7→ ωα. This function is the basis of the Cantor normal form representation
of ordinals:
Lemma 1.2.7 (Cantor normal form). For any α ∈ Ord with α> 0, there are
α0≥ α1≥ . . . ≥ αk for some k<ω such that:
α = ωα0 + . . .ωαk .
A non-zero ordinal α such that for any δ,γ< α we have that δ + γ< α
is called an additively indecomposable ordinal. These ordinals are exactly the
ordinals of the form ωβ for some β.
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Normal functions and hyper-exponentiation
The arithmetic operations defined in the previous section are examples of
normal functions, that is, functions f : Ord → Ord which are strictly increas-
ing and continuous, in the sense that if λ is a limit then f (λ) = supα< λ f (α).
This notion can be formalized as follows:
Definition 1.2.8. A function f : Ord→ Ord is normal iff:
1. f (α)< f (β) whenever α< β, and
2. f (λ) = supα< λ f (α) for λ ∈ Lim.
When f : X → X, it is natural and often useful to ask whether f has
fixed points, i.e., solutions to the equation x = f (x). In particular, normal
functions have many fixed points:
Proposition 1.2.9. Every normal function on Ord has arbitrarily large fixed points.
The first ordinal α such that α = ωα is the limit of the ω-sequence
〈ω,ωω,ωωω , . . .〉,
and is usually denoted ε0. Every ξ < ε0 can be written in terms of 0 us-
ing only addition and the function ω 7→ ωξ via its Cantor normal form.
The hyper-exponential function is then a natural transfinite iteration of the
ordinal exponential which remains normal after each iteration.
Definition 1.2.10 (Hyper-exponential functions). The hyper-exponential func-
tions (eζ)ζ∈Ord are the unique family of normal functions that satisfy
1. e1 = e,
2. eα+β = eα ◦ eβ for all α and β, and
3. if ( f ξ)ξ∈Ord is a family of functions satisfying 1 and 2, then for all α, β ∈ Ord,
eαβ≤ f αβ.
Ferna´ndez-Duque and Joosten proved that the hyperexponentials are
well-defined [22]. In [20] it is also shown that the function ξ 7→ eξ1 is it-
self a normal function, hence it has a least non-zero fixed point: this fixed
point is the Feferman-Schu¨tte ordinal, Γ0. Just like ordinals below ε0 may
be written using 0, addition, and ω-exponentiation, every ordinal below Γ0
may be written in terms of 0, 1, addition and the function (ξ, ζ) 7→ eξζ.
As the reader might notice, there is a close link between hyper-exponential
functions and the more standard Veblen functions. Notations using hyper-
exponentials or Veblen functions can be translated from one to the other
with the help of the following proposition that can be found in [20]:
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Proposition 1.2.11. Given ordinals α, β:
1. eα(0) = 0,
2. e1(1+ β) = ϕ0(1+ β),
3. eω
1+α
(1+ β) = ϕ1+α(β).
Ordinal notation systems
Broadly speaking, we can define an ordinal notation system for Λ as a way
of encoding ordinals by using finite sequences of an alphabet A. For this
presentation, we shall focus on representing ordinals as relations defined
over N. Furthermore, we are interested in ordinal notation systems with a
low arithmetical complexity.
We say Λ ∈ Ord is a recursive ordinal if there is D := 〈D,≺〉 such that
both D ⊆ N and ≺ are recursive, ≺ is a well-order in D and the rank of D
is Λ. Along this thesis, we shall focus on recursive ordinals within EA+. To
this purpose, we shall consider elementarily definable relations on N. An
elementary linear ordering is a structure D := 〈D,≺〉 where both, D and ≺ are
elementarily definable, D ⊆N and EA+ proves that ≺ linearly orders D. An
elementary well-ordering is an elementary linear ordering that is well-founded
in the standard model.
For the remainder of this dissertation we shall furthermore assume that
our elementary orders are nice in that the basic properties of and operations
on the elements of the ordering are available in EA+. As such we can view
the elements as ordinals, we can distinguish successor ordinals from limit
ordinals and perform the basic operations like addition, multiplication and
exponentiation.
1.3. Turing progressions
The well-known theorem of Go¨del shows that every system of logic is in a
certain sense incomplete, but at the same time it indicates means whereby
from a system L of logic a more complete system L′ may be obtained. By
repeating the process we get a sequence L, L1 = L′, L2 = L′1, . . . each more
complete than the preceding. A logic Lω may then be constructed in which the
provable theorems are the totality of theorems provable with the help of the
logics L, L1, L2, . . .. We may then form L2ω related to Lω the same may as Lω
was related to L. Proceeding in this way we can associate a system of logic with
any constructive ordinal. It may be asked whether such a sequence of logics of
this kind is complete in the sense that to any problem A there corresponds an
ordinal α such that A is solvable by means of the logic Lα.
Alan Turing
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After the impact of Go¨del’s incompleteness results, Alan Turing took the
first endeavor to overcome this situation. This attempt was the topic of his
PhD dissertation, published in 1939 under the title Systems of logics based on
ordinals [36].
The method proposed by Turing to try to deal with Go¨del’s incomplete-
ness is based on the natural idea of extending formal systems by iteratedly
adding these non-provable statements, such as the consistency of the system.
Furthermore, this construction can be carried out up to transfinite levels, be-
ing that given a sequence 〈Ln〉n∈N of formal systems, we can consider a new
system Lω :=
⋃
n∈N Ln by just taking the union of their axioms. Then this
iteration can be continued to Lω+1 as we did for the construction of the Ln’s
and so on. This process suggest a way of associating a formal system Lα to
any recursive ordinal α.
In particular, if we start this construction by taking as our base formal
system any sound r.e. arithmetical theory T that is sufficiently rich, we
can build the successor step Tα+1 by taking Tα together with the consistency
statement for Tα, Con
(
Tα
)
and therefore, by Go¨del’s second incompleteness
theorem, we obtain a hierarchy of theories of stronger strength. These hier-
archies are known as Turing progressions which nowadays are widely used
in proof theory and can serve the purpose of gauging the proof-theoretic
strength of mathematical theories that contain or interpret arithmetic. (See
e.g. [5].)
More formally, let us assume that we have fixed some recursive limit or-
dinal Λ together with a natural ordinal notation system for Λ that is elemen-
tary presented. Turing progressions are essentially defined by the following
three clauses.
T1. (T)0n := T where T is an initial or base theory;
T2. (T)α+1n := (T)αn ∪ {Conn
(
(T)αn
)};
T3. (T)λn :=
⋃
β<λ(T)
β
n, for λ a limit ordinal not exceeding Λ.
There are various ways one can define/present a series of theories that
satisfy these three clauses. Here we will consider smooth Turing progressions,
studied by Beklemishev in among others [6], [] and [1]. We give a slightly
different presentation.
Suppose we are given some elementary well-ordering (D,≺) and an ini-
tial theory T. The conditions T1-T3 can be reformulated by the following
unique clause:
(T)αn := T ∪ {Conn
(
(T)βn
)
: ≺ (β, α), β ∈ D} ∀α ∈ D, n<ω.
Note that there appears to be a circularity in this definition. Of course,
by means of the fixed point theorem (see [16]) we can find a formalization
of the definition within arithmetic.
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We say that τσ(z)n (α, x) enumerates the α-th theory of a progression based
on iteration of n-consistency along (D,≺) with base σ(z) if:
EA+ ` τσ(z)n (α, x) ↔
( (
e(x) ∨ σ(x)) ∨
∃β ( ≺ (β, α) ∧ x = pConn(τσ(z)n (β˙, y))q ) ).
The free variables of τσ(z)n (α, x) are x and α, where x is the Go¨del number
of a formula and α is the code of an ordinal. Recall that by our reading
conventions we have that Conn(τ
σ(z)
n (β˙, y)) denotes the n-consistency of the
theory axiomatized by τσ(z)n (β˙, y). Since the equivalence does not directly
refer to τσ(z)n (β˙, y) but rather to the Go¨del number of its n-consistency (that
is Conn(τ
σ(z)
n (β˙, y))), the existence of such τ
σ(z)
n (α, x) is guaranteed by the
fixed point theorem. Furthermore, in [2] and [4] it is shown that given
an elementary presented theory T and an elementary well-ordering (D,≺),
there is a unique progression (T)αn for n<ω and α ∈ D, modulo provable
equivalence in EA+. The proof of this result makes use of a trick coming
from the work of U. Schmerl [34], namely reflexive induction or sometimes
called reflexive transfinite induction.
Proposition 1.3.1 (Reflexive induction). For any p.r. well-ordering (D,≺), any
theory T containing EA+ is closed under the following reflexive induction rule:
T ` ∀α
(
T
(∀β ≺ α˙ ϕ(β)) → ϕ(α)) =⇒ T ` ∀αϕ(α).
Reflexive induction is our main tool for proving facts about Turing pro-
gressions. It may seem very tricky but it has a very simple proof and is in a
sense a direct consequence of Lo¨b’s theorem. Whenever we say that we are
going to prove that T proves ∀αϕ(α) by reflexive induction, we implicitly
say that we are going to show that in T we can prove
∀α
(
T
(∀β ≺ α˙ ϕ(β))→ ϕ(α)).
Further, we call the challenge of proving T ` ϕ(0) the base case, and for
given α, refer to the assumption in T that T
(∀β ≺ α˙ ϕ(β)), as the reflexive
induction hypothesis (RIH).
1.4. Provability Logic
Provability logics are modal systems in which the modal operators (
and ♦) are interpreted as provability predicates and consistency statements
for theories such as EA, EA+ or PA. The basic provability logic GL (Go¨del-
Lo¨b) is given in the language of propositional modal logic whose formulas
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are constructed from propositional variables, standard Boolean connectives
and a unary modal operator . GL is a normal modal logic, that is, the
theorems of GL contains all boolean tautologies and formulas of the form

(
ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ). Moreover, the theorems of GL are closed under
substitution and the inference rules of modus ponens and necessitation. The
smallest logic satisfying these conditions is the modal logic K. GL extends
K by adding the following axiom scheme:
(GL) 
(
ϕ→ ϕ)→ ϕ.
We can observe that this axiom scheme is a modal version of the formal-
ization of Lo¨bs theorem as expressed in Corollary 1.1.5, which makes GL a
suitable candidate to capture the behavior of the provability predicate. To
show that this is the case, we need to define a way to interpret modal for-
mulas as arithmetical statements. An arithmetical realization of the language
of GL for the theory T is a function ∗ that maps propositional variables to
arithmetical sentences. This can be naturally extended to any modal formula
ϕ. In particular, the modal operator  is mapped to the Go¨del provability
predicate T. Hence, we have the following:
(ϕ→ ψ)∗ = ϕ∗ → ψ∗;
(¬ϕ)∗ = ¬ϕ∗;
(ϕ)∗ = Tϕ∗.
Clearly, we can see that for each modal formula ϕ and any arithmetical
realization ∗, if GL ` ϕ then EA+ ` (ϕ)∗. The converse implication holds by
the arithmetical completeness theorem for GL due to Solovay [35]:
Theorem 1.4.1. For any elementarily presented theory T which is Σ01-sound and
contains EA we have that:
GL ` ϕ ⇐⇒ T ` (ϕ)∗, for every realization ∗ of the variables in ϕ.
Apart from arithmetical semantics, GL also has relational semantics which
provide a powerful tool to help us in the study of provability logic.
The relational semantics we shall discuss in this dissertation are un-
derstood in the usual way. A frame is a pair F = 〈W, R〉 consisting of a
nonempty set W together with R, a binary relation on W known as the ac-
cessibility relation. The elements of W are called worlds. A frame F = 〈W, R〉
is said to be finite iff W is finite. Moreover, sometimes F is said to have
some property of its corresponding accessibility relation e.g. F is reflexive
iff R ⊆ W2 is reflexive. A valuation v on a set W is a function v : W × Var→
{0, 1} where Var is the set of propositional variables. A valuation assigns
a truth value to each propositional variable at each world of W. A Kripke
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model is a triple M := 〈W, R, v〉 where 〈W, R〉 is a frame and v a valuation
on W. We say that a model is finite iff the frame on which is based is finite.
Analogously, we say that a model is reflexive, transitive, etc iff the the frame
on which is based is reflexive, transitive, etc.
For each modal formula ϕ, each modelM := 〈W, R, v〉 and each x ∈W,
we inductively define the relation
M, x  ϕ
as follows:
M, x  >;
M, x  p iff v(x, p) = 1, for p ∈ Var;
M, x  ¬ϕ iffM, x 6 ϕ;
M, x  ϕ ∧ ψ iffM, x  ϕ andM, x  ψ;
M, x  ϕ iff for all y ∈W such that xRy, we have thatM, y  ϕ.
The following theorem establishes the completeness of GL with respect
to finite, transitive and irreflexive models.
Theorem 1.4.2. For any formula ϕ:
GL ` ϕ ⇐⇒ ∀x ∈W, M, x  ϕ,
for every finite, transitive and irreflexive modelM := 〈W, R, v〉.
GLP
As we saw in Section 1.1, apart from consistency statements and the
standard provability predicate, we can define the notions of n-consistency
with their dual n-provability predicate. The logic that fully describes these
operators is GLPω; a polymodal version of GL wich contains modalities [ n ]
and 〈 n 〉 for each n<ω. This system was introduced by Japaridze in [31]
and later, extended to a class-sized logic by Beklemishev in [7] where for
each α ∈ Ord we have modalities 〈 α 〉 and [ α ].
Given Λ ∈ Ord , we can consider fragments GLPΛ of GLP by restricting
our signature to modalities [ α ] for α<Λ. The logic GLPΛ is then given by
the following rules and axioms:
1. all propositional tautologies,
2. [ α ](φ→ ψ)→ ([ α ]φ→ [ α ]ψ) for all α<Λ,
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3. [ α ]([ α ]φ→ φ)→ [ α ]φ for all α<Λ,
4. [ β ]φ→ [ α ]φ for β< α<Λ,
5. 〈 β 〉φ→ [ α ]〈 β 〉φ for β< α<Λ,
6. modus ponens and
7. necessitation for each [ α ].
GLPω is sound and complete with respect to its natural arithmetical re-
alization in terms of n-provability. Moreover, one of the main applications of
GLP is that its closed fragment can be used to perform a Π01-ordinal analysis
of PA and related systems [5]. On the other hand, the main disadvantage
of GLP or even the smallest polymodal fragment, GLP2, is that it is incom-
plete for its relational semantics. Without propositional variables, Ignatiev
built a relational model in which every consistent formula of variable-free
GLPω is satisfied [30], and Ferna´ndez-Duque and Joosten extended this to
variable-free GLP over the ordinals.
The Reflection Calculus
GLP gained much interest due to Beklemishev’s proof-theoretic applica-
tions [5]; however, from a modal logic point of view, it is not an easy system
to work with. To this end, in [17, 8, 9] Beklemishev and Dashkov introduced
the system called Reflection Calculus, RC, that axiomatizes the fragment of
GLPω consisting of unnested implications of strictly positive formulas. This
system is much simpler than GLPω but yet expressive enough to maintain
its main proof-theoretic applications.
Similar to GLPΛ, the signature of RCΛ contains modalities of the form
〈 α 〉 for α ∈ Λ. However, since this system only considers strictly positive
formulas, the signature does not contain negation, disjunction or modalities
[ α ]. Thus, the set of formulas FRCΛ in this signature is defined by the
following grammar:
ϕ := > | p | (ϕ ∧ ψ) | 〈 α 〉ϕ for α ∈ Λ.
Next we define a consequence relation over FRCΛ . For the purposes of
this presentation, a deductive calculus is a pair X = (FX,`X) such that FX
is some set, the language of X, and `X ⊆ FX × FX. We write ϕ ∼=X ψ for
ϕ `X ψ and ψ `X ϕ. We will omit the subscript X when this does not lead to
confusion, including in the definition below, where ` denotes `RCΛ .
Definition 1.4.3. Given an ordinal Λ, the calculus RCΛ over FRCΛ is given by the
following set of axioms and rules:
Axioms:
17
1. Preliminaries
1. ϕ ` ϕ, ϕ ` >;
2. ϕ ∧ ψ ` ϕ, ϕ ∧ ψ ` ψ;
3. 〈 α 〉〈 α 〉ϕ ` 〈 α 〉ϕ;
4. 〈 α 〉ϕ ` 〈 β 〉ϕ for α> β;
5. 〈 α 〉ϕ ∧ 〈 β 〉ψ ` 〈 α 〉(ϕ ∧ 〈 β 〉ψ)
for α> β.
Rules:
1. If ϕ ` ψ and ϕ ` χ, then ϕ ` ψ ∧ χ;
2. If ϕ ` ψ and ψ ` χ, then ϕ ` χ;
3. If ϕ ` ψ, then 〈 α 〉ϕ ` 〈 α 〉ψ;
The reflection calculus has natural arithmetical [25], Kripke [17, 9], alge-
braic [11] and topological [13, 19, 29, 30] interpretations for which it is sound
and complete, but in this dissertation we will work exclusively with reflec-
tion calculi from a syntactical perspective. Other variants of the reflection
calculus have been proposed, for example working exclusively with worms
[18] or allowing additional conservativity operators [15, 10].
This suffices to define the consistency ordering between worms, a crucial
ingredient in Beklemishev’s proof-theoretic analysis.
Worms and the consistency ordering
We review the consistency ordering between worms, along with some of
their basic properties.
Definition 1.4.4. Fix an ordinal Θ<Λ. The setWΘ of worms in FRCΛ is recur-
sively defined as follows:
1. > ∈WΘ;
2. If A ∈WΘ and α < Θ, then 〈 α 〉A ∈WΘ.
Similarly, we inductively define for each α ∈ Θ the set of worms W≥αΘ where all
ordinals are at least α:
1. > ∈W≥αΘ ;
2. If A ∈W≥αΘ and β ≥ α, then 〈 β 〉A ∈W≥αΘ .
Definition 1.4.5. Let A = 〈ξ1〉 . . . 〈ξn〉> and B = 〈ζ1〉 . . . 〈ζm〉> be worms.
Then, define AB = 〈ξ1〉 . . . 〈ξn〉〈ζ1〉 . . . 〈ζm〉>. Given an ordinal λ, define λ ↑ A
to be 〈λ+ ξ1〉 . . . 〈λ+ ξn〉>.
Often we will want to put an extra ordinal between two worms, and we
write B〈λ〉A for B(〈λ〉A). Next, we define the consistency ordering between
worms.
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Definition 1.4.6. Given ordinals β,Θ<Λ, we define a relation <β on W
≥β
Θ by
B<β A if and only if A ` 〈β〉B. We also define B≤β A if B<β A or B ∼= A.
The ordering ≤0 has some nice properties.
Theorem 1.4.7. For any ordinal Θ, the relation ≤0 is a pre-well-order on WΘ.
Note that ≤0 fails to be a linear order merely because it is not antisym-
metric. To get around this, one may instead consider worms modulo prov-
able equivalence. Alternately, as Beklemishev has done [7], one can choose
a canonical representative for each worm.
Definition 1.4.8 (Beklemishev Normal Form). A worm A ∈ W is defined re-
cursively to be in BNF if either
1. A = >, or
2. A := Ak〈 α 〉Ak−1〈 α 〉 . . . 〈α〉A0 with
α = minS(A);
k ≥ 1;
Ai ∈W≥α+1Λ , for i ≤ k;
such that Ai ∈ BNF and Ai+1≤α+1 Ai for each i < k.
This definition essentially mirrors that of Cantor normal forms for ordi-
nals. The following was proven in [7] and [12].
Theorem 1.4.9. Given any worm A there is a unique A′ ∈ BNF such that A ∼= A′.
Thus, with the help of BNF we have the following result:
Theorem 1.4.10. For any ordinal Θ, the relation ≤0 is a well-order onWΘ ∩BNF.
The consistency ordering between worms allows us to compute the order-
type of “finite” worms i.e. Wω. The elements of Wω provide an alternative
ordinal notation for ordinals up to ε0. Let us introduce first the following
operations on worms: ‘promotion’ (↑) and ‘demotion’ (↓).
Definition 1.4.11. Let ϕ ∈ FRCΛ and λ an ordinal. We define λ ↑ ϕ to be the
result of replacing every ordinal α appearing in ϕ by λ+ α. Similarly define λ ↓ ϕ
by replacing every occurrence of α by −λ+ α.
Now we can formulate a simple correspondence betweenWω ∩BNF and
the ordinals below ε0.
Theorem 1.4.12. The map o : Wω ∩ BNF→ ε0 is surjective and satisfies
1. o(>) = 0, and;
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2. o
(
(1 ↑ A)〈 0 〉B) = o(B) +ωo(A).
We can go further and consider worms which contain modalities with
transfinite ordinals as entries. Fortunately, Theorem 1.4.10 holds for any set
of worms, even those which have transfinite entries. Thus, we can extend
our previous theorem to all of W obtaining a complete calculus for o.
Theorem 1.4.13. Let A, B ∈W and α ∈ Ord:
1. o(>) = 0, and;
2. o
(
A〈 0 〉B) = o(B) + 1+ o(A);
3. o(α ↑ A) = eα(o(A)).
Finally, we mention a useful property of o proven in [20] where max A is
the greatest ordinal appearing in A.
Lemma 1.4.14. Let A 6= > be a worm and µ an ordinal. Then,
1. if µ≤ max A, then o(〈µ〉>)≤ o(A), and
2. if max A< µ, then o(A)< o(〈µ〉>).
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The Turing-Schmerl Calculus
In this Chapter we introduce a propositional modal language using or-
dinal modalities, which are modalities of the form 〈 nα 〉 where α ∈ Λ for
some fixed ordinal Λ and n ∈ ω (named exponent and base, respectively).
Also, we will introduce the system TSC (for Turing-Schmerl Calculus) in
this language.
First rank inhabitants of TSC are the so-called monomial normal forms
(MNF’s for short). We will show that each formula is equivalent to such a
MNF.
2.1. Signature and Ordinal Modalities
We shall work with the closed fragment of a strictly positive proposi-
tional modal signature. From now on, we use Λ to denote some fixed ordi-
nal. Moreover, if we shall speak of Λ in a formalized setting, we shall tacitly
assume that Λ is some elementary well-order the properties of which are
readily provable in a weak base theory. Further, we require some properties
of Λ that are collected in the following remark.
Remark 2.1.1. As we shall see in the axioms of our logic, they only make sense if
the ordinals occurring in them are available. As such, the usable closure conditions
on Λ naturally suggest themselves. Since it suffices to require that for n < ω
that α, β<Λ ⇒ α+ en(β)<Λ, we shall for the remainder assume that Λ is an
ε-number, that is, a fixpoint of e whence e(Λ) = Λ = ωΛ.
The modal signature we are going to work with consists of one constant
symbol >, one logical connective ∧ and a set of modal connectives M :=
{〈 nα 〉 : n<ω and α<Λ}, named ordinal modalities. We call n the base and α
the exponent. The set of formulas in this language is defined as follows:
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Definition 2.1.2. By FTSC we denote the smallest set such that:
i) > ∈ FTSC;
ii) If ϕ,ψ ∈ FTSC then (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∈ FTSC;
iii) If ϕ ∈ FTSC, n<ω and α<Λ then 〈 nα 〉ϕ ∈ FTSC.
In the next chapter we shall see how these formulas can be associated to
arithmetical theories in a natural way. To have some control over the nature
of these theories, for any formula ψ in the signature we define the following
two functions returning the set of base and exponent elements respectively
of any modality occurring in ψ. That is:
Definition 2.1.3. Given a formula ψ, by N-mod(ψ) we denote the set of natural
numbers corresponding to the base element in each modality that occurs in ψ, i.e.,
i) N-mod(>) = ∅;
ii) N-mod(ϕ ∧ ψ) = N-mod(ϕ) ∪ N-mod(ψ);
iii) N-mod(〈 nα 〉ψ) = {n} ∪ N-mod(ψ).
Analogously, by O-mod(ψ) we denote the set of ordinals below Λ corresponding
to the exponent element of each modality in ψ, i.e.,
i) O-mod(>) = ∅;
ii) O-mod(ϕ ∧ ψ) = O-mod(ϕ) ∪ O-mod(ψ);
iii) O-mod(〈 nα 〉ψ) = {α} ∪ O-mod(ψ).
Ordinal worms and restricted sets of formulas
Within FTSC we can find some special formulas, named Ordinal Worms
(OWs), which are defined as follows:
Definition 2.1.4 (Ordinal Worms, WOrd ). The set of OWs denoted by WOrd is
inductively defined as:
i) > ∈WOrd;
ii) if B ∈WOrd, then 〈 nα 〉 B ∈WOrd for any n<ω and α<Λ.
In order to control the complexity of the theories corresponding to our
formulas, for any n<ω we define the set of formulas F< n as follows:
Definition 2.1.5. F< n is the smallest set such that:
i) > ∈ F< n;
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ii) if ϕ, ψ ∈ F< n then (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∈ F< n;
iii) if ϕ ∈ F< n then 〈mβ 〉 ϕ ∈ F< n for all m< n and β<Λ.
This last set of formulas will have some special relevance when trying to
capture some conservativity results.
From now on, we let Greek letters α, β,γ, . . . denote ordinals below Λ,
Greek lower case in the middle of the alphabet like ϕ,ψ,χ denote formulas,
and capital latin letters A, B, C, . . . denote OWs. Also, given A ∈ WOrd of
the form 〈 nα00 〉 . . . 〈 nαkk 〉>, and ϕ ∈ FTSC by Aϕ we denote the formula ψ
obtained by the concatenation 〈 nα00 〉 . . . 〈 nαkk 〉 ϕ.
Monomial and increasing normal forms
In this subsection we consider two different kinds of special formu-
las named monomial normal forms and increasing normal forms. Formulas in
monomial normal form are used in the axiomatization of the calculus TSC
as introduced in the next section and play an important role in this thesis.
Later we will show that for every formula ψ in monomial normal form
there is a unique equivalent (modulo TSC) OW A in increasing normal form
and vice versa. Moreover, we shall show that for any formula ϕ in the above
signature, there is a unique equivalent ψ in monomial normal form. These
uniqueness claims shall be proved after proving the arithmetical soundness.
Definition 2.1.6. The set Mon of monomials is defined as the set of all OWs
obtained by a single iteration of an ordinal modality over >. Moreover, we shall
focus on those which have an exponent greater that zero i.e., Mon := { 〈 nα 〉> ∈
WOn : for some n<ω and 0< α<Λ }.
Monomial normal forms are conjuntions of monomials with an addi-
tional condition on the occuring exponents. To formulate this condition we
make use of the hyper-exponential functions introduced in Definition 1.2.10
of Chapter 1, Section 1.2.
Definition 2.1.7. The set of formulas in monomial normal form, MNF, is induc-
tively defined as follows:
i) > ∈ MNF;
ii) if A ∈ Mon then A ∈ MNF;
iii) if (a) 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉> ∈ MNF;
(b) n< n0;
(c) α is of the form en0−n(α0) · (2+ β) for some β<Λ,
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then 〈 nα 〉> ∧ 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉> ∈ MNF.
Thus, monomial normal forms are conjunctions of monomials where the
base of the modalities run in increasing order from left to right. The tech-
nical Item iii) (c) is there to ensure that only monomials are included in the
MNF if they add new information to the MNF that was not already implicit
by one of the other monomials.
Remark 2.1.8. We can observe that when we chop the left-most monomial of a
MNF, the resulting formula remains a MNF. Hence if 〈 nα 〉> ∧ ψ ∈ MNF, we
have that ψ ∈ MNF.
As we shall later see, there is another natural class of formulas that pro-
vides us with alternative normal forms. We define this set already here.
Definition 2.1.9. The set of formulas in increasing normal form, INF, is induc-
tively defined as follows:
i) > ∈ INF;
ii) if A ∈ Mon then A ∈ INF;
iii) if 〈mβ 〉A ∈ INF, n<m and 0< α, then 〈 nα 〉〈mβ 〉A ∈ INF.
2.2. The Turing-Schmerl Calculus
In this section we introduce the logic TSC in this modal language whose
main goal is to express valid relations that hold between the corresponding
Turing progressions.
We will use the following notation: by ϕ ≡ ψ we will denote that both
ϕ ` ψ and ψ ` ϕ are derivable. Analogously, by ϕ ≡n ψ we denote that for
any formula χ ∈ F<n+1, we have that ϕ ` χ iff ψ ` χ, i.e., ϕ and ψ share the
same F<n+1 consequences. Also, by convention we take that for any n, the
formula 〈 n0 〉ϕ is just ϕ.
Definition 2.2.1. TSC is given by the following set of axioms and rules:
Axioms:
1. ϕ ` ϕ, ϕ ` >;
2. ϕ ∧ ψ ` ϕ, ϕ ∧ ψ ` ψ;
3. Monotonicity axioms: 〈 nα 〉ϕ ` 〈 nβ 〉ϕ, for β≤ α;
4. Co-additivity axioms: 〈 nα+β 〉ϕ ≡ 〈 nβ 〉〈 nα 〉ϕ;
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5. Reduction axioms: 〈 (m + n)α 〉ϕ ` 〈men(α) 〉ϕ;
6. Schmerl axioms:
〈 nα 〉
(
〈 nα00 〉> ∧ ψ
)
≡ 〈 nen0−n(α0)·(1+α) 〉> ∧ 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ ψ
for n< n0 and 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ ψ ∈ MNF.
Rules:
1. If ϕ ` ψ and ϕ ` χ, then ϕ ` ψ ∧ χ;
2. If ϕ ` ψ and ψ ` χ, then ϕ ` χ;
3. If ϕ ` ψ, then 〈 nα 〉ϕ ` 〈 nα 〉ψ ;
4. If ϕ ` ψ, then 〈 nα 〉ϕ ∧ 〈mβ+1 〉ψ ` 〈 nα 〉
(
ϕ ∧ 〈mβ+1 〉ψ
)
for m< n.
It is worth mentioning the special character of Axioms 5 and 6 since
both axioms are modal formulations of principles related to Schmerl’s fine-
structure theorem, also known as Schmerl’s formulas (see [34] and [4]), that
we already mentioned in the introduction. These results are formulated
precisely in Proposition 3.2.5 of this thesis.
The following proposition expresses some useful properties that can be
easily proved.
Proposition 2.2.2. For any A ∈WOrd and ϕ,ψ ∈ FTSC:
1. If ϕ ` ψ, then Aϕ ` Aψ;
2. Aϕ ` ϕ ∧ A;
3. 〈 (m + n)α 〉ϕ ` 〈mα 〉ϕ;
4. 〈 nα 〉(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∧ 〈mβ+1 〉ϕ ≡ 〈 nα 〉(〈mβ+1 〉ϕ ∧ ψ) for m< n;
5. 〈 nα 〉ϕ ∧ ψ ≡ 〈 nα 〉(ϕ ∧ ψ) for ψ ∈ F<n and O-mod(ψ) ⊂ Succ.
Proof. The only non-trivial item is Item 5 which follows from a straight-
forward induction on the length of ψ using Rule 4.
2.3. Normal Forms
In this section we shall prove that any formula of FTSC is equivalent to
a formula in monomial normal for –MNF– and also equivalent to a formula
in increasing normal form, INF.
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Monomial normal forms versus increasing normal forms
In this subsection we prove that monomial normal forms and increasing
normal forms can easily be transformed into each other. Let us first observe
that for each MNF there is an equivalent INF that holds some similarities
with the original MNF. From now on we shall make use of the Euclidean
algorithm for ordinals. More precisely, for β, δ ∈ Lim, by βδ we denote the
unique α such that δ · α = β, if this exists.
Theorem 2.3.1. For every ψ ∈ MNF with ψ := 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ . . .∧ 〈 nαkk 〉>, there is
an ordinal worm A ∈ INF such that:
1. ψ ≡ A;
2. A := 〈 nβ00 〉 . . . 〈 nβkk 〉> where:
a) βk = αk and,
b) for all i, 0≤ i< k we have
βi = −1+ αieni+1−ni(αi+1) .
Proof. By induction on k. The base case is trivial and the inductive case
follows from the I.H. and the Schmerl axiom (Axiom 6). Note that by an
easy induction we see that the division is well-defined in virtue of Item (iii)
of Definition 2.1.7.
In particular, this theorem tells us that if we start out with a MNF ψ,
there is an equivalent INF ordinal worm A where the modality bases are the
same. The next theorem tells us that this feature of conserving the modality
bases also holds if we go from an ordinal worm A in INF to an equivalent
formula ψ in MNF.
Theorem 2.3.2. Let A := 〈 nβ00 〉 . . . 〈 nβkk 〉> ∈ INF. There is ψ ∈ MNF such that:
1. A ≡ ψ;
2. ψ := 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉> where
a) αk = βk and,
b) for all i, 0≤ i< k, αi = eni+1−ni(βi+1) · (1+ βi).
Proof. By induction on k, with the help of the Schmerl axiom (Axiom 6) for
the inductive case.
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The proofs of these theorems actually provide operations I and M to
go from a formula ψ in MNF to a corresponding I(ψ) in INF and from an
ordinal worm A in INF to a corresponding formulaM(A) in MNF.
Corollary 2.3.3. Given ψ := 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉> ∈ MNF and A of the form
〈 nβ00 〉 . . . 〈 nβkk 〉> ∈ INF, we have that:
M◦ I(ψ) = ψ;
I ◦M(A) = A;
If I(ψ) = A, then I(〈 nα11 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉>) = 〈 nβ11 〉 . . . 〈 nβkk 〉>.
Monomial normal forms are closed under conjunctions
In this subsection we will prove that MNF’s are closed under taking con-
junctions. A first step in doing so is established by the following lemma.
Lemma 2.3.4. Let ψ := 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉> ∈ MNF and n< n0. For any
β<Λ, there is ψ′ ∈ MNF such that:
〈 nβ 〉> ∧ ψ ≡ ψ′,
with N-mod(ψ′) ⊆ N-mod(〈 nβ 〉> ∧ ψ).
Proof. If β≤ en0−n(α0), clearly we can take ψ′ = ψ. Otherwise, let βCNF be
the Cantor normal form of β with base ω and we write βCNF := β0 + . . .+ βi
with each β j non-zero and additively indecomposable and β0≥ . . . ≥ βi.
If for all j with 0≤ j≤ i we have that β j≥ en0−n(α0) (or equivalently, if
βi≥ en0−n(α0)), then it easy to see that 〈 nβ 〉>∧ψ ∈ MNF. If on the contrary,
there is j with 0< j≤ i such that β j < en0−n(α0) and β j−1≥ en0−n(α0), then we
reason as follows:
〈 nβ 〉> ∧ ψ ≡ 〈 nβ 〉> ∧ 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ ψ;
≡ 〈 nβ0+...+βi 〉> ∧ 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ ψ;
` 〈 nβ0+...+β j−1+1 〉> ∧ 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ ψ;
` 〈 nα00 〉〈 nβ0+...+β j−1+1 〉> ∧ ψ;
` 〈 nen0−n(α0) 〉〈 nβ0+...+β j−1+1 〉> ∧ ψ;
` 〈 nβ0+...+β j−1+en0−n(α0) 〉> ∧ ψ.
However, by the monotonicity axiom (Axiom 3) we see that
〈 nβ0+...+β j−1+en0−n(α0) 〉> ` 〈 nβ 〉>
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so that actually 〈 nβ0+...+β j−1+en0−n(α0) 〉> ∧ ψ ≡ 〈 nβ 〉> ∧ ψ. Clearly we have
〈 nβ0+...+β j−1+en0−n(α0) 〉> ∧ ψ ∈ MNF
and we are done.
We can observe that, in any case, the modality bases occurring in ψ′
are contained in N-mod(〈 nβ 〉> ∧ ψ), and so, N-mod(ψ′) ⊆ N-mod(〈 nβ 〉> ∧
ψ).
We get the following simple corollaries.
Corollary 2.3.5. Any conjunction of monomials χ is equivalent to some ψ ∈ MNF
with N-mod(ψ) ⊆ N-mod(χ).
Proof. By the length of such a conjunction of monomials written with the
modality bases from small to large, applying Lemma 2.3.4 at the inductive
step.
We can recast this corollary as the first inductive step that each formula
is equivalent to a MNF.
Corollary 2.3.6. The monomials normal forms –MNF’s– are closed under conjunc-
tions.
In the light of this corollary, it only remains to show that MNF’s are
closed under putting an ordinal-diamond up front of them.
Monomial normal forms are closed under ordinal diamonds
We shall now see that the collection of monomial normal forms is, mod-
ulo provable equivalence, closed under putting ordinal diamonds up front
of them. Let us recall Schmerl’s axiom scheme:
〈 nα 〉
(
〈 nα00 〉> ∧ ψ
)
≡ 〈 nen0−n(α0)·(1+α) 〉> ∧ 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ ψ,
for n< n0 and 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ ψ ∈ MNF. We observe that this axiom tells us that
putting a relatively small (n< n0) non-trivial (α≥ 1) ordinal modality up
front a MNF 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ ψ yields a new MNF. To see that putting any ordinal
modality up front a MNF is equivalent to some other MNF, we need to study
two cases: n = n0 and n> n0. Let us start with the latter.
Proposition 2.3.7. Let n, n0 be natural numbers with n> n0. Furthermore, let
〈 nα00 〉> ∧ 〈 nα11 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉> with k≥ 0 be a conjunction of monomials not
necessarily in MNF. The following principle (we use PS for Pseudo Schmerl) is
derivable in TSC:
〈 nα 〉
(
〈 nα00 〉> ∧ 〈 nα11 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉>
)
≡ (PS1)
〈 nα0+en−n0 (α)0 〉> ∧ 〈 nα 〉
(
〈 nα11 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉>
)
.
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Note that for the case when k = 0, the formula 〈 nα11 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉> is to be
read as the empty conjunction which is > so that the principle becomes
〈 nα 〉〈 nα00 〉> ≡ 〈 nα0+e
n−n0 (α)
0 〉> ∧ 〈 nα 〉>.
Proof. For the right-to-left sequent, we apply the following reasoning:
〈 nα0+en−n0 (α)0 〉> ∧ 〈 nα 〉
(
〈 nα11 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉>
)
` 〈 nα0+10 〉> ∧ 〈 nα 〉
(
〈 nα11 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉>
)
;
` 〈 nα 〉
(
〈 nα0+10 〉> ∧ 〈 nα11 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉>
)
;
` 〈 nα 〉
(
〈 nα00 〉> ∧ 〈 nα11 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉>
)
.
For the left-to-right sequent we can reason as follows:
〈 nα 〉
(
〈 nα00 〉>∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉>
)
` 〈 nα 〉〈 nα00 〉> ∧ 〈 nα 〉
(
〈 nα11 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉>
)
;
` 〈 nen−n0 (α)0 〉〈 nα00 〉> ∧ 〈 nα 〉
(
〈 nα11 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉>
)
;
` 〈 nα0+en−n0 (α)0 〉> ∧ 〈 nα 〉
(
〈 nα11 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉>
)
.
We now turn to the remaining case when n = n0, that is, when we take a
Turing progression based on n0 consistency of a theory that is axiomatized
by a MNF whose smallest modality has base n0.
Proposition 2.3.8. Let 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉> ∈ MNF for k≥ 1. The following
principle (that we shall call Pseudo Schmerl 2) is derivable in TSC:
〈 nα0 〉
(
〈 nα00 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉>
)
(PS2)
≡ 〈 nα0+en1−n0 (α1)·α0 〉> ∧ 〈 nα0 〉
(
〈 nα11 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉>
)
;
≡ 〈 nα0+en1−n0 (α1)·α0 〉> ∧ 〈 nα11 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉>.
Proof. Note that by means of Theorem 2.3.1 together with the co-additivity
axiom (Axiom 4) we have that
〈 nα0 〉
(
〈 nα00 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉>
)
≡ 〈 nδ0+α0 〉〈 nδ11 〉 . . . 〈 nαkk 〉>
with δi = −1+ αieni+1−ni (αi+1) for 0≤ i< k. Thus, by Corollary 2.3.3 we get that:
〈 nδ0+α0 〉〈 nδ11 〉 . . . 〈 nαkk 〉> ≡ 〈 nδ0+α0 〉
(
〈 nα11 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉>
)
.
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Now, we apply the Schmerl axiom (Axiom 6) observing that
en1−n0(α1) · (1+ δ0 + α) = en1−n0(α1) · (1+ (−1+ α0en1−n0(α1) ) + α)
that is,
en1−n0(α1) · (1+ δ0 + α) = en1−n0(α1) · ( α0en1−n0(α1) + α) = α0 + e
n1−n0(α1) · α,
to conclude that
〈 nδ0+α0 〉〈 nδ11 〉 . . . 〈 nαkk 〉> ≡ 〈 nα0+e
n1−n0 (α1)·α
0 〉> ∧ 〈 nα11 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉>.
Thus,
〈 nα0 〉
(
〈 nα00 〉> ∧ . . .∧ 〈 nαkk 〉>
)
≡
〈 nα0+en1−n0 (α1)·α0 〉> ∧ 〈 nα11 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉>.
Since we have that 〈 nα0 〉
(
〈 nα00 〉>∧ . . .∧ 〈 nαkk 〉>
)
` 〈 nα0 〉
(
〈 nα11 〉>∧ . . .∧
〈 nαkk 〉>
)
and 〈 nα0 〉
(
〈 nα11 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉>
)
` 〈 nα11 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉>, we
also get that
〈 nα0 〉
(
〈 nα00 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉>
)
` 〈 nα0+en1−n0 (α1)·α0 〉> ∧ 〈 nα0 〉
(
〈 nα11 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉>
)
;
` 〈 nα0+en1−n0 (α1)·α0 〉> ∧ 〈 nα11 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉>,
which concludes the proof.
This proposition allows us to incorporate a small modality into a MNF
that starts with the same modality. We note that the degenerate version of
the proposition would be with k = 0 which is covered by the co-additivity
axiom (Axiom 4): 〈 nα0 〉〈 nα00 〉> ≡ 〈 nα0+α0 〉>.
Theorem 2.3.9. The set of MNF’s is, modulo provable equivalence, closed under
putting ordinal modalities up front.
Proof. For an arbitrary MNF 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉> and arbitrary ordinal
modality 〈 nα 〉 we have to see that 〈 nα 〉
(
〈 nα00 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉>
)
is equiva-
lent to some MNF. The proof follows directly from our earlier results.
By Pseudo Schmerl 1, Proposition 2.3.7, we can ‘pull’ the ordinal modal-
ity 〈 nα 〉 over the smaller ordinal modalities of 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉> until
n ≤ ni for some 0 ≤ i ≤ k.
In case n = ni we can apply (PS2) (or the co-additivity axiom (Axiom 4)
for the degenerate case) and we can apply directly Schmerl’s axiom when
n < ni. The result yields us a conjunction of monomials which by Corollary
2.3.5 we know is equivalent to some MNF.
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Each formula is equivalent to a normal form
In this subsection, we shall combine all the earlier results of this section
to obtain the, by now, simple corollary that every formula ϕ is equivalent to
a MNF formula. As a corollary we will obtain that ϕ is also equivalent to
an ordinal worm A in INF. However, to establish the uniqueness of MNF’s
and INF’s we need non-derivability results. And, without modal semantics,
the arithmetical soundness of the system is required. Hence, the uniqueness
will be discussed later.
Theorem 2.3.10. For every formula ϕ, there is ψ ∈ MNF such that ϕ ≡ ψ.
Proof. By induction on ϕ applying Corollary 2.3.6 and Theorem 2.3.9 for the
conjunctive and ordinal modality cases, respectively.
Consequently, we see that each formula also has an INF.
Corollary 2.3.11. For every formula ϕ, there is A ∈ INF such that ϕ ≡ A.
Proof. By combining Theorems 2.3.1 and 2.3.10.
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CHAPTER3
Arithmetical Semantics
We dedicate this chapter to introduce the arithmetical semantics of TSC.
First we shall make the link between our logic and graded Turing progres-
sions more precise by introducing the Formalized Turing Progression (FTP)
Interpretation that defines an arithmetical translation between modal formu-
las and arithmetical formulas. This allows us to fix an interpretation for the
modal sequents within EA+.
In Section 3.2 we prove the soundness of TSC with respect to this inter-
pretation. In Section 3.3, we prove some conservativity results and a char-
acterization for the derivability between MNF. With these results we prove
the arithmetical completeness of the system.
The content of this chapter can be found in [27].
3.1. Arithmetical interpretation of modal formulas
As we already mentioned in the introduction, we want our modal for-
mulas to directly denote arithmetical theories rather than individual arith-
metical sentences. Therefore, we interpret our modal formulae in terms of
the τ-formulae presented in Section 1.1 of Chapter 1. Moreover, the conjunc-
tion of modal formulas is intended to mean the union of theories. Hence,
we map the interpretation of modal conjunctions to the disjunction of the
respective interpretations.
Definition 3.1.1. An arithmetical interpretation for FTSC is a map ∗ : FTSC −→
FormLN inductively defined as follows:
1. (>)∗(x) = e(x);
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2. (ϕ ∧ ψ)∗(x) = (ϕ)∗(x) ∨ (ψ)∗(x);
3. (〈 nα 〉 ϕ)∗(x) = τϕ∗n (α, x).
Note that since FTSC has no propositional variables, we can identify a
modal formula with its arithmetical interpretation unambiguously and so
we will do in the remainder of this dissertation.
Definition 3.1.2. Given a numeration σ, by Thσ we denote the theory of σ. We
say that χ ∈ Thσ iff N |= σ(pχq).
For the sake of clarity, and since we are working in the closed fragment,
we will use the following notation: given ϕ ∈ FTSC by Thϕ we denote Thσ
where ϕ∗(x) = σ(x), following Definition 3.1.1. If ϕ∗(x) = e(x) we use just
EA+ instead of The. Also, if ϕ := 〈 nα 〉ψ we write (Thψ)αn for the theory of
(〈 nα 〉ψ)∗.
The Formalized Turing Progression Interpretation (FTP) is the represen-
tation of provable TSC sequents as the entailment between the correspond-
ing first order theories within EA+ via the Π02-sentence expressing such
derivability. Thus, given ϕ,ψ ∈ FTSC the intended interpretation of ϕ ` ψ is
the arithmetical statement:
EA+ ` ∀x (Thψ(x)→ Thϕ(x)).
Hereinafter, we will adopt the following notation: by T ⊆ U we denote
the arithmetical formula ∀x (T(x) → U(x)). Likewise, by T ≡ U, we
denote the formula ∀x (T(x)↔ U(x)) and T ≡n U stands for the formula
∀x ∈ Π0n+1
(
T(x)↔ U(x)
)
.
3.2. Arithmetical Soundness of TSC
In this section we shall prove that the logic TSC adequately describes
graded Turing progressions.
Before proving soundness of TSC under the FTP interpretation we will
present some useful facts and tools in this subsection. In Lemma 2.2 of [2] a
very simple yet very useful fact is shown: if a formula is provable in some
Turing progression, then it is provable in the base theory together with a
single consistency statement.
Lemma 3.2.1. Provably in EA+ we have that
∀α  0 ∀x
(
Tαn (x)→ ∃γ≺α T
(
Conn((T)
γ˙
n)→ x
))
.
The proof of this lemma is elementary as holds for the following.
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Lemma 3.2.2. Let T and U be theories extending EA. For any n, m<ω and
δ  α ≺ Λ, provably in EA+:
1. T ⊆ U → (Conn(U)→ Conn(T));
2. U ≡n T →
(
Conn(T)↔ Conn(U)
)
;
3. β  γ → (T)βn ⊆ (T)γn ;
4. Conn
(
(T)αm
)→ Conn((T)δm).
Proof. All items allow for elementary proofs. For example, reasoning infor-
mally in EA+, for Item 1, assume T ⊆ U and Conn(U). Now, let pi ∈ Π0n+1
such that Tpi. By assumption, Upi and by Conn(U) we get that Trn+1(pi)
as was to be shown. Item 2 goes analogously. Item 3 follows directly from
Lemma 3.2.1 and Item 4 follows from Item 1 together with the fact that
(T)δm ⊆ (T)αm.
In Chapter 1, Section 1.3 we presented Schmerl’s reflexive induction. With
this tool at hand, we have access to some form of transfinite induction even
if we cannot prove well-foundedness of the corresponding orderings within
the base theory. Let us, by way of example, proof with detail that stronger
theories yield stronger Turing progressions.
Lemma 3.2.3. Let T and U be theories extending EA+, n<ω and α ≺ Λ. Prov-
ably in EA+:
T ⊆ U → (T)αn ⊆ (U)αn.
Proof. We reason informally in EA+, assume T ⊆ U and use reflexive trans-
finite induction on α with the base case being trivial. Thus, for α  0,
consider an arbitrary formula χ such that (T)αnχ. Then, there is some
δ ≺ α such that T
(
Conn
(
(T)δn
) → χ). By the assumption that T ⊆ U
together with provable monotonicity of the provability operator, we get that
(U)αn
(
Conn((T)δn) → χ
)
. Moreover, we have that (U)αn Conn((U)
δ
n). Now,
by the RIH we know that EA+
(
(T)δn ⊆ (U)δn
)
so that along with Item 1 of
Lemma 3.2.2 under the EA+ we obtain (U)αn Conn((T)
δ
n) and consequently
(U)αnχ.
From now on we shall include less details in our proofs that employ
reflexive induction.
Lemma 3.2.4. Let T be any theory extending EA+ and σ ∈ Σ0n+1. The following
principles are provable in EA+:
1. Conn(T) ∧ σ→ Conn(T + σ);
2. (T + σ)αn ≡ (T)αn + σ;
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3. T + Conn
(
(T)αn
) ≡ (T)α+1n ;
4. Conn+1(T) → Conn(T);
5. (T)αn ⊆ (T)αn+m.
Proof. Items 1, 3 and 4 are easy to check. The right-to-left implication of
Item 2 is straightforward.
For the left-to-right implication we proceed by transfinite reflexive in-
duction with the base case being trivial. Thus, we reason in EA+, assume as
the RIH that EA+ ∀β≺α˙ ((T + σ)βn ⊆ (T)βn + σ), and let (T+σ)αnχ for some
arbitrary χ. Thus, ∃δ≺α T+σ
(
Conn
(
(T + σ)δn
)→ χ), and by monotonicity
∃δ≺α (T)αn+σ
(
Conn
(
(T + σ)δn
)→ χ). (3.1)
Notice that (T)αn+σ
(
Conn
(
(T)δn
) ∧ σ) so with the help of Item 1 we obtain
that (T)αn+σConn
(
(T)δn + σ
)
. By the RIH together with monotonicity, we get
that (T)αn+σ
(
(T + σ)δn ⊆ (T)δn + σ
)
. Combining this with Item 1 of Lemma
3.2.2 (under a box) we conclude that (T)αn+σConn
(
(T + σ)δn
)
. With the help
of 3.1 we finally get that (T)αn+σ χ.
Item 5 tells us that Turing progressions are monotone in the consistency
notion and follows from Item 4 from a straightforward reflexive transfinite
induction.
Our calculus will prove all the provable relations between the Turing
progressions that are considered in this dissertation. A first step and cor-
nerstone in this study is Proposition 3.2.5 below as was proven by Schmerl
in [34] for the base theory of primitive recursive arithmetic. Beklemishev
generalized this to the setting of EA+ with variable base theories. We cite
Beklemishev’s formulation here (Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 of [4]).
Proposition 3.2.5 (Fine-structure formula). Let T be an axiomatizable theory
which is a Π0n+2-axiomatized extension of EA, then provably in EA
+:
S1 ∀α  0
(
(T)αn+m ≡n (T)e
m(α)
n
)
;
S2 ∀β  0
((
(T)βn+m
)α
n ≡n (T)
em(β)·(1+α)
n
)
.
Soundness
In this subsection we shall show that TSC is sound for the FTP interpre-
tation. We first present the main simple argument and will then fill out the
missing details in the remainder of this subsection.
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Theorem 3.2.6 (Soundness). Given ϕ,ψ ∈ FTSC, if ϕ ` ψ then
EA+ ` ∀x (Thψ(x)→ Thϕ(x)).
Proof. By induction on the length of a TSC proof of ϕ ` ψ. Thus, we see that
all axioms are arithmetically sound and that all rules preserve provability.
The first three axioms and first two rules are easily seen to be arithmeti-
cally sound. In particular, Axiom 3 –〈 nα 〉ϕ ` 〈 nβ 〉ϕ for α ≥ β– expresses
the property that smooth Turing progressions are monotone in the ordinal
as expressed by Item 3 of Lemma 3.2.2. On the other hand, Rule 3 –if ϕ ` ψ,
then 〈 nα 〉ϕ ` 〈 nα 〉ψ– expresses the monotonicity of smooth Turing pro-
gressions in the base theory as reflected in Lemma 3.2.3. For a proof of the
soundness of the co-additivity axiom, Axiom 4, we refer to Lemma 2.6 of [2].
The remaining rule and the remaining two axioms are separately proven to
be sound in the remainder of this subsection.
We will start by looking at the remaining rule. Note that in proving the
soundness we may use the arithmetical counterpart of the modal axioms
and rules that we already have proven to be sound. Instead of talking every
time about the arithmetical counterpart of such rules and axioms, we will for
the sake of presentation simply speak about the modal rules and axioms. As
such, our proofs below will seem an amalgamate of modal and arithmetical
reasoning.
Lemma 3.2.7. Rule 4 is sound w.r.t. the FTP interpretation.
Proof. Let us recall Rule 4:
If ϕ ` ψ, then 〈 nα 〉ϕ ∧ 〈mβ+1 〉ψ ` 〈 nα 〉
(
ϕ ∧ 〈mβ+1 〉ψ
)
for m< n.
To prove the arithmetical soundness, we assume that provably in EA+ we
have Thψ ⊆ Thϕ. Consequently (Thψ + Thϕ) ⊆ Thϕ so that by Rule 3 we
obtain
(Thψ + Thϕ)
α
n ⊆ (Thϕ)αn. (3.2)
Also, we have the following provably in EA+:(
Thϕ + (Thψ)
β+1
m
)α
n
⊆
(
Thϕ + Thψ + Conm
(
(Thψ)
β
m
))α
n
,
and since Conm
(
(Thψ)
β
m
) ∈ Π0m+1 and Π0m+1 ⊂ Σ0n+1 we also have(
Thϕ + Thψ + Conm
(
(Thψ)
β
m
))α
n
⊆ (Thϕ + Thψ)αn + Conm((Thψ)βm).
Consequently, for any formula χ we have provably in EA+ that
(
Thϕ+(Thψ)
β+1
m
)α
n
χ −→ 
(Thϕ+Thψ)αn+ Conm((Thψ)
β
m)
χ .
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Now, by the formalized deduction theorem together with 3.2 we have
that for any formula χ that if 
(Thϕ+Thψ)αn+ Conm((Thψ)
β
m)
χ, then
(Thϕ)αn
(
Conm((Thψ)
β
m)→ χ
)
whence by monotonicity 
(Thϕ)αn + (Thψ)
β+1
m
(
Conm
(
(Thψ)
β
m
) → χ). In partic-
ular we get 
(Thϕ)αn + (Thψ)
β+1
m
χ as was to be shown.
We will now consider Axiom 5: 〈 (m + n)α 〉ϕ ` 〈men(α) 〉ϕ. It is easy
to see that we can reduce the arithmetical soundness of this axiom to the
arithmetical soundness of 〈 (n + 1)α 〉ϕ ` 〈 ne(α) 〉ϕ. Thus, we just check the
soundness of this principle with the help of the following proposition:
Proposition 3.2.8. Let ϕ(x) be any arithmetical formula. By Iϕ(n¯) we denote the
formula ϕ(0) ∧ ∀x
(
ϕ(x) → ϕ(s(x))) → ϕ(n¯). For any extension T of EA,
provably in EA+:
∀n T Iϕ(n¯).
Proof. Sketch: We consider the proof that combines ϕ(0) with ϕ(0) → ϕ(1)
to obtain ϕ(1) and so forth till arriving at ϕ(n¯) and observe that the Go¨del
number of this proof can be exponentially bounded in the Go¨del number of
ϕ.
The following lemma states a slightly stronger principle than the one
captured by Axiom 5 and thus suits the purpose of proving soundness.
Lemma 3.2.9. For any extension T of EA+, any ordinals α, β ≺ Λ and natural
number n, provably in EA+ we have:(
(T)βn
)e(α)
n ⊆
(
(T)βn
)α
n+1.
Proof. By reflexive transfinite induction on α with the base case being trivial.
Thus, reasoning in EA+, we assume
EA+ ∀γ≺α˙ ∀β
((
(T)βn
)e(γ)
n ⊆
(
(T)βn
)γ
n+1
)
as the RIH. We proceed by a case distinction on α.
If α ∈ Succ, i.e., α := δ + 1, let χ be some arbitrary formula such that
(
(T)βn
)e(δ+1)
n
χ. Note that e(δ+ 1) = e(δ) ·ω. Therefore we have
(
(T)βn
)e(δ+1)
n
χ −→ ∃m≺ω T
(
Conn
((
(T)βn
)e(δ)·m
n
)
→ χ
)
,
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and by monotonicity of provability we obtain
∃m≺ω (
(T)βn
)δ+1
n+1
(
Conn
((
(T)βn
)e(δ)·m
n
)
→ χ
)
.
Let θ(x) := Conn
((
(T)βn
)e(δ)·x˙
n
)
. We prove
∀m≺ω (
(T)βn
)δ+1
n+1
θ(m˙) (3.3)
by applying Proposition 3.2.8. Therefore, it suffices to show
(
(T)βn
)δ+1
n+1
(
θ(0) ∧ ∀x
(
θ(x)→ θ(s(x)))).
Clearly (
(T)βn
)δ+1
n+1
Conn(T), that is, (
(T)βn
)δ+1
n+1
θ(0). We only need to check
that
(
(T)βn
)δ+1
n+1
∀x
(
θ(x)→ θ(s(x))).
For this purpose, assume (
(T)βn
)δ+1
n+1
Conn
((
(T)βn
)e(δ)·m
n
)
and set out to prove
(
(T)βn
)δ+1
n+1
Conn
((
(T)βn
)e(δ)·(m+1)
n
)
. Hence, we have that
(
(T)βn
)δ+1
n+1
(
Conn
((
(T)βn
)e(δ)·m
n
)
∧Conn+1
((
(T)βn
)δ
n+1
))
.
By Lemmas 3.2.4 and 3.2.2 we can push the small consistency inside the
bigger ones and obtain
(
(T)βn
)δ+1
n+1
Conn+1
(((
(T)βn
)e(δ)·m
n
)δ
n+1
)
. (3.4)
We note that
(
(T)βn
)e(δ)·m
n ≡ (T)
β+e(δ)·m
n and by the RIH we have that
(
(T)βn
)δ+1
n+1
((
(T)β+e(δ)·mn
)e(δ)
n ⊆
(
(T)β+e(δ)·mn
)δ
n+1
)
.
Thus, (
(T)βn
)δ+1
n+1
Conn+1
((
(T)β+e(δ)·mn
)e(δ)
n
)
, and by monotonicity
(
(T)βn
)δ+1
n+1
Conn
((
(T)β+e(δ)·mn
)e(δ)
n
)
.
We can observe that
(
(T)β+e(δ)·mn
)e(δ)
n ≡
(
(T)βn
)e(δ)·(m+1)
n . Therefore, we have
that (
(T)βn
)δ+1
n+1
Conn
((
(T)βn
)e(δ)·(m+1)
n
)
as required.
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In the case that α ∈ Lim we assume (
((T)βn
)e(α)
n
χ. Since e is a continuous
function, as before we have that
∃δ≺α T
(
Conn
((
(T)βn
)e(δ)
n
)→ χ).
By monotonicity we obtain for this δ that
(
(T)βn
)α
n+1
(
Conn
((
(T)βn
)e(δ)
n
)→ χ).
Since (
(T)βn
)α
n+1
Conn
((
(T)βn
)δ
n+1
)
by the RIH we get
(
(T)βn
)α
n+1
Conn
((
(T)βn
)e(δ)
n
)
so that (
(T)βn
)α
n+1
χ.
Corollary 3.2.10. Axiom 5 is sound.
Proof. This follows directly from the previous lemma by taking β = 0.
Before we are going to prove the soundness of the Schmerl axioms, we
first need some observations to the extent that for sufficiently similar base
theories, their corresponding Turing progressions will be similar as well.
Lemma 3.2.11. For any theories T and U extending EA, 0<m and α ≺ Λ, if,
provably in EA+, T ≡n+m U, then
EA+ ` Conn
(
(T)αn
)↔ Conn((U)αn).
Proof. For reasoning in EA+, suppose that T ≡n+m U. By reflexive transfinite
induction on α. Since base case is trivial, we check the Lemma for α  0.
Thus, assume as RIH that EA+ ∀β≺α˙
(
Conn
(
(T)βn
)↔ Conn((U)βn)).
For the left-to-right implication, assume Conn
(
(T)αn
)
and assume for pi ∈
Π0n+1, (U)αnpi. Thus, U
(
Conn
(
(U)δn
)→ pi) for δ ≺ α. Since pi ∈ Π0n+1 and
n< n + m, by assumption, T
(
Conn
(
(U)δn
)→ pi) and by monotonicity,
(T)αn
(
Conn
(
(U)δn
)→ pi).
Observe that (T)αn Conn
(
(T)δn
)
, and since by monotonicity the RIH holds
provably in (T)αn, we conclude that (T)αnpi. For the other other implication
we reason analogously.
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With this previous result, we can establish the following corollary about
the conservativity between Turing progressions built up from sufficiently
similar base theories.
Corollary 3.2.12. For any theories T and U extending EA, any m> 0 and any
ordinal α<Λ,
EA+ ` T ≡n+m U =⇒ EA+ `
(
T
)α
n ≡n
(
U
)α
n.
Proof. For reasoning in EA+, suppose that T ≡n+m U. Let pi ∈ Π0n+1 and
assume (T)αnpi for some arbitrary α. Thus,
∃δ≺α T
(
Conn
(
(T)δn
)→ pi ).
By assumption together with monotonicity, we have that
(U)αn
( (
Conn
(
(T)δn
)→ pi ) ∧ Conn((U)δn) ).
Therefore, by previous lemma, (U)αn Conn
(
(T)δn
)
and so (U)αnpi. For the
other inclusion we reason analogously.
We can now prove that the smallest term of an MNF captures all the
small consistency strength that is implied by the entire MNF.
Lemma 3.2.13. Let ψ := 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉> ∈ MNF. We then have that
provably in EA+:
Thψ ≡n0 (EA+)α0n0 .
Proof. By induction on k with base case being trivial. For the inductive step,
let ψ′ := 〈 nα11 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉> ∈ MNF and ψ := 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ ψ′ ∈ MNF.
Notice that the right-to-left inclusion is straightforward so we just check
the left-to-right direction. Reasoning in EA+, suppose that Thψpi for some
pi ∈ Π0n0+1. Thus, Thψ′
(
Conn0
(
(EA+)δn0
) → pi) for some δ ≺ α0. Notice
that (
Conn0
(
(EA+)δn0
) → pi) ∈ Π0n0+2
whence also in Π0n1+1 so that by the external induction on k we get that
(EA+)α1n1
(
Conn0
(
(EA+)δn0
) → pi). By monotonicity it follows that

((EA+)
α1
n1 )
β0
n0
(
Conn0
(
(EA+)δn0
) → pi)
for β0 so that α0 = en1−n0(α1) · (1 + β0). Notice that by Schmerl’s fine-
structure formula (Item 3.2.5 of Proposition 3.2.5) together with the facts that
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δ ≺ α0 and Conn0
(
(EA+)δn0
) ∈ Π0n0+1, we get that((EA+)α1n1 )β0n0 Conn0((EA+)δn0)
and so, 
((EA+)
α1
n1 )
β0
n0
pi. Applying Schmerl’s fine-structure formula again we
get that (EA+)α0n0pi.
The lemma can be easily generalized to conclude that initial truncations
of an MNF provide optimal approximations of the entire MNF.
Lemma 3.2.14. Let ψ := 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉> ∈ MNF. We then have for any
j≤ k that provably in EA+:
Thψ ≡nj (EA+)α0n0 ∧ . . . ∧ (EA+)
αj
nj .
Proof. The right-to-left implication is straightforward. For the other impli-
cation, we make the following case distinction on j. If j = 0, then it follows
from Lemma 3.2.13. If j 6= 0, for reasoning within EA+, let pi ∈ Π0nj+1 such
that Thψpi. By the formalized deduction theorem we get that

(EA+)
αj
nj+...+(EA
+)
αk
nk
( ∧
0≤ i< j
Conni
(
(EA+)
βi
ni
)→ pi)
for some sequence of βi ≺ αi. Notice that each Conni
(
(EA+)
βi
ni
) ∈ Π0ni+1 with
ni < nj. Therefore,
(∧
0≤ i< j′ Conni
(
(EA+)
βi
ni
)→ pi) ∈ Π0nj+1.
Also, notice that 〈 nαjj 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉> ∈ MNF. Thus, applying Lemma
3.2.13, we obtain that

(EA+)
αj
nj
( ∧
0≤ i< j
Conni
(
(EA+)
βi
ni
)→ pi)
and by monotonicity,

(EA+)
α0
n0+...+(EA
+)
αj
nj
( ∧
0≤ i< j
Conni
(
(EA+)
βi
ni
)→ pi).
Finally, we have that 
(EA+)
α0
n0+...+(EA
+)
αj
nj
∧
0≤ i< j Conni
(
(EA+)
βi
ni
)
since βi ≺
αi for each i, 0≤ i< j. Therefore, we can conclude that

(EA+)
α0
n0+...+(EA
+)
αj
nj
pi.
We are now ready to prove the soundness of our more complicated ax-
iom.
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Lemma 3.2.15. Schmerl’s axioms –Axiom 6– is sound. That is,
〈 nα 〉
(
〈 nα00 〉> ∧ ψ
)
≡ 〈 nen0−n(α0)·(1+α) 〉> ∧ 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ ψ
for n< n0 and 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ ψ ∈ MNF.
Proof. Let ψ′ := 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ ψ. Thus, by the previous lemma we have that
EA+ ` Thψ′ ≡n0 (EA+)α0n0 ,
and then, since n< n0, by Corollary 3.2.12 we get that
EA+ ` (Thψ′)αn ≡n ((EA+)α0n0)αn.
Thus, applying Schmerl’s fine-structure formula (Proposition 3.2.5, Item
3.2.5), we have that EA+ ` (Thψ′)αn ≡n (EA+)en0−n(α0)·(1+α)n .
To check the soundness of Axioms 6, we need to see that provably in
EA+:
(
Thψ′
)α
n ≡
(
EA+
)en0−n(α0)·(1+α)
n + Thψ′ . For the right-to-left inclusion,
suppose that (
EA+
)en0−n(α0)·(1+α)
n
+Thψ′
ϕ for some formula ϕ of arbitrary com-
plexity. Therefore, by the formalized deduction theorem,
∃δ≺en0−n(α0) · (1+ α) Thψ′
(
Conn
(
(EA+)δn
) → ϕ).
Hence, by monotonicity, (
Thψ′
)α
n
(
Conn
(
(EA+)δn
) → ϕ). Since we have
that provably in EA+,
(
Thψ′
)α
n ≡n
(
EA+
)en0−n(α0)·(1+α)
n , that Conn
(
(EA+)δn
) ∈
Π0n+1 and that δ ≺ en0−n(α0) · (1 + α), we get that (Thψ′)αn Conn((EA+)δn)
and so, (
Thψ′
)α
n
ϕ.
For the left-to-right inclusion, assume (
Thψ′
)α
n
ϕ for some ϕ. Then, by
the formalized deduction theorem, Thψ′
(
Conn
(
(Thψ′)
δ
n
) → ϕ) for some
δ ≺ α and by monotonicity, (
EA+
)en0−n(α0)·(1+α)
n
+Thψ′
(
Conn
(
(Thψ′)
δ
n
) → ϕ).
Since we have that Conn
(
(Thψ′)
δ
n
) ∈ Π0n+1, that (Thψ′ )αn Conn((Thψ′)δn) and
that provably in EA+, (
Thψ′
)α
n ≡n
(
EA+
)en0−n(α0)·(1+α)
n
and (
EA+
)en0−n(α0)·(1+α)
n ⊆
(
EA+
)en0−n(α0)·(1+α)
n + Thψ′ ,
then, we have that (
EA+
)en0−n(α0)·(1+α)
n
+Thψ′
Conn
(
(Thψ′)
δ
n
)
and this way, we
get that(
EA+
)en0−n(α0)·(1+α)
n
+Thψ′
ϕ. This concludes the proof of the lemma.
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3.3. Completeness of TSC
In this section, we shall prove the uniqueness of MNF’s (Theorem 3.3.6)
together with some important facts that characterize the derivability in TSC.
With these results we shall show the completeness of our system in Theorem
3.3.13.
Conservativity and uniqueness of MNF’s
The following corollary is a result of combining arithmetical soundness
of TSC together with Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem.
Corollary 3.3.1. For any formula ϕ ∈ FTSC, n<ω and 0< α<Λ, the sequent
ϕ ` 〈 nα 〉ϕ is not derivable in TSC.
As we shall see, this corollary is the only tool needed to obtain the re-
quired results on non-derivability. Many of the results that we will prove
below can be proven in a shorter fashion using the soundness theorem.
Moreover, Corollary 3.3.1 can also be obtained via relational semantics as
we will show in the following chapter.
The following result is an application of Corollary 3.3.1.
Proposition 3.3.2. Let ψ := 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉> ∈ MNF. For any i with
0≤ i≤ k the sequent ψ ` 〈 nαi+1i 〉> is not derivable.
Proof. If k = 0 then the result follows directly from a combination of Axiom
4 and Corollary 3.3.1. For k> 0, assume ψ ` 〈 nαi+1i 〉> and reason as follows:
〈 n1i 〉ψ ` 〈 nα0+10 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 n1i 〉〈 nαi+1i 〉> by (PS1) and monotonicity;
` 〈 nαi+2i 〉〈 nα0+10 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 n2i 〉〈 nαii 〉> by Axiom 4 and
Proposition 2.2.2, Item 4;
` 〈 n2i 〉〈 nα0+10 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 n2i 〉〈 nαii 〉> by monotonicity;
` 〈 nα0+eni−n0 (2)0 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 n2i 〉〈 nαii 〉> by Axioms 5 and 4.
Therefore, in case i = k, by (PS1) we get that 〈 n1i 〉ψ ` 〈 n2i 〉ψ which by
means of Corollary 3.3.1 makes the sequent ψ ` 〈 nαk+1k 〉> not derivable. If
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i< k, we can make the following observation:
〈 n1i 〉ψ ` 〈 n1i 〉
(
〈 nαi+1i 〉> ∧ 〈 nαi+1i+1 〉>
)
;
` 〈 n1i 〉
(
〈 nαi+1i+1 〉〈 nαi+1i 〉> ∧ 〈 nαi+1i+1 〉>
)
by Proposition 2.2.2, Item 4;
` 〈 n1i 〉
(
〈 nαi+eni+1−ni (αi+1)i 〉> ∧ 〈 nαi+1i+1 〉>
)
by Axiom 5 and Axiom 4;
` 〈 nαi+eni+1−ni (αi+1)+1i 〉> ∧ 〈 nαi+1i+1 〉> by Axiom 4;
` 〈 nαi+1i+1 〉〈 nαi+e
ni+1−ni (αi+1)+1
i 〉> ∧ 〈 nαi+1i+1 〉>
by Proposition 2.2.2, Item 4;
` 〈 nαi+eni+1−ni (αi+1)·2i 〉> ∧ 〈 nαi+1i+1 〉> by Axiom 5 and Axiom 4;
` 〈 nαi+eni+1−ni (αi+1)·2i 〉> ∧ 〈 nαi+1i+1 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉>
` 〈 n2i 〉
(
〈 nαii 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉>
)
by (PS2).
Combining this result with previous reasoning we have that
〈 n1i 〉ψ ` 〈 nα0+e
ni−n(2)
0 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 n2i 〉
(
〈 nαii 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉>
)
and then, by (PS1) we get that 〈 n1i 〉ψ ` 〈 n2i 〉ψ. Hence, by Corollary 3.3.1
we obtain that the sequent ψ ` 〈 nαi+1i 〉> is not derivable.
The next proposition tells us in a sense that we are justified to not nec-
essarily enlist consecutive modalities in MNF’s. For the sake of clarity let us
introduce the following definition.
Definition 3.3.3. Let ψ := 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉> ∈ MNF and n≤ nk. By
µ(n,ψ) we denote the least upper bound of n in N-mod(ψ) defined as:
µ(n,ψ) = min{m ∈ N-mod(ψ) : m≥ n}.
Proposition 3.3.4. Let ψ := 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉> ∈ MNF. For any n≤ nk
and µ(n,ψ) = nJ , the following rules are derivable in TSC:
(B1) If ψ ` 〈mβ 〉> for m> nk and β> 0, then 〈 n1k 〉ψ ` 〈 ne
m−nk (β)
k 〉ψ;
(B2) If ψ ` 〈 nγ 〉> for γ> enJ−n(αJ), then 〈 n1J 〉ψ ` 〈 n2J 〉ψ;
Proof. For a proof of (B1), suppose that ψ ` 〈mβ 〉> for some m> nk. Thus,
we reason as follows:
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〈 n1k 〉ψ ` 〈 n1k 〉
(
〈 nα00 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉>
)
∧ 〈mβ 〉>;
` 〈 nα0+enk−n0 (1)0 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 n1k 〉〈 nαkk 〉> ∧ 〈mβ 〉> by (PS1) ;
` 〈 nα0+enk−n0 (1)0 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαk+1k 〉> ∧ 〈mβ 〉> by Axiom 4;
` 〈 nα0+10 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαk+1k 〉> ∧ 〈mβ 〉> by Axiom 3;
Notice that by Proposition 2.2.2, Item 4:
〈 nα0+10 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαk+1k 〉> ∧ 〈mβ 〉> `
〈 nα0+10 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈mβ 〉〈 nαk+1k 〉> ∧ 〈mβ 〉>.
Thus, by a combination of Axioms 5 and 4 together with the previous fact
we obtain that 〈 n1k 〉ψ ` 〈 nα0+10 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαk+e
m−nk (β)
k 〉> ∧ 〈mβ 〉>.
Applying successively Proposition 2.2.2, Item 4 we get that
〈 n1k 〉ψ ` 〈 nαk+e
m−nk (β)
k 〉〈 nα0+10 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαk+e
m−nk (β)
k 〉> ∧ 〈mβ 〉>,
and combining Axioms 5 and 4:
〈 n1k 〉ψ ` 〈 n
α0+enk−n0
(
αk+em−nk (β)
)
0 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαk+e
m−nk (β)
k 〉>
and so, by monotonicity
〈 n1k 〉ψ ` 〈 n
α0+enk−n0
(
em−nk (β)
)
0 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαk+e
m−nk (β)
k 〉>.
Finally, by successively applying (PS1) we get that 〈 n1k 〉ψ ` 〈 ne
m−nk (β)
k 〉ψ.
Since β > 0 and m > nk we see that em−nk(β) ∈ lim so that 1 + em−nk(β) =
em−nk(β) whence, by Axiom 4, 〈 nem−nk (β)k 〉ψ ≡ 〈 ne
m−nk (β)
k 〉〈 n1k 〉ψ and so,
〈 n1k 〉ψ ` 〈 ne
m−nk (β)
k 〉〈 n1k 〉ψ.
As pointed out, this yields a contradiction with Go¨del II as reflected in
Corollary 3.3.1.
As for (B2), for n = nJ the rule is trivially admissible since the antecedent
is not derivable because of Proposition 3.3.2. Thus, we just check the case
where n< nJ .
Assume ψ ` 〈 nγ 〉> for some γ> enJ−n(αJ). Therefore, by Axiom 3 we
get that ψ ` 〈 nenJ−n(αJ)+1 〉> ∧ 〈 nαJJ 〉> and so, by Proposition 2.2.2, Item 4,
ψ ` 〈 nαJJ 〉〈 ne
nJ−n(αJ)+1 〉>.
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By a combination of Axioms 5 and 4, ψ ` 〈 nenJ−n(αJ)·2 〉> and hence,
〈 n1 〉ψ ` 〈 nenJ−n(αJ)·2+1 〉> ∧ 〈 nαJJ 〉>.
By Proposition 2.2.2, Item 4, combined with Axioms 5 and 4,
〈 n1 〉ψ ` 〈 nenJ−n(αJ)·3 〉>. (3.5)
By (PS1) and Axiom 6, we have that
〈 n1 〉ψ ` 〈 nα0+en−n0 (1)0 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 ne
nJ−n(αJ)·2 〉> ∧ 〈 nαJJ 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉>.
This combined with (3.5) give us that
〈 n1 〉ψ ` 〈 nα0+en−n0 (1)0 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 ne
nJ−n(αJ)·3 〉> ∧ 〈 nαJJ 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉>.
Now we can reason as follows:
〈 n1 〉ψ ` 〈 nα0+en−n0 (1)0 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ ne
nJ−n(αJ)·3 〉>∧
〈 nαJJ 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉>;
` 〈 nα0+10 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 ne
nJ−n(αJ)·3 〉>∧
〈 nαJJ 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉> by monotonicity;
` 〈 nenJ−n(αJ)·3 〉〈 nα0+10 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 ne
nJ−n(αJ)·3 〉>∧
〈 nαJJ 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉> by Proposition 2.2.2, Item 4;
` 〈 n2 〉〈 nα0+10 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 ne
nJ−n(αJ)·3 〉>∧
〈 nαJJ 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉> by monotonicity;
` 〈 n2 〉〈 nα0+10 〉> ∧ . . .∧
〈 n2 〉
(
〈 nαJJ 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉>
)
by Axiom 6;
` 〈 nα0+en−n0 (2)0 〉> ∧ . . .∧
〈 n2 〉
(
〈 nαJJ 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉>
)
by Axioms 5 and 4;
` 〈 n2 〉
(
〈 nα00 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαJJ 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉>
)
by (PS1);
` 〈 n2 〉ψ.
We may observe that this result yields a contradiction with Go¨del II, that is,
Corollary 3.3.1. Hence, we obtain that if ψ ` 〈 nγ 〉>, then γ≤ enJ−n(αJ).
The following corollary gathers some immediate consequences of Rules
(B1) and (B2) together with Corollary 3.3.1.
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Corollary 3.3.5. Let ψ := 〈 nα00 〉>∧ . . .∧〈 nαkk 〉> ∈ MNF, n≤ nk and µ(n,ψ) =
nJ
1. If ψ ` 〈mβ 〉> for some β> 0, then m≤ nk;
2. If ψ ` 〈 nβi 〉> for ni ∈ N-mod(ψ), then β≤ αi;
3. If ψ ` 〈 nδi 〉> for ni ∈ N-mod(ψ), then 〈 nαii 〉> ` 〈 nδi 〉>;
4. If ψ ` 〈 nγ 〉> for n 6∈ N-mod(ψ), then 〈 nαJJ 〉> ` 〈 nγ 〉>.
With these results, we can now obtain uniqueness of our MNF’s.
Theorem 3.3.6. Given ψ1,ψ2 ∈ MNF, if ψ1 ≡ ψ2 then ψ1 = ψ2.
Proof. This now follows by an easy induction on the number of monomials
in an MNF by the previous results.
This last theorem can be combined with Theorem 2.3.10 obtaining the
next corollary.
Corollary 3.3.7. For every formula ϕ there is a unique ψ ∈ MNF such that ϕ ≡ ψ.
The uniqueness of MNF’s will be key in proving completeness. It also
has a couple of other nice corollaries.
Corollary 3.3.8. Each formula has a unique INF.
Corollary 3.3.9. Let ϕ ∈ F<n for some n, and ψ ∈ MNF such that ϕ ≡ ψ. Then
ψ ∈ F<n.
Proof. As we have seen in Section 2.3, there is a procedure by which any
formula ϕ can be reduced to an equivalent ψϕ ∈ MNF that only contains
modality bases occurring in ϕ, and so ψϕ ∈ F<n. Moreover, by uniqueness,
for every ψ ∈ MNF such that ϕ ≡ ψ, we obtain that ψ = ψϕ an thus ψ ∈
F<n.
In a next proposition we will prove that in a sense, initial truncations of
MNF’s are modally optimal approximations of the entire MNF. In order to
precisely formulate what this means, we first need to recall that ϕ ≡n ψ is
defined as ϕ ` χ iff ψ ` χ, for any χ ∈ F<n+1.
We point out that the following proposition is a direct consequence of
Lemma 3.2.14 through the arithmetical soundness and completeness of our
calculus. However, since the current proof only hinges on purely modal
facts together with 3.3.1 it is amenable to a setting where arithmetical com-
pleteness or soundness is not (yet) available.
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Proposition 3.3.10. Given ψ := 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉> ∈ MNF and n≤ nk,
provably in TSC:
〈 nα00 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉> ≡n
∧
0≤ i≤ J
〈 nαii 〉>
where nJ = µ(n,ψ).
Proof. This follows from Corollary 3.3.9 together with Items 3 and 4 of Corol-
lary 3.3.5.
Arithmetical Completeness
With the help of some of the results established in the previous subsec-
tion, we can state the following characterization of the derivability between
formulas in MNF.
Proposition 3.3.11. For any ψ0, ψ1 ∈ MNF, where ψ0 := 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ . . . ∧
〈 nαkk 〉> and ψ1 := 〈mβ00 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈m
β j
j 〉>, ψ0 ` ψ1 iff the following holds:
1. mj≤ nk;
2. For any ml ∈ N-mod(ψ1) and nI = µ(ml ,ψ0), we have βl ≤ enI−ml (αI).
Proof. Assume ψ0 ` ψ1. For a proof of Item 2, consider some ml ∈ N-mod(ψ1).
Since ψ0 ` ψ1 then, in particular, ψ0 ` 〈mβll 〉> and so, by Corollary 3.3.5,
Items 2 and 4, together with Proposition 3.3.2, we have that βl ≤ enI−ml (αI).
Moreover, since if ψ0 ` ψ1 then ψ0 ` 〈mβ jj 〉>. Thus, Item 1 follows from
Corollary 3.3.5, Item 1.
For the other direction, assume Items 1 and 2 and consider any mono-
mial 〈mβll 〉> occurring in ψ1. We can distinguish two cases: either ml ∈
N-mod(ψ0) and then by Axiom 3 ψ0 ` 〈mβll 〉> or ml 6∈ N-mod(ψ0), but
then by a combination of Axioms 5 and 3, 〈 nαII 〉> ` 〈mβll 〉>, and so
ψ0 ` 〈mβll 〉>. Therefore, ψ0 ` ψ1.
Before proving the completeness of our system, we need to check the
correctness of the derivable Rules (B1) and (B2) introduced in Proposition
3.3.4 of the previous subsection.
Lemma 3.3.12. Rules (B1) and (B2) are sound w.r.t. the FTP interpretation.
Proof. To check the soundness of (B1), assume (EA+)βm ⊆ Thψ. Since for
m> nk, em−nk(β) ∈ Lim, we can observe that
(
(Thψ)1nk
)em−nk (β)
nk
≡ (Thψ)e
m−nk (β)
nk ,
and then, by correctness of Axiom 5:
(Thψ)
em−nk (β)
nk ⊆
(
(Thψ)
1
nk
)β
m ⊆
(
(Thψ)
1
nk + EA
+
)β
m.
49
3. Arithmetical Semantics
Since m> nk, we get that
(
(Thψ)1nk + EA
+
)β
m ⊆ (Thψ)1nk + (EA+)
β
m and by
our assumption, (Thψ)1nk + (EA
+)
β
m ⊆ (Thψ)1nk . Therefore, (Thψ)
em−nk (β)
nk ⊆
(Thψ)1nk .
With respect to (B2), we can observe that it holds trivially since the as-
sumption of the antecedent together with Lemma 3.2.14 and Proposition
3.2.5, Item 3.2.5 yields Thψ is inconsistent.
With these two results, we are ready now to prove completeness of TSC:
Theorem 3.3.13. For any ϕ,ψ ∈ FTSC, if EA+ ` Thψ ⊆ Thϕ, then the sequent
ϕ ` ψ is derivable in TSC.
Proof. W.l.o.g., let ϕ, ψ ∈ MNF be such that ϕ := 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ . . .∧ 〈 nαkk 〉> and
ψ := 〈mβ00 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈m
β j
j 〉>. By contraposition, assume ϕ 6` ψ. Hence
by Proposition 3.3.11, either:
nk <mj or,
There is ml ∈ N-mod(ψ) and nI = µ(ml , ϕ), such that βl > enI−ml (αI).
Towards a contradiction assume that EA+ ` Thψ ⊆ Thϕ. If nk <mj, no-
tice that provably in EA+ we have that (EA+)
β j
mj ⊆ Thψ and so, in particular
we have that (EA+)
β j
mj ⊆ Thϕ. Thus, applying (B1), together with Lemma
3.3.12 we obtain that
EA+ ` (Thϕ)e
mj−nk (β)
nk ⊆
(
Thϕ +Connk(Thϕ)
)
.
Therefore, EA+ ` (Thϕ)1nk Connk
(
(Thϕ)1nk
)
and then EA+ ` (Thϕ)1nk⊥. Hence,
N |= (Thϕ)1nk⊥ and so, (Thϕ)
1
nk is inconsistent.
For the second case, we reason analogously but using (B2).
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Relational Semantics for TSC
In this chapter we shall discuss relational semantics for TSC. We will
start by defining a new model J which is proven to be universal for our
logic. That is, any derivable sequent will hold -in a precise sense to be de-
fined below- everywhere in the model whereas any non-derivable sequent
will be refuted somewhere in the model. This frame J is a slight modifica-
tion of Ignatiev’s universal model I .
The results of this chapter are included in [28].
4.1. A Variation on Ignatiev’s Frame
In [30], K. Ignatiev introduced a frame which is a universal model for
the variable-free fragment of GLP which has been intensively studied (see
[14], [23], [29]).
This model will be based on special sequences of ordinals. In order to
define them, we need the following central definition.
Definition 4.1.1. We define ordinal logarithm as `(0) := 0 and `(α+ωβ) := β.
Thus, the set of worlds of this frame is defined as follows.
Definition 4.1.2. By Igω we denote the set of `-sequences or Ignatiev sequences.
That is, the set of sequences x := 〈 x0, x1, x2, . . . 〉 where for i<ω, xi+1 ≤ `(xi).
Given a `-sequence x, if all but finitely many of its elements are zero, we
will write 〈 x0, . . . , xn,~0 〉 to denote such sequence or even simply 〈 x0, . . . , xn 〉
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whenever xn+1 = 0.
We can define relations Tn in Igω by:
xTny :⇔ (∀m< n xm = ym ∧ xn > yn).
The resulting structure I = 〈Igω, {Tn}n<ω〉 is called the Ignatiev’s frame.
To define J we will make use of the same set of `-sequences but we shall
consider some minor modifications in the definition of the relations:
Definition 4.1.3. JΛ := 〈 I, {Rn}n<ω 〉 is defined as follows:
I := {x∈ Igω : xm <Λ for m<ω}
and
xRny :⇔ (∀m≤ n xm > ym ∧ ∀m> n xm≥ ym).
Since Λ was already fixed in the previous chapter, from now on we sup-
press the subindex Λ.
The observations collected in the next lemma all have elementary proofs.
Basically, the lemma confirms that the Rn-relations are good to model prov-
ability logic and respect the increasing strength of the provability predicates
[n].
Lemma 4.1.4.
1. Each Rn for n<ω is transitive: xRny ∧ yRnz ⇒ xRnz;
2. Each Rn for n<ω is Noetherian: each non-empty X ⊆ I has an Rn-
maximal element y ∈ X, i.e., ∀ x∈X ¬yRnx;
3. The relations Rn are monotone in n in the sense that: xRny ⇒ xRmy
whenever n>m.
Note that Item 2 is equivalent to stating that there are no infinite ascend-
ing Rn chains. In other words, the converse of Rn is well-founded.
We can also make the following observation.
Lemma 4.1.5. For any x, y, z ∈ I and n, m<ω:
xRnyRmz =⇒ xRnz ∧ xRmz.
Proof. Assume that xRny and yRmz. Then, we have that xi > yi≥ zi for all
i≤ n and for all i> n, we get that xi≥ yi≥ zi. Hence, xRnz. On the other
hand, for any i<ω, we have that xi≥ yi. Therefore, for all i≤m, xi > zi and
for any i>m, xi≥ zi. Thus, xRmz.
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We define the auxiliary relations Rαn for any n<ω and α<Λ. The idea
is that the Rαn relation will model the 〈 nα 〉 modality.
Definition 4.1.6. Given x, y ∈ I and Rn on I, we recursively define xRαny as
follows:
1. xR0ny :⇔ x = y;
2. xR1+αn y :⇔ ∀ β< 1+α ∃ z
(
xRnz ∧ zRβny
)
.
In Definition 4.1.6, we could have given an equivalent formulation in
terms of successor and limit ordinals as the next lemmata tell us.
Proposition 4.1.7. Given x, y ∈ I, n<ω and α<Λ:
xRα+1n y ⇐⇒ ∃z
(
xRnz ∧ zRαny
)
.
Proof. We make a case distinction on α with α = 0 being trivial. For α> 0,
we have that α = 1 + γ for some γ≤ α. With the help of this fact, we can
reason as follows:
xRα+1n y ⇔ xR1+γ+1n y;
⇔ ∀β< 1+ δ+ 1 ∃z (xRnz ∧ zRβny);
⇒ ∃z(xRnz ∧ zRαny), in particular.
Thus, xRα+1n y ⇒ ∃z
(
xRnz ∧ zRαny
)
. For the right-to-left implication we
proceed analogously:
∃z(xRnz ∧ zRαny) ⇔ ∃z (xRnz ∧ zR1+γn y);
⇔ ∃z
((
xRnz ∧ zR1+γn y
) ∧
∀β< 1+ γ ∃z′ (zRnz′ ∧ z′Rβny));
⇒ ∀β′< 1+ γ+ 1 ∃u (xRnu ∧ uRβ′n y);
⇒ xR1+γ+1n y;
⇒ xRα+1n y.
We can also make a similar simple observation for limit ordinals.
Proposition 4.1.8. Let x, y ∈ I, n<ω and λ<Λ such that λ ∈ Lim:
xRλny ⇐⇒ ∀β< λ xR1+βn y ⇐⇒ ∀β, 0< β< λ, xRβny.
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Proof. Since the last equivalence is straightforward, we just show that:
xRλny ⇐⇒ ∀β< λ xR1+βn y.
For left-to-right implication, notice that if xRλny then by Definition 4.1.6, we
have that
∀β< λ ∃u (xRnu ∧ uRβny).
Therefore, since λ ∈ Lim we obtain that ∀β< λ ∃u (xRnu ∧ uR1+βn y) and
so, by Definition 4.1.6, we have that
∀β< λ ∀δ< 1+ β ∃u, v (xRnu ∧ uRnv ∧ vRδny).
By transitivity of Rn, we get that ∀β< λ xR1+βn y. For the other direction, if
∀β< λ xR1+βn y, then in particular, ∀β< λ xRβ+1n y and then, by Proposition
4.1.7, ∀β< λ ∃u (xRnu ∧ uRβny), that is, xRλny.
It is easy to see that for example 〈ω,~0 〉R1+n0 〈m,~0 〉 for each n, m ∈ ω,
so that also 〈ω,~0 〉Rω0 〈m,~0 〉 for each m ∈ ω. Clearly, we do not have
〈ω,~0 〉Rω+10 〈m,~0 〉 for any m<ω but we do have 〈ω + 1,~0 〉Rω+10 〈m,~0 〉 for
all m<ω.
We also note that the dual definition xR0ny :⇔ x = y; and xR1+αn y :⇔
∀ β< 1+α ∃z (xRβnz ∧ zRny) does not make much sense on our frames. For
example we could have 〈ω,~0 〉Rα0〈 0,~0 〉 for any ordinal α> 0.
With the the auxiliary relations Rαn, we give the following definition for
a formula ϕ being true in a point x of J .
Definition 4.1.9. Let x ∈ I and ϕ ∈ FTSC. By x  ϕ we denote the validity of ϕ
in x that is recursively defined as follows:
x  > for all x ∈ I;
x  ϕ ∧ ψ iff x  ϕ and x  ψ;
x  〈 nα 〉ϕ iff there is y ∈ I, xRαny and y  ϕ.
In the following lemma we present some easy observations on the Rαn
relations which among others tell us that all the R1+αn serve the purpose of
a provability predicate for any n<ω and α<Λ.
Lemma 4.1.10.
1. Each R1+αn for n<ω and α an ordinal is transitive: xR1+αn y ∧ yR1+αn z ⇒
xR1+αn z;
2. Each R1+αn for n<ω and α an ordinal is Noetherian: each non-empty X ⊆ I
has an R1+αn -maximal element y ∈ X, i.e., ∀ x∈X ¬yR1+αn x;
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3. The relations R1+αn are monotone in n in the sense that: xR1+αn y⇒ xR1+αm y
whenever n>m;
4. The relations R1+αn are monotone in 1+ α in the sense that: xR1+αn y ⇒
xR1+βn y whenever 1+ β< 1+ α.
Proof. The first three items follow directly from Lemma 4.1.4 by an easy
transfinite induction. The last item is also easy.
The following lemma states the polytransitivity condition for the Rαn re-
lations.
Lemma 4.1.11 (Polytransitivity). For any x, y, z ∈ I, n, m<ω and α, β<Λ
with 0< α, β:
xRαnyR
β
mz =⇒ xRαnz ∧ xRβmz.
Proof. We assume xRαny and yR
β
mz and set out to prove xRαnz. We proceed by
induction on α. For the base case, let α = 1. We can observe that by Lemma
4.1.10, Item 4, since yRβmz, then yRmz. Therefore, the implication follows
from Lemma 4.1.5.
For α ∈ Succ, let α := α′ + 1. By Proposition 4.1.7, if xRαny, then ∃ u ∈ I
such that xRnu and uRα
′
n y. Since uRα
′
n y and yR
β
mz, by the I.H. we have that
uRα
′
n z and thus, xRαnz.
For α ∈ Lim, by Proposition 4.1.8, we have that for all δ< α, xR1+δn y and
yRβmz. Thus, by the I.H. we get that xR1+δn z for all δ< α. Hence, xRαnz.
To prove that xRβmz we proceed by induction on β. The base and limit
cases are analogous to the ones of the induction on α. For the case β ∈ Succ,
let β := β′ + 1. With the help of Proposition 4.1.7 we have that ∃ u ∈ I such
that yRmu and uR
β′
m z. By Lemma 4.1.10, Item 4, since xRαny, then xRny and
by Lemma 4.1.5 xRmu. Therefore, xR
β
my.
A characterization for transfinite accessibility
The intuitive idea behind the xRαny assertion, is that this tells us that
there exists a chain of ‘length’ α of Rn steps leading from the point x up to
the point y. The following useful lemma tries to capture this intuition.
Lemma 4.1.12. For x, y ∈ I, α<Λ and n<ω we have that the following are
equivalent
1. xR1+αn y
2. There exists a collection c1+α := {x1+αδ }δ< 1+α so that
a) xRnx1+αδ for any x
1+α
δ ∈ c1+α,
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b) x1+α0 = y and,
c) for any δ′< δ< 1+ α we have x1+αδ Rnx
1+α
δ′ .
Proof. By induction on α. The base case is immediate if we consider the
collection {y}. For α ∈ Succ, let α := α′ + 1. By Proposition 4.1.7, we
have that xR1+α
′+1
n y iff there is z such that xRnz and zR1+α
′
n y. Thus, by
the I.H. xR1+α
′+1
n y iff there is z such that xRnz and there is a collection
c1+α
′
:= {z1+α′δ }δ< 1+α′ such that:
1. zRnz1+α
′
δ for any z
1+α′
δ ∈ c1+α
′
,
2. z1+α
′
0 = y and,
3. for any δ′< δ< 1+ α′ we have z1+α
′
δ Rnz
1+α′
δ′ .
Thus, we just need to consider the collection c1+α
′+1 defined as follows:
x1+α
′+1
δ =
{
z if δ = 1+ α′;
z1+α
′
δ otherwise.
To check the other implication, assume we have a collection c1+α
′+1 sat-
isfying the properties 2a, 2b and 2c. Then, we have that xRnx1+α
′+1
1+α′ and ap-
plying the I.H. to the collection {x1+α′+1δ }δ< 1+α′ , we get that x1+α
′+1
1+α′ R
1+α′
n y.
Hence, xR1+α
′+1
n y.
For α ∈ Lim, let us first prove the implication from Item 1 to Item 2. By
Proposition 4.1.8 we have that xRαny iff for any γ< α, xR
1+γ
n y. Thus, for each
γ< α, we have a collection c1+γ := {z1+γδ }δ< 1+γ satisfying the properties 2a,
2b and 2c. In order to build the collection cα := {xαγ}γ< α, we set xα0 to be y
and define xα1+γ uniformly as follows:
(xα1+γ)m :=

ym in case m> n,
min{(zζ1+γ)m : zζ1+γ ∈ cζ for ζ> 1+ γ} in case m = n,
en−m
(
(xα1+γ)n
)
in case m< n.
The reason why we consider the minimum value for (xα1+γ)n is that mini-
mum means highest in the Rn relation. Therefore, the minimum value guar-
antees that we are sufficiently down to reach y but, at the same time, that we
still have room enough to build the remaining members of our collection.
First, we check that cα ⊆ I. Since xα0 = y ∈ I, we only check xαγ ∈ I for
γ> 0. Since for m > n, (xαγ)m = ym and y ∈ I, it suffices to establish the
following:
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`
(
(xαγ)n
)≥ (xαγ)n+1. By definition, there is ζ∗> γ, such that (xαγ)n =
(zζ
∗
γ )n and z
ζ∗
γ ∈ I. Hence `
(
(zζ
∗
γ )n
)≥ (zζ∗γ )n+1. By the I.H. Items 2b and
2c zζ
∗
γ Rny, and so (z
ζ∗
γ )n+1≥ yn+1 = (xαγ)n+1. Thus, `
(
(xαγ)n
)≥ (xαγ)n+1.
`
(
(xαγ)m
)≥ (xαγ)m+1 for m< n. By definition we have that (xαγ)m+1 =
en−(m+1)
(
(xαγ)n
)
and (xαγ)m = en−m
(
(xαγ)n
)
. Thus,
`
(
(xαγ)m
)
= `
(
en−m
(
(xαγ)n
))
= en−(m+1)
(
(xαγ)n
)
= (xαγ)m+1.
With respect to the conditions 2a, 2b and 2c, Item 2b follows by definition.
Regarding Item 2a, pick an arbitrary xαδ ∈ cα. By the I.H. we know that for
any point z1+γδ ∈ c1+γ for γ< α we have that xRnz1+γδ . Then:
xRnz
1+γ
0 , that is, xRny and so, xm ≥ ym = (xαδ )m for m> n;
xn > min{(zζδ)n : zζδ ∈ cζ for ζ> δ} = (xαδ )n ;
For m< n and ζ> δ, we have that xm > (z
ζ
δ)m≥ en−m
(
(zζδ)n
)
. There-
fore, xm > en−m
(
(xαδ )n
)
.
Hence, xRnxαδ for any δ< α. Concerning Item 2c, by definition of c
α, to
obtain that for any δ′< δ< α, we have that xαδRnx
α
δ′ it suffices to check that
(xαδ′)n < (x
α
δ )n considering that (x
α
δ′)m = (x
α
δ )m for m> n and (x
α
δ′)m < (x
α
δ )m
for m≤ n. We assume δ′ 6= 0 since that case is easy.
We can observe that there are ζ∗ and ξ∗ such that α> ζ∗> δ and α> ξ∗< δ′,
satisfying the following:
(xαδ )n = (z
ζ∗
δ )n and (x
α
δ′)n = (z
ξ∗
δ′ )n.
Since δ> δ′, there is zζ
∗
δ′ ∈ cζ
∗
and by the I.H. zζ
∗
δ Rnz
ζ∗
δ′ . Thus, (z
ζ∗
δ′ )n < (z
ζ∗
δ )n.
Since (xαδ′)n is obtained by considering the minimum, we have have that
(xαδ′)n = (z
ξ∗
δ′ )n≤ (zζ
∗
δ′ )n < (z
ζ∗
δ )n = (x
α
δ )n.
That is, (xαδ′)n < (x
α
δ )n.
We know prove the implication from Item 2 to Item 1. Thus, we assume
there is a collection cα satisfying conditions 2a, 2b and 2c. We will show that
xRαny. First we prove the following by induction on γ:
For any xαγ ∈ cα, xαγRγny.
The base case is immediate since we have that xα0 = y and yR
0
ny. For the
successor step, let γ = γ′ + 1. Since by assumption xαγRnxαγ′ and by the I.H.
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xαγ′R
γ′
n y, then xαγR
γ′+1
n y. For the limit case, assume as the I.H. that for any
δ < γ, xαδR
δ
ny. By assumption we have that xαγRnxαδ for any δ < γ. Thus,
xαγRnxαδ and x
α
δR
δ
ny for any δ < γ, and so, xαγR
γ
ny.
Hence, for any γ < α we have that xRnxαγ and xαγR
γ
ny, that is, xRαny.
We shall now provide another characterization of the R1+αn relations that
is easier to work with. To this end, let us for convenience define
xRζ−1y :⇔ ∀ n> 0 xn≥ yn.
With this notation the following theorem makes sense.
Theorem 4.1.13 (Characterization Theorem). For x, y ∈ I and n with 0≤ n<ω
we have that the following are equivalent
1. xR1+αn y;
2. xn≥ yn +
(
1+ e(yn+1)
) · (1+ α) and xRe(1+α)n−1 y;
3.
xn≥ yn +
(
1+ e(yn+1)
) · (1+ α) and,
xm > ym for m< n and,
xm≥ ym for m> n.
We dedicate the remainder of this subsection to prove this theorem and
move there through a series of lemmas. The first lemma in this series is
pretty obvious. It tells us that if we can move from x to y in α many steps,
then the distance between xn and yn must allow α many steps; That is, they
lie at least α apart.
Lemma 4.1.14. For x, y ∈ I and n<ω and any ordinal α<Λ, if xRαny, then
xn≥ yn + α.
Proof. By an easy induction on α. The base case is immediate since x = y.
For α ∈ Succ, we just need to apply Proposition 4.1.7 and the I.H. The case
α ∈ Lim follows from Proposition 4.1.8 and the I.H.
However, how many Rn steps one can make is not entirely determined
by the n coordinates of the points. For example, there is just a single R0 step
from the point 〈ω · 2, 1 〉 to the point 〈ω, 1 〉 whereas these points lie ω apart
on the ‘0 coordinate’. The following lemma tells us how for Rn steps, the
n-th coordinates are affected by the values of the n + 1-th coordinate.
Lemma 4.1.15. For x, y ∈ I and n<ω with xR1+αn y, we have
xn≥ yn + e(yn+1) · (1+ α).
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In order to give a smooth presentation of this proof, we first give two
simple technical lemmas with useful observations on the ordinals and ordi-
nal functions involved.
Lemma 4.1.16. For α, β and γ ordinals we have
1. `(β)≥ 1+ α ⇐⇒ β ∈ e(1+ α) · (1+Ord);
2. If (1+ α)< β and γ ∈ e(β) · (1+Ord), then γ ∈ e(1+ α) · (1+Ord);
3. e(β+ (1+ α)) = e(β) · e(1+ α);
Proof. The first two items can easily be seen by using a Cantor normal form
expression with base ω. For Item 1, we use the fact that β ∈ Lim together
with that if `(β) ≥ 1 + α , then β ≥ e(`(β)) ≥ e(1 + α). For Items 2 and 3
we use that e(1+ω) = ω1+ω = ω1 ·ωω.
Lemma 4.1.17. For x, y ∈ I and n<ω, we have that xRny =⇒ xn≥ yn +
e(xn+1).
Proof. For yn = 0 the lemma is straightforward. Hence, we assume yn > 0
and proceed by a case distinction on xn. We can observe that since xRny,
then xn > yn and thus, xn 6= 0. If xn ∈ Succ then the lemma is trivial since
e(xn+1) = 0. If xn is an additively indecomposable limit ordinal, then for
any α, β< xn, we have that xn > α+ β. Thus, since xn > yn and xn≥ e(xn+1),
we can easily check that xn≥ yn + e(xn+1).
Otherwise, we can rewrite xn as α + e(β) for some β≥ xn+1, and yn as
δ+ ωγ. If yn≤ α then clearly xn≥ yn + e(xn+1). For the remaining case, if
α = δ and γ< β, then we have that ωγ + e(β) = e(β) and thus, α+ e(β) =
δ+ωγ + e(β)≥ yn + e(xn+1).
With these technical lemmas at hand we can now prove Lemma 4.1.15.
Proof. By induction on α. For α := 0, we check that xn≥ yn + e(yn+1). Note
that since xRny, then xn≥ yn + e(xn+1) and xn+1≥ yn+1, whence xn≥ yn +
e(yn+1).
For α := β+ 1, if xR1+β+1n y then there is z ∈ I such that xRnz and
zR1+βn y. Thus, by the I.H. we have the following:
1. xn≥ zn + e(zn+1);
2. zn≥ yn + e(yn+1) · (1+ β).
Therefore, xn≥ yn + e(yn+1) · (1+ β) + e(zn+1). Since e(zn+1)≥ e(yn+1) then
xn≥ yn + e(yn+1) · (1+ β) + e(yn+1), i.e., xn≥ yn + e(yn+1) · (1+ β+ 1).
For α ∈ Lim, we notice that by the I.H. we have that xn≥ yn + e(yn+1) ·
(1+ δ) for any δ< α. Thus, xn≥ yn + e(yn+1) · (1+ α).
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Combining Lemma 4.1.15 and Lemma 4.1.14 we get the following.
Corollary 4.1.18. For x, y ∈ I and n<ω we have that
xR1+αn y =⇒ xn≥ yn +
(
1+ e(yn+1)
) · (1+ α).
Proof. For yn+1 > 0, we have that e(yn+1) ∈ Lim and thus, 1 + e(yn+1) =
e(yn+1). Therefore, it follows immediately from Lemma 4.1.15. If yn+1 =
0, then yn +
(
1 + e(yn+1)
) · (1 + α) = yn + (1 + α) and so, it follows from
Lemma 4.1.14.
This corollary takes care of part of the implication from Item (1) to Item
(2) in the characterization theorem (Theorem 4.1.13). We will now focus
on the implication from Item (3) to Item (1) but before we do so, we first
formulate a simple yet useful lemma.
Lemma 4.1.19. For x, y ∈ I and m> 0, if xRn+my, then xn≥ yn + e(xn+1).
Proof. Since Rn+m is contained in Rn, if xRn+my then xRny and thus by
Lemma 4.1.17, xn≥ yn + e(xn+1).
With this technical lemma we can obtain the next step in the direction
from Item (3) to Item (1) in the characterization theorem (Theorem 4.1.13).
Lemma 4.1.20. For x, y ∈ I and n<ω we have that if
xn≥ yn +
(
1+ e(yn+1)
) · (1+ α) and,
xm > ym for m< n and,
xm≥ ym for m> n,
then
xR1+αn y.
Proof. First, we assume
1. xn≥ yn +
(
1+ e(yn+1)
) · (1+ α);
2. xm > ym for m< n;
3. xm≥ ym for m> n.
We use Lemma 4.1.12 whence are done if we can find a collection c1+α =
{z1+αδ }δ< 1+α so that
1. xRnz1+αδ for any z
1+α
δ ∈ c1+α,
2. z1+α0 = y and,
3. for any δ′< δ< 1+ α we have z1+αδ Rnz
1+α
δ′ .
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We set z1+α0 := y and for γ> 0, we define z
1+α
γ uniformly as follows:
(z1+αγ )m :=

ym in case m> n,
yn +
(
1+ e(yn+1)
) · γ in case m = n,
ym + e
(
(z1+αγ )m+1
)
in case m< n.
We make a collection of simple observations:
i For any γ< 1 + α and m<ω, we have that (z1+αγ )m+1≤ `
(
(z1+αγ )m
)
and
so, each z1+αγ is an element of I;
ii We now see that xRnz1+αγ for each γ< α. For m> n we obviously have
that xm≥ (z1+αγ )m and also xn > (z1+αγ )n is clear. For m< n, first we can
observe that from assumptions 1, 2 and 3 we get that xRny. Using this
fact, we check by induction on n − m that xm > (z1+αγ )m. For the base
case, since xRny, using Lemma 4.1.19 we have that
xn−1 ≥ yn−1 + e(xn)
≥ yn−1 + e
(
yn +
(
1+ e(yn+1)
) · (1+ α))
> yn−1 + e
(
(z1+αγ )n
)
.
For the inductive step, assume xn−m > (z1+αγ )n−m as the I.H. Hence, by
Lemma 4.1.19 xn−(m+1)≥ yn−(m+1) + e(xn−m). Combining this with the
I.H. we get that xn−(m+1)> (z1+αγ )n−(m+1);
iii x0 = y by definition;
iv By strict monotonicity of e, we see that for any γ′< γ < α we have
z1+αγ Rnz
1+α
γ′ .
We are now ready to combine all the above observations and obtain a
proof for the characterization theorem (Theorem 4.1.13).
Proof. From Item 2 to Item 3 is easy and from Item 3 to Item 1 is Lemma
4.1.20 so we focus on the remaining implication, that is:
xR1+αn y =⇒ xn≥ yn +
(
1+ e(yn+1)
) · (1+ α) and xRe(1+α)n−1 y
for any x, y ∈ I and n with 0≤ n<ω.
As mentioned before, half of this implication follows from Corollary
4.1.18 so that it remains to show that xR1+αn y ⇒ xRe(1+α)n−1 y. For n = 0
this is trivial and in case n 6= 0 we reason as follows.
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Since xR1+αn y we get in particular that xn≥ yn + 1+ α. We proceed by a
case distinction. If yn = 0, then by Lemma 4.1.19 we see
xn−1≥ yn−1 + e(xn)≥ yn−1 + e(yn + 1+ α) = yn−1 + e(1+ α).
Thus, xn−1≥ yn−1 +
(
1+ e(yn)
) · (1+ e(1+ α)) and by Lemma 4.1.20 we are
done. If yn > 0, then e(yn) ∈ Lim and so, using the fact (Lemma 4.1.16) that
e(yn + 1+ α) = e(yn) · e(1+ α) we get that
xn−1≥ yn−1+ e(xn)≥ yn−1+ e(yn + 1+ α) = yn−1+
(
1+ e(yn)
) · (1+ e(1+ α)).
The result now follows from an application of Lemma 4.1.20.
Definable sets
In this subsection we shall define a map between formulas in MNF and
`-sequences as well as a way of characterizing definable subsets of I. More-
over, we shall see how some of these subsets of I can be related to the
extensions of single formulas.
In virtue of the reduction axioms (Axiom 5), a formula ψ ∈ MNF may
bear implicit information on monomials 〈 nα 〉> for n 6∈ N-mod(ψ). The next
definition is made to retrieve this information.
Definition 4.1.21. Let ψ := 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉> ∈ MNF. By pini(ψ) we
denote the corresponding exponent αi. Moreover, for m 6∈ N-mod(ψ), with nk > m,
pim(ψ) is set to be e
(
pim+1(ψ)
)
and for m′ > nk, pim′(ψ) is defined to be 0.
We can use these functions to associate a sequence of ordinals to each
formula in MNF.
Definition 4.1.22. Let ψ := 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉> ∈ MNF. By xψ we denote
the sequence 〈pii(ψ) 〉i<ω.
On account of Definition 4.1.21, we can observe that for ψ ∈ MNF, we
have that xψ ∈ I. Therefore, we shall refer xψ as the corresponding world of ψ.
Furthermore, we shall see that xψ is the first point in I where ψ holds. First
we make some simple observations.
Lemma 4.1.23.
1. For any x ∈ I, x  〈 nα 〉> iff xn≥ α;
2. For any ψ ∈ MNF, xψ  ψ.
Proof. The second item follows from the first one and the definition of xψ
(Definition 4.1.22). For the right-to-left implication of the first item, the case
α = 0 is straightforward. Hence, assume xn≥ α> 0. Therefore, for i< n, we
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have that xi > 0 and for i> n, xi≥ 0. Thus, by the characterization theorem
(Theorem 4.1.13), xRαn〈0〉 and so x  〈 nα 〉>.
For the other direction, assume x  〈 nα 〉> for α> 0. Hence, there is
y ∈ I such that xRαny and y  >. By the characterization theorem, xn≥ yn +(
1+ e(yn+1)
) · α and so, xn≥ α.
The following two definitions introduce the extension of `-sequences and
the extension of formulas, respectively.
Definition 4.1.24. Given x ∈ I, by JxK we denote the set of `-sequences which
are coordinate-wise at least as big as x. That is, we define JxK := {y∈ I :
yi≥ xi for every i<ω}.
Definition 4.1.25. Let ϕ ∈ FTSC. By J ϕ K we denote the set of worlds where ϕ
holds i.e. J ϕ K = {x∈ I : x  ϕ}.
The following lemma relates definitions 4.1.24 and 4.1.25.
Lemma 4.1.26. For any ϕ ∈ FTSC, there is x := 〈x0, . . . , xk, 0〉 ∈ I such thatJ ϕ K = JxK.
Proof. The proof goes by induction on ϕ. The base case is trivial. For the
conjunctive case, let ϕ = ψ ∧ χ. By the I.H. we have that there are y, z ∈ I
such that Jψ K = JyK and Jχ K = JzK. Moreover, by the I.H. we also have
that y := 〈y0, . . . , yj, 0〉 and z := 〈z0, . . . , zk, 0〉. Let n = max(j, k), that is,
the index of the rightmost non-zero component. Hence we can define x as
follows:
xi = max(yi, zi) for i≥ n;
xi = min{δ : δ≥ max(yi, zi) & l(δ)≥ xi+1} for i< n.
We can easily check that x ∈ I. Next, we check that for any x′ ∈ I, we have
that
x′  ψ ∧ χ iff x′ ∈ JxK.
For the right-to-left implication, consider x′ ∈ JxK. Thus, for i<ω, we have
that both x′i ≥ xk≥ yi and x′i ≥ xi≥ zi. Thus, x′ ∈ JyK ∩ JzK and so by the I.H.
x′  ψ ∧ χ.
For the other direction, consider x′ ∈ I such that x′  ψ ∧ χ. Clearly, for
i> n, we have that x′i ≥ xi. We check by induction on m that x′n−m≥ xn−m.
For the base case, since x′  ψ ∧ χ, then by the I.H. x′ ∈ JyK ∩ JzK and so
x′n≥ yn and x′n≥ zn. Thus, x′n≥ max(yn, zn) = xn. For the inductive step,
by definition of the Ignatiev sequences together with the I.H., we have that
l(x′n−(m+1))≥ x′n−m≥ xn−m and since x′  ψ ∧ χ, then we can conclude that
x′n−(m+1)≥ max(yn−(m+1), zn−(m+1)). Therefore, being xn−(m+1) the minimal
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ordinal satisfying both conditions, we can conclude that x′n−(m+1)≥ xn−(m+1).
Hence, Jψ ∧ χ K = JxK.
For the modality case, let ϕ := 〈 nα 〉ψ with α> 0. Thus, by the I.H. there
is y ∈ I such that Jψ K = JyK and y := 〈y0, . . . , yj, 0〉. We can define x as
follows:
xi = yi for i> n;
xn = yn +
(
1+ e(yn+1)
) · α;
xi = min{δ : δ> yi & l(δ)≥ xi+1} for i< n.
As in the previous case, we can easily check that x ∈ I. Thus, we check thatJxK = J〈 nα 〉ψK. To prove JxK ⊆ J〈 nα 〉ψK, let x′ ∈ JxK. By the characterization
theorem (Theorem 4.1.13) we can see that xRαny. Hence, since x′i ≥ xi for
i<ω, x′Rαny and so x′  〈 nα 〉ψ.
For the other inclusion, consider x′ ∈ I such that x′  〈 nα 〉ψ. Thus,
there is z ∈ JyK such that x′Rαnz. Hence, with the help of the characterization
theorem we can establish that for i> n we have that x′i ≥ zi≥ yi = xi, that is,
x′i ≥ xi. For i≤ n, we proceed by an easy induction on k to see that x′n−k ≥
xn−k. The base case follows directly from the characterization theorem. For
the inductive step, by definition of Ignatiev sequences together with the I.H.,
we have that l(x′n−(k+1))≥ x′n−k≥ xn−k. Since x′  〈 nα 〉ψ, then there is z ∈ I
such that x′Rαnz and z  ψ. Thus, by the I.H., z ∈ JyK, and so we have that
x′n−(k+1)> zn−(k+1)≥ yn−(k+1). Therefore, we get that l(x′n−(k+1))≥ xn−k and
x′n−(k+1)> yn−(k+1). Thus, since xn−(k+1) is the least ordinal satisfying both
conditions, we have that x′n−(k+1)≥ xn−(k+1).
Some of the facts established in the proof of the previous lemma are
collected in the following corollary.
Corollary 4.1.27. For any ϕ, ψ ∈ FTSC:
1. If J〈x0, . . . , xj, 0〉K = JϕK and J〈y0, . . . , yk, 0〉K = JψK, then there is z ∈ I
such that JzK = Jϕ ∧ ψK and z is defined as follows:
zi = max(xi, yi) for i≥ max(j, k);
zi = min{δ : δ≥ max(xi, yi) & l(δ)≥ zi+1} for i< max(j, k).
2. If JxK = JϕK, then there is y ∈ I such that JyK = J〈 nα 〉ϕK and y is defined
as follows:
yi = xi for i> n;
yn = xn +
(
1+ e(yx+1)
) · α;
yi = min{δ : δ> xi & l(δ)≥ yi+1} for i< n.
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The next lemma relates the extension of a formula ψ in MNF with the
extension of its corresponding world xψ.
Lemma 4.1.28. For any ψ ∈ MNF, we have that Jψ K = JxψK.
Proof. Let ψ := 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉>. We proceed by induction on k. For
the base case, we start by checking Jψ K ⊆ JxψK. Assume x  〈 nα00 〉>.
Then, there is y ∈ I such that xRα0n0 y, and so, by the characterization the-
orem (Theorem 4.1.13) we have that xRe
n0−m(α0)
m y for m≤ n, that is, x 
〈men0−m(α0) 〉>. Therefore, with the help of Lemma 4.1.23, Item 1 we have
that xm≥ en0−m(α0), and so x ∈ JxψK.
For the other inclusion, let x ∈ JxψK. Thus, xn0 ≥ (xψ)n0 and so, by
Lemma 4.1.23, Item 1 x  〈 nα00 〉>. For the inductive step we reason analo-
gously.
4.2. Modal Soundness and Completeness
We dedicate this section to prove the soundness and completeness of
TSC w.r.t. J .
Modal soundness
To prove the soundness of TSC, let us begin by semantically define the
entailment between our modal formulas.
Definition 4.2.1. For any formulas ϕ, ψ ∈ FTSC, we write ϕ |=J ψ iff for all
x ∈ I, if x  ϕ then x  ψ. Analogously, we write ϕ ≡J ψ iff for any x ∈ I, we
have that x  ϕ iff x  ψ.
With our notion of semantical entailment we can formulate our sound-
ness theorem.
Theorem 4.2.2 (Soundness). For any formulas ϕ, ψ ∈ FTSC,
ϕ ` ψ =⇒ ϕ |=J ψ.
Proof. By induction on the length of a TSC proof of ϕ ` ψ. It is easy to see
that the first three rules:
1. If ϕ ` ψ and ϕ ` χ, then ϕ ` ψ ∧ χ;
2. If ϕ ` ψ and ψ ` χ, then ϕ ` χ;
3. If ϕ ` ψ, then 〈 nα 〉ϕ ` 〈 nα 〉ψ ;
preserve validity. With respect to the axioms, the first two axioms
1. ϕ ` ϕ, ϕ ` >;
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2. ϕ ∧ ψ ` ϕ, ϕ ∧ ψ ` ψ;
are easily seen to be valid. The the correctness of reduction axiom
〈 (m + n)α 〉ϕ ` 〈men(α) 〉ϕ
is given by the characterization theorem (Theorem 4.1.13). The remaining
axioms and rules are separately proven to be sound in the remainder of this
subsection.
We start by proving the soundness of co-additivity axiom i.e.
〈 nα 〉〈 nβ 〉ϕ ≡J 〈 nβ+α 〉ϕ.
Proposition 4.2.3. For any x, z ∈ I, n<ω and α, β<Λ,
∃ y ∈ I (xRαny and yRβnz) ⇐⇒ xRβ+αn z.
Proof. We proceed by transfinite induction on α with the base case being
trivial. For α ∈ Succ, let α := δ+ 1 for some δ. Therefore:
xRαny and yR
β
nz ⇔ xRδ+1n y and yRβnz;
⇔ ∃u (xRnu ∧ uRδny ∧ yRβnz);
⇔ ∃u (xRnu ∧ uRβ+δn z), by the I.H. ;
⇔ xRβ+δ+1n z;
⇔ xRβ+αn z.
For α ∈ Lim, we have that xRαny and yRβnz ⇔ ∀δ< α
(
xR1+δn y ∧ yRβnz
)
by
Proposition 4.1.8. By the I.H. we obtain ∀δ< α xRβ+1+δn z and so xRβ+αn z.
With this last result, we get the co-additivity of the Rαn relations. This
together with Definition 4.1.9 gives us the following corollary.
Corollary 4.2.4. The co-additivity axiom is sound.
Proof. By Definition 4.1.9, x  〈 nα 〉〈 nβ 〉ϕ iff there are y, z ∈ I such that
xRαny, yR
β
nz and z  ϕ. Thus, by Proposition 4.2.3, x  〈 nα 〉〈 nβ 〉ϕ iff
xRβ+αn z and z  ϕ i.e., x  〈 nβ+α 〉ϕ.
The following proposition establishes the soundness of the monotonicity
axiom.
Proposition 4.2.5. The monotonicity axiom is sound, that is:
〈 nα 〉ϕ |=J 〈 nβ 〉ϕ
for β< α.
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Proof. With the help of the monotonicity property of the R1+αn relations
(Lemma 4.1.10, Item 4), we have that if x  〈 nα 〉ϕ then x  〈 nβ 〉ϕ for
β, 0< β< α. We check that if x  〈 n1 〉ϕ then x  ϕ by induction on ϕ.
The base and the conjunctive cases are straightforward, so we consider
ϕ := 〈mδ 〉ψ for some δ> 0 and assume x  〈 n1 〉〈mδ 〉ψ. Thus, there are
y, z ∈ I such that xRnyRδmz and z  ψ. Then, by the polytransitivity condi-
tion (Lemma 4.1.11) we have that xRδmz, and so x  〈mδ 〉ψ.
The following proposition establishes the correction of the Schmerl ax-
iom by using the translation between formulas in monomial normal form
and `-sequences.
Proposition 4.2.6. The Schmerl axiom is sound i.e.
〈 nα 〉( 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ ψ ) ≡J 〈 nen0−n(α0)·(1+α) 〉> ∧ 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ ψ
for n< n0 and 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ ψ ∈ MNF.
Proof. For the left-to-right direction, assume x  〈 nα 〉(〈 nα00 〉> ∧ ψ). Thus,
by soundness of monotonicity axiom, we have that x  〈 nα00 〉> ∧ ψ. There-
fore, we only need to check that x  〈 nen0−n(α0)·(1+α) 〉>. We can observe
that x  〈 nα 〉〈 nα00 〉> and so there are y, z ∈ I such that xRαnyRα0n0 z. By the
characterization theorem (Theorem 4.1.13) we have that
xn≥ yn + (1+ e(yn+1)) · α. (4.1)
Also since yRα0n0 z then yR
en0−n(α0)
n z and yR
en0−(n+1)(α0)
n+1 z. Hence by the charac-
terization theorem we get that yn≥ en0−n(α0) and yn+1≥ en0−(n+1)(α0). Com-
bining this with 4.1 we get that
xn ≥ en0−n(α0) +
(
1+ e
(
en0−(n+1)(α0)
)) · α
= en0−n(α0) + e
(
en0−(n+1)(α0)
) · α
= en0−n(α0) + en0−n(α0) · α
= en0−n(α0) · (1+ α).
Thus, we have that xRe
n0−n(α0)·(1+α)
n 〈0〉 and so, x  〈 nen0−n(α0)·(1+α) 〉>.
For the other direction, assume x  〈 nen0−n(α0)·(1+α) 〉> ∧ 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ ψ. Let
ψ′ = 〈 nen0−n(α0)·(1+α) 〉> ∧ 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ ψ. In virtue of Definition 4.1.22 we can
consider the corresponding worlds of 〈 nα00 〉>∧ψ and ψ′, that are, x〈 nα00 〉>∧ψ
and xψ′ . We set out to prove xRαnx〈 nα00 〉>∧ψ.
Since x  ψ′ then by Lemma 4.1.28 we have that x ∈ Jψ′ K = Jxψ′K. Thus,
we can make the following observations in order to apply the characteriza-
tion theorem:
68
4.2. Modal Soundness and Completeness
By Definition 4.1.22, for all m> n, we have that (xψ′)m = (x〈 nα00 〉>∧ψ)m.
Combining this with the fact that x ∈ JxψK, we get that for all m> n,
xm≥ (x〈 nα00 〉>∧ψ)m;
Since x ∈ JxψK we have that xn≥ (xψ′)n = en0−n(α0) · (1 + α). Also,
by Definition 4.1.22, we can observe that (x〈 nα00 〉>∧ψ)n = e
n0−n(α0) and
(x〈 nα00 〉>∧ψ)n+1 = e
n0−(n+1)(α0). Thus, we can reason as follows:
xn ≥ en0−n(α0) · (1+ α)
= en0−n(α0) + en0−n(α0) · α
= en0−n(α0) + e
(
en0−(n+1)(α0)
) · α
= (x〈 nα00 〉>∧ψ)n +
(
1+ e
(
(x〈 nα00 〉>∧ψ)n+1
)) · α;
For all m< n, we can observe that xn≥ en−m
(
en0−n(α0) · (1 + α)
)
. On
the other hand, (x〈 nα00 〉>∧ψ)m = e
n−m(en0−n(α0)). Therefore, for all
m< n, we have that xm > (x〈 nα00 〉>∧ψ)m.
Hence, by the characterization theorem, we have that xRαnx〈 nα00 〉>∧ψ, and
thus x〈 nα00 〉>∧ψ.
Lastly, we check the soundness of Rule 4 by applying the relation be-
tween definable sets and the extension of `-sequences proved in Lemma
4.1.26. This next result concludes the soundness proof of TSC.
Proposition 4.2.7. If ϕ |=J ψ then, for m< n:
〈 nα 〉ϕ ∧ 〈mβ+1 〉ψ |=J 〈 nα 〉
(
ϕ ∧ 〈mβ+1 〉ψ ).
Proof. Assume ϕ |=J ψ and let x ∈ I such that x  〈 nα 〉ϕ ∧ 〈mβ+1 〉ψ.
Since ϕ |=J ψ, by Lemma 4.1.26, there are y, z ∈ I such that
JyK = JϕK ⊆ JψK = JzK.
Let y′, z′ ∈ I such that Jy′K = J〈 nα 〉ϕK and Jz′K = J〈mβ+1 〉ψK, and w ∈ I
such that:
JwK = Jϕ ∧ 〈mβ+1 〉ψK = JϕK∩ J〈mβ+1 〉ψK = JyK∩ Jz′K.
First, we shall make some observations about w and x, respectively. We will
use these facts together with the characterization theorem (Theorem 4.1.13)
to conclude that xRαnw. Since y ∈ JzK, then for all i<ω we have that yi≥ zi.
Furthermore, by Corollary 4.1.27, Item 2 we have that for i>m, z′i = zi.
Thus, we can observe that
For i>m we have that
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wi = min{δ : δ≥ max(yi, z′i) & l(δ)≥wi+1}
= min{δ : δ≥ max(yi, zi) & l(δ)≥wi+1}
= yi;
wm = min{δ : δ≥ max(yi, z′i) & l(δ)≥wm+1}
= min{δ : δ≥ max(yi, z′i) & l(δ)≥ ym+1}.
On the other hand, since x  〈 nα 〉ϕ ∧ 〈mβ+1 〉ψ, we have the following:
By Corollary 4.1.27, Item 1 xi≥ min{δ : δ≥ max(y′i, z′i) & l(δ)≥ xi+1}
for i≤m;
Since x  〈 nα 〉ϕ ∧ 〈mβ+1 〉ψ, then x  ϕ and so, we have that xi≥ yi
for i> n;
As x  〈 nα 〉ϕ we get that xn≥ y′n and xi≥ min{δ : δ≥ y′i & l(δ)≥ xi+1}
for i, m< i< n.
It remains to be checked that xRαnw. Recall that m< n and that for i>m,
we have that wi = yi. Thus, for i> n, we have that xi≥ yi =wi . Also,
since wn = yn, wn+1 = yn+1 and xn≥ y′n = yn +
(
1+ e(yn+1)
) · α we have that
xn≥wn +
(
1+ e(wn+1)
) · α. Thus, we need to see that xi >wi for i< n.
For i, m< i< n, we know that yi =wi and by Corollary 4.1.27, Item 2,
y′i > yi. Since xi≥ y′i for i, m< i< n, then xi >wi. For i≤m, we show by
induction on k that xm−k >wm−k. For the base case, recall that by assumption
ϕ |=J ψ and so, y ∈ JzK, that is, for i ∈ ω, yi≥ zi. Thus, we can first observe
that zm+1≤ ym+1 = wm+1 < xm+1 and max(y′m, z′m)≥ max(ym, z′m). We make
the following case distinction:
If wm = ym, then xm≥ y′m > ym. Therefore, xm >wm;
If wm = zm +
(
1+ e(zm+1)
) · (1+ β)+ e(wm+1), then since xm+1 >wm+1,
we have that
xm ≥ zm +
(
1+ e(zm+1)
) · (1+ β) + e(xm+1)
> zm +
(
1+ e(zm+1)
) · (1+ β) + e(wm+1)
=wm.
Thus, xm >wm.
For the inductive step, by the I.H. we have that xm−k >wm−k. We reason as
follows:
If wm−(k+1)= min{δ : δ≥ ym−(k+1) & l(δ)≥wm−k}, then since y′m > ym
and by the I.H. we have that xm−(k+1)>wm−(k+1);
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If wm−(k+1)= min{δ : δ≥ z′m−(k+1) & l(δ)≥wm−k}, then we can ob-
serve that wm−(k+1)= zm−(k+1)+
(
1+ e(zm−k)
) · (1+ β)+ e(wm−k). Thus,
by the I.H. we get that
xm−(k+1) ≥ zm−(k+1) +
(
1+ e(zm−k)
) · (1+ β) + e(xm−k)
> zm−(k+1) +
(
1+ e(zm−k)
) · (1+ β) + e(wm−k)
=wm−(k+1),
and so xm−(k+1) > wm−(k+1).
Hence, in virtue of the characterization theorem we get that xRαnw, and so
we obtain that x  〈 nα 〉( ϕ ∧ 〈mβ+1 〉ψ ) as needed.
Modal completeness
In the previous chapter we made use of Corollary 3.3.1 to characterize
the non-derivability in our system. As we mentioned, the same result can
be obtained by using relational semantics since for any α> 0 and x ∈ I, we
have that ¬xRαnx.
In this chapter we shall follow a different approach to establish the modal
completeness of TSC. First we prove the following proposition that charac-
terizes the derivability between formulas in monomial normal form in terms
of the pin-functions introduced in Definition 4.1.21. Therefore, this result
provides a refinement of Proposition 3.3.11 by means of the pin-functions.
Proposition 4.2.8. Given ψ0, ψ1 ∈ MNF, we have that:
ψ0 ` ψ1 ⇐⇒ pin(ψ0)≥pin(ψ1) for all n ∈ N-mod(ψ1).
Proof. For the left-to-right implication, assume ψ0 ` ψ1. By Theorem 3.3.11,
Item 2 we have that pin(ψ1)≤ em−n
(
pim(ψ0)
)
for m = µ(n,ψ0). We can ob-
serve that em−n
(
pim(ψ0)
)≤pin(ψ0), and so, we get that pin(ψ0)≥pin(ψ1).
For the right-left-implication, assume that pin(ψ0)≥pin(ψ1) for for any
n ∈ N-mod(ψ1). We make the following case distinction:
If n ∈ N-mod(ψ0), then we have that ψ0 ` 〈 npin(ψ0) 〉>. Since by as-
sumption pin(ψ0)≥pin(ψ1), then by monotonicity axiom (Axiom 3),
〈 npin(ψ0) 〉> ` 〈 npin(ψ1) 〉>. Thus, ψ0 ` 〈 npin(ψ1) 〉>.
If n 6∈ N-mod(ψ0), then pin(ψ0) = em−n
(
pim(ψ0)
)
where m = µ(n,ψ0).
Hence, we have that ψ0 ` 〈 npin(ψ0) 〉> and by reduction axiom (Axiom
5), ψ0 ` 〈mem−n
(
pin(ψ0)
)
〉>. Since em−n(pim(ψ0)) = pin(ψ0)≥pin(ψ1),
with the help of monotonicity axiom, we get that
〈 npin(ψ0) 〉> ` 〈 npin(ψ1) 〉>.
Therefore, ψ0 ` 〈 npin(ψ1) 〉>.
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Thus, for each monomial 〈 nα 〉> occurring in ψ1 we have that ψ0 ` 〈 nα 〉>,
and so, ψ0 ` ψ1.
The following corollary follows immediately from this characterization
of the derivability between formulas in monomial normal form.
Corollary 4.2.9. Given ϕ, ψ ∈ MNF, if ϕ 6` ψ then there is mI ∈ N-mod(ψ) such
that pimI (ϕ)<pimI (ψ).
Now we are ready to prove the completeness of TSC.
Theorem 4.2.10 (Completeness). Given formulas ϕ, ψ ∈ FTSC, if ϕ |=J ψ, then
ϕ ` ψ.
Proof. By Theorem 3.3.7, w.l.o.g. let ϕ, ψ ∈ MNF such that ϕ := 〈 nα00 〉> ∧
. . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉> and ψ := 〈mβ00 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈m
β j
j 〉>. Reasoning by contraposi-
tion, suppose ϕ 6` ψ. Therefore, by Corollary 4.2.9, we can conclude that
for some mI ∈ N-mod(ψ), we have that pimI (ϕ)<pimI (ψ). Thus, consider the
Ignatiev sequence xϕ. By Lemma 4.1.23, Item (2), xϕ  ϕ but xϕ 6 〈mβ II 〉>.
Hence, xϕ 6 ψ and so ϕ 6|=J ψ.
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More on TSC
We dedicate this chapter to collecting some miscellaneous results about
TSC. First, we shall consider a new universal frame for TSC by restricting
the domain of J to those `-sequences with finite support. This new frame
will provide us with some useful arithmetical applications by depicting a
road map to consistency strength and conservativity results of Turing pro-
gressions. Secondly, we shall introduce a presentation of TSC that makes no
use of MNF’s, namely TSC∗. We prove the equivalence between both sys-
tems. Finally, we give a modal formulation of the Schmerl’s formulas and
provide a modal proof of them without requiring the completeness result.
5.1. A Finitely Supported Universal Frame
In this section we present a new universal frame H, which is a slight
modification of J and allows for the modal definability of each world in
the domain. More precisely, the set of worlds of H is built from finitely
supported `-sequences, i.e., sequences of the form 〈 x0, . . . , xk, 0 〉 ∈ I.
Definition 5.1.1. H := 〈H, {Sn}n<ω 〉 is defined as follows:
H := {x∈ I : ∃ n<ω xn = 0 }
and
xSny :⇔ (∀m≤ n xm > ym ∧ ∀m> n xm≥ ym).
Remark 5.1.2. Since H ⊆ I and Sn = Rn  H, clearly for any x, y ∈ H, we have
that xSny ⇐⇒ xRny. Moreover, we can easily check that if x ∈ H and xRny for
some y ∈ I, then y ∈ H and xSny.
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The next lemma is a reformulation of Theorem 4.1.4 for the Sn-relations.
These observations confirm that the Sn-relations are good to model prov-
ability logic.
Lemma 5.1.3.
1. Each Sn for n ∈ ω is transitive: xSny ∧ ySnz ⇒ xSz;
2. Each Sn for n ∈ ω is Noetherian: each non-empty X ⊆ H has an Sn-
maximal element y ∈ X, i.e., ∀ x∈X ¬ySnx;
3. The relations Sn are monotone in n in the sense that: xSny ⇒ xSmy when-
ever n>m.
As we did for J , we need to define the auxiliary relations Sαn for any
n<ω and α<Λ whose purpose is to model the 〈 nα 〉 modality.
Definition 5.1.4. Given x, y ∈ H and Sn on H, we recursively define xSαny as
follows:
1. xS0ny :⇔ x = y;
2. xS1+αn y :⇔ ∀ β< 1+α ∃z
(
xSnz ∧ zSβny
)
.
We can also reformulate Definition 4.1.9 in terms of H.
Definition 5.1.5. Let x ∈ H and ϕ ∈ FTSC. By x  ϕ we denote the validity of ϕ
in x that is recursively defined as follows:
1. x  > for all x ∈ H;
2. x  ϕ ∧ ψ iff x  ϕ and x  ψ;
3. x  〈 nα 〉ϕ iff there is y ∈ H, xSαny and y  ϕ.
The following proposition establishes the preservation between the Sαn
relations of H and the Rαn relations of J when restricted to the elements in
H.
Proposition 5.1.6. For any x, y ∈ H, n < ω and α < Λ:
xSαny ⇐⇒ xRαny.
Proof. We proceed by induction on α being the base case trivial. The succes-
sor and limit cases follows from Remark 5.1.2 and the I.H.
74
5.1. A Finitely Supported Universal Frame
Preservation of validity
To prove the completeness of TSC w.r.t. H, first we shall prove the
preservation of validity between the frames H and J when restricted to
`-sequences with finite support.
Theorem 5.1.7. For any x ∈ H and ϕ ∈ FTSC,
J , x  ϕ ⇐⇒ H, x  ϕ.
Proof. Proof goes by induction on ϕ. The base and conjunctive cases are
straightforward. For the case ϕ := 〈 nα 〉ψ, assume J , x  〈 nα 〉ψ. Thus,
there is y ∈ I such that xRαny and J , y  ψ. By Remark 5.1.2, we know
y ∈ H and by Proposition 5.1.6 we have that xSαny. This together with the
I.H. gives us that there is y ∈ H such that xSαny and H, y  ψ, that is,
H, x  〈 nα 〉ψ. For the other implication, suppose that H, x  〈 nα 〉ψ i.e.
there is y ∈ H such that xSαny and H, y  ψ. By Remark 5.1.2, we know
H ⊂ I. Thus, by Proposition 5.1.6 and the I.H. we obtain that there is y ∈ I
such that xRαny and J , y  ψ and so, J , x  〈 nα 〉ψ.
Now we can show the completeness of our system w.r.t. H.
Theorem 5.1.8. For any ϕ, ψ ∈ FTSC, we have that:
ϕ ` ψ ⇐⇒ ∀ x ∈ H
(
H, x  ϕ =⇒ H, x  ψ
)
.
Proof. For the left-to-right implication, assume ϕ ` ψ. Thus, by Theorem
4.2.2, ϕ |=J ψ. Assume H, x  ϕ for some x ∈ H. Then, by Theorem 5.1.7,
J , x  ϕ and since ϕ |=J ψ, we get that J , x  ψ. Hence, by Theorem 5.1.7,
H, x  ψ.
For the other implication, reasoning by contraposition, assume ϕ 6` ψ
with ϕ,ψ ∈ MNF. Thus, by Corollary 4.2.9, we have that pim(ϕ)<pim(ψ)
for some m ∈ N-mod(ψ). Therefore, by Lemma 4.1.23, Item 1, we have the
following:
J , xϕ  ϕ and J , xϕ 6 ψ.
By Definitions 4.1.22 and 4.1.21 we can observe that xϕ is a `-sequence with
finite support. Thus, xϕ ∈ H. Hence, by means of Theorem 5.1.7, we obtain
that H, xϕ  ϕ but H, xϕ 6 ψ which concludes the proof.
Modal definability
In this subsection we shall see an application of the completeness of TSC
w.r.tH. As established by some results proven in the previous chapter, some
`-sequences seemed to be modally definable, but having finite support was
75
5. More on TSC
essential. We show how this modal definability can be achieved in H.
By m : H → FTSC we denote the map defined as follows:
m
( 〈 α0, . . . , αj, 0 〉 ) = ∧
0≤ i≤ j
〈 iαi 〉>.
While it is not generally true that given x ∈ H, we have that m(x) ∈ MNF,
by simple applications of the reduction axiom (Axiom 5) we can omit the
superfluous terms contained in m(x) and thus, obtain a formula ψx such
that
m(x) ≡ ψx ∈ MNF.
We shall refer to ψx as the corresponding MNF of x. The following lemma
establishes the natural relation between the notion of corresponding world,
introduced in Definition 4.1.22, and the notion of corresponding MNF. The
proof follows immediately from said definition.
Lemma 5.1.9. For any x ∈ H we have that xψx = x.
With the following auxiliary definition we are ready to introduce our
result about the modal definability of the worlds in H.
Definition 5.1.10. For each x ∈ H, by x↓ we denote the subset of H such that
y ∈ x↓ iff yn < xn for some n<ω.
The following two results express the relation between the downset gen-
erated by a world x and the extension of its corresponding MNF.
Lemma 5.1.11. For any x, y ∈ H:
y ∈ x↓ ⇐⇒ H, y 6 ψx.
Proof. For the left-to-right implication, assume y ∈ x↓, that is, yn < xn for
some n<ω. Thus, by Lemma 4.1.23, Item 1 together with Theorem 5.1.7, we
have that H, y 6 〈 nxn 〉>. On the other hand, since ψx ≡ m(x) and m(x) `
〈 nxn 〉>, we have that ψx ` 〈 nxn 〉>. Thus, by completeness (Theorem 5.1.8)
we get that H, y 6 ψx.
For the other implication, reasoning by contraposition, assume y 6∈ x↓.
Thus, for all n<ω we have that yn≥ xn and so, in particular, for all n ∈
N-mod
(
ψx
)
, we have that yn≥ xn = pin(ψx). Then, by Lemma 4.1.23, Item 1
and Theorem 5.1.7, H, y  ψx.
With this last lemma we obtain the following corollary about the modal
definability.
Corollary 5.1.12. For any x ∈ H:
H, x  ψx & ∀ y ∈ x↓, H, y 6 ψx.
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Proof. Folows directly from previous lemma by observing that x 6∈ x↓.
One of the most useful features of the modal definability of H is that
it provides us with a road map to understand the inclusions that hold be-
tween different Turing progressions. The relation between Turing progres-
sions and `-sequences has already been explored in [32] where Ignatiev’s
universal frame is presented as a map to conservation results. However, the
analysis we provide here allows us to compare both the conservation and
the consistency strength of the Turing progressions depicted in the frame
(see Figure 5.1).
To capture this idea, first we make the following observation.
Lemma 5.1.13. For any x, y ∈ H, n<ω and α<Λ, we have that:
xSαny ⇐⇒ ψx ` 〈 nα 〉ψy.
Proof. For the left-to-right implication, assume xSαny and let H, z  ψx for
some z ∈ H. We set out to prove H, z  〈 nα 〉ψy. If H, z  ψx, then z ∈ JψxK.
By Lemma 4.1.28, we have that z ∈ JxψxK and by Lemma 5.1.9, z ∈ JxK.
Thus, since xSαny we have that zSαny and by Theorem 5.1.12, we have that
H, y  ψy. Therefore, H, z  〈 nα 〉ψy, and so, by completeness (Theorem
5.1.8), ψx ` 〈 nα 〉ψy.
For the other implication, assume ψx ` 〈 nα 〉ψy. By completeness we
have that
∀z ∈ H (H, z  ψx =⇒ H, z  〈 nα 〉ψy )
and by Theorem 5.1.12, H, x  ψx. Hence, H, x  〈 nα 〉ψy, that is, ∃z′ ∈ H
such that xSαnz′ and H, z′  ψy. Then, x ∈ Jz′K and by a combination of
Lemmas 4.1.28 and 5.1.9, z′ ∈ JψyK = JyK. Therefore, xSαny.
This last result together with the arithmetical completeness (Theorems
3.2.6 and 3.3.13) gives us the aforementioned road map.
Lemma 5.1.14. For any x, y ∈ H, n<ω and α<Λ, we have that:
xSαny ⇐⇒ EA+ ` (Thψy)αn ⊆ Thψx .
H also provide us with a road map to conservation results. This can be
achieved by defining the following family of relations {≈n}n<ω on H:
x ≈n y :⇔ ∀m≤ n xm = ym.
From an arithmetical point of view, the ≈n-relations specify that (the the-
ories of) x and y accumulate the same amount of m-consistency for m≤ n.
Thus, we obtain the following result
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Proposition 5.1.15. For any x, y ∈ H and n<ω, we have that:
x ≈n y ⇐⇒ EA+ ` Thψx ≡n Thψy .
The proof of this last proposition follows from Lemma 3.2.14 and the
following observation:
Lemma 5.1.16. Let ψ := 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉> ∧ 〈mβ 〉> ∈ MNF and
n, nk < n<m. Provably in EA+:
Thψ ≡n (EA+)α0n0 + . . . + (EA+)αknk + (EA+)
em−n(β)
n .
Proof. Since ψ ` 〈 nα00 〉>∧ . . .∧ 〈 nαkk 〉> ∧ 〈 ne
m−n(β) 〉>, in particular we have
the right-to-left inclusion. For the left-to-right inclusion, reasoning in EA+,
let pi ∈ Π0n+1 such that

(EA+)
α0
n0 + ...+ (EA
+)
αk
nk + (EA
+)
em−n(β)
n
pi.
By the formalized deduction theorem we get that

(EA+)
em−n(β)
n
( ∧
0≤ i≤ k
Conni
(
(EA+)
βi
ni
)→ pi)
for some sequence of βi ≺ αi. Since each Conni
(
(EA+)
βi
ni
) ∈ Π0ni+1 we have
that
(∧
0≤i<j′ Conni
(
(EA+)
βi
ni
) → pi) ∈ Π0n+1. Thus, by reduction property
(Item 3.2.5 of Proposition 3.2.5) , we have that

(EA+)
β
m
( ∧
0≤ i≤ k
Conni
(
(EA+)
βi
ni
)→ pi)
and so, by monotonicity Thψpi.
Now we are ready to give a detailed proof of Proposition 5.1.15.
Proof. We start by the left-to-right implication. Suppose x ≈n y, and let
ψx := 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉> and ψy := 〈mβ00 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈m
β j
j 〉>. Moreover,
let n∗ = µ(n,ψx) and m∗ = µ(n,ψy). Thus, by a combination of Lemmas
3.2.14 and 5.1.16, we have that:
a) Thψx ≡n∗ (EA+)α0n0 + . . . + (EA+)αn∗n∗ ≡n (EA+)α0n0 + . . . + (EA+)e
n∗−n(αn∗ )
n ;
b) Thψy ≡m∗ (EA+)β0m0 + . . . + (EA+)βm∗m∗ ≡n (EA+)β0m0 + . . . + (EA+)e
m∗−n(βm∗ )
n .
Furthermore, we can make the following observations:
en
∗−n(αn∗) = xn∗ = yn∗ = em
∗−n(βm∗);
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Since for all m< n we have that xm = ym, for any ni < n such that
ni ∈ N-mod(ψx), provably in EA+:
(EA+)
αni
ni ⊆ (EA+)β0m0 + . . . + (EA+)e
m∗−n(βm∗ )
n .
Analogously, for any mi < n such that mi ∈ N-mod(ψy), we have that:
(EA+)
βmi
mi ⊆ (EA+)α0n0 + . . . + (EA+)
en
∗−n(αn∗ )
n .
Thus, we have that
Thψx ≡n (EA+)α0n0 + . . . + (EA+)e
n∗−n(αn∗ )
n
≡ (EA+)β0m0 + . . . + (EA+)e
m∗−n(βm∗ )
n
≡n Thψy .
For the right-to-left implication, assume Thψx ≡n Thψy and suppose to-
wards a contradiction that there is m< n such that xm 6= ym. W.l.o.g assume
that xm > ym. Hence, we can observe that Conm
(
(EA+)
ym
m
)
is a Π0n+1-formula
that by Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem is not provable in Thψy while
remains provable in Thψx . This argument can be formalized in EA
+ which
contradicts our assumption.
5.2. A calculus without normal forms
This section is dedicated to introduce a presentation of TSC that makes
no use of formulas in monomial normal form. To this purpose, we shall
make use of INF’s, define the notion of m-β-ordinals and replace Schmerl’s
axiom by a new principle that establishes the derivability between INF’s.
Definition 5.2.1. Let 〈 nα 〉A ∈ INF, m< n and β<Λ. By oβm
(〈 nα 〉A) we denote
the m-β-ordinal of 〈 nα 〉A, that is recursively defined as follows:
i) oβm
(〈 nα 〉>) = en−m(α) · (1+ β);
ii) oβm
(〈 nα 〉A) = en−m(oαn(A)) · (1+ β).
For any m<ω and β<Λ, we set oβm(>) to be zero.
By TSC∗ we denote the system obtained by substituting in TSC the
Schmerl axiom by the following principle:
IW axioms: 〈 nα 〉A ≡ 〈 noαn(A) 〉> ∧ A
for 〈 nα 〉A ∈ INF.
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EA+
(EA+)10
(EA+)20
...
(EA+)11 (EA
+)!0
(EA+)!+10
...
((EA+)11)
1
0 (EA
+)!·20
... ...
((EA+)11)
n
0 (EA
+)
!·(n+1)
0
... ...
(EA+)21 ((EA
+)11)
!
0 (EA
+)!
2
0
...
((EA+)11)
!+1
0 (EA
+)!
2+!
0
... ...
((EA+)21)
1
0 ((EA
+)11)
!·2
0 (EA
+)!
2·2
0
... ... ...
(EA+)n+21 : : : ((EA
+)21)
!n
0 ((EA
+)11)
!n+1
0 (EA
+)!
n+2
0
... ... ... ...
I1 PRA : : : ((EA
+)n+21 )
!ω
0 : : : ((EA
+)21)
!ω
0 ((EA
+)11)
!ω
0 (EA
+)!
ω
0
: : :
: : :: : :
: : : : : :
: : :
1
Figure 5.1: A fragment of the road map generated by frame H. The black
single-headed arrows (→) represent the inclusion between theories (⊆). The
blue and red double-headed arrows represent the Π01- and Π
0
2-conservativity
relations, respectively. The equivalences (EA+)12 ≡ IΣ1 and (EA+)ω1 ≡ PRA
are displayed in the picture.
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MNF’s and INF’s
To prove the equivalence of both systems, first we shall see how formu-
las in monomial normal form and increasing worms are related. Therefore,
in the following lemmata we state how every formula in monomial normal
form is equivalent to an increasing worm, modulo TSC∗, and likewise, that
every increasing worm is TSC-equivalent to a formula in monomial normal
form.
From now on we will use the following notation: given ϕ, ψ ∈ FTSC, we
write ϕ `TSC ψ (ϕ `TSC∗ ψ) to denote that the sequent ϕ ` ψ is derivable
in TSC (TSC∗). Analogously, we use ϕ ≡TSC ψ (ϕ ≡TSC∗ ψ) to denote that
both ϕ ` ψ and ψ ` ϕ are derivable in TSC (TSC∗).
Lemma 5.2.2. For every ψ := 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉> ∈ MNF there is an A ∈
INF such that:
1. A ≡TSC∗ ψ;
2. A := 〈 nβ00 〉 . . . 〈 nβkk 〉> where:
a) βk = αk and
b) for all i, 0≤ i< k we have
βi = −1+ αieni+1−ni(αi+1) .
Proof. By induction on k. The base case is trivial and the inductive case
follows from the I.H. and the IW axiom.
Recall that by Corollary 3.3.7, for each formula ϕ ∈ FTSC there is a
unique ψ ∈ MNF such that ϕ ≡ ψ. Thus, in particular, any A ∈ INF has its
corresponding ψ ∈ MNF. This combined with Theorem 2.3.2 gives us the
following lemma.
Lemma 5.2.3. For any A := 〈 nβ00 〉 . . . 〈 nβkk 〉> ∈ INF there is a unique ψ ∈ MNF
such that:
1. ψ ≡TSC A;
2. ψ := 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nαkk 〉> where:
a) αk = βk and
b) for all i, 0≤ i< k we have
αi = o
βi
ni
( 〈 nβi+1i+1 〉 . . . 〈 nβkk 〉> ).
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Equivalence between TSC∗ and TSC
We are ready to prove the equivalence of both systems by checking the
interderivability of Schmerl and IW axioms.
Proposition 5.2.4. The Schmerl axiom is derivable in TSC∗ i.e.
〈 nα 〉( 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ ψ ) ≡TSC∗ 〈 nen0−n(α0)·(1+α) 〉> ∧ 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ ψ
for n< n0 and 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ ψ ∈ MNF.
Proof. By Lemma 5.2.2 we have that:
〈 nα 〉( 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ ψ ) ≡TSC∗ 〈 nα 〉〈 nβ00 〉A
with 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ ψ ≡TSC∗ 〈 nβ00 〉A ∈ INF. Thus, by the IW axiom, we get that
〈 nα 〉( 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ ψ ) ≡TSC∗ 〈 noαn(〈 nβ00 〉A) 〉> ∧ 〈 nβ00 〉A,
and so
〈 nα 〉( 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ ψ ) ≡TSC∗ 〈 noαn(〈 nβ00 〉A) 〉> ∧ 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ ψ.
Since oαn
(〈 nβ00 〉A) = en0−n( oβ0n0 (A) ) · (1+ α) and by Lemma 5.2.2, oβ0n0 (A) =
α0, we can conclude that oαn
(〈 nβ00 〉A) = en0−n(α0) · (1+ α) and therefore:
〈 nα 〉( 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ ψ ) ≡TSC∗ 〈 nen0−n(α0)·(1+α) 〉> ∧ 〈 nα00 〉> ∧ ψ.
Proposition 5.2.5. The IW axiom is derivable in TSC i.e.
〈 nα 〉A ≡TSC 〈 noαn(A) 〉> ∧ A
for 〈 nα 〉A ∈ INF.
Proof. By induction on A with base case being trivial. For the inductive step,
let A := 〈 nβ00 〉A′. By Lemma 5.2.3, we have that
〈 nα 〉A ≡TSC 〈 nα 〉
( 〈 noβ0n0 (A′)0 〉> ∧ ψ )
for 〈 nβ00 〉A′ ≡TSC 〈 n
oβ0n0 (A
′)
0 〉> ∧ ψ ∈ MNF, and so by Schmerl’s axiom:
〈 nα 〉A ≡TSC 〈 ne
n0−n
(
oβ0n0 (A
′)
)
·(1+α) 〉 ∧ 〈 no
β0
n0 (A
′)
0 〉> ∧ ψ.
Thus,
〈 nα 〉A ≡TSC 〈 no
α
n
(
〈 nβ00 〉A′
)
〉 ∧ 〈 no
β0
n0 (A
′)
0 〉> ∧ ψ,
that is, 〈 nα 〉A ≡TSC 〈 no
α
n
(
〈 nβ00 〉A′
)
〉 ∧ A.
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Corollary 5.2.6. For any ϕ, ψ ∈ FTSC,
ϕ `TSC ψ ⇐⇒ ϕ `TSC∗ ψ.
Proof. By induction on the length of the proof. It follows immediately from
Propositions 5.2.4 and 5.2.5.
5.3. Modal Schmerl principles
In this subsection we give a modal formulation of the Schmerl’s formulas
introduced in Proposition 3.2.5. We provide a modal proof without using
the completeness result.
Proposition 5.3.1. For any ϕ ∈ F<n+2, the following principles are derivable TSC:
1. 〈 (n + 1)α 〉 ϕ ≡n 〈 ne(α) 〉 ϕ;
2. 〈 nα 〉 〈 (n + 1)β 〉 ϕ ≡n 〈 ne(β)·(1+α) 〉 ϕ.
Proof. We only check Item 2 since Item 1 follows from Item 2 by taking
α = 0. Let ψ ∈ MNF such that ψ ≡ ϕ. First we prove that the sequent
〈 nα 〉 〈 (n + 1)β 〉 ϕ ` 〈 ne(β)·(1+α) 〉 ϕ
is derivable. By Theorem 2.3.10 and monotonicity we have that:
〈 nα 〉 〈 (n + 1)β 〉 ϕ `
( ∧
0≤i≤k 〈 nαi+e
n−ni (e(β)·(1+α))
i 〉>
)
∧
〈 nγ+e(β)·(1+α) 〉> ∧ 〈 (n + 1)δ 〉>
where each 〈 nαii 〉> occurs in ψ with nk < n, and γ and δ might be 0. Thus,
by (PS1) we get that 〈 nα 〉 〈 (n + 1)β 〉 ϕ ` 〈 ne(β)·(1+α) 〉 ϕ.
For the other direction, consider χ ∈ Fn+1 such that 〈 nα 〉 〈 (n+ 1)β 〉 ϕ `
χ. Therefore, by (PS1) and (PS2) get the following:( ∧
0≤i≤k〈 nαi+e
n+1−ni (δ+β)+en−ni (α)
i 〉>
)
∧
〈 nγ+e(δ+β)+e(δ+β)·α 〉> ∧ 〈 (n + 1)δ+β 〉> ` χ
where as before, each 〈 nαii 〉> occurs in ψ with nk < n, and γ and δ might be
0. Thus,
〈 nκ00 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nκkk 〉> ∧ 〈 nγ+e(δ+β)·(1+α) 〉> ∧ 〈 (n + 1)δ+β 〉> ` χ
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where κk := αk + en−nk
(
γ+ e(δ+ β) · (1 + α) ) and κi := αi + eni+1−ni(κi+1).
We can easily check that there is {n0, . . . , nj} ⊆ N-mod
( 〈 nκ00 〉> ∧ . . . ∧
〈 nκkk 〉>
)
1 such that:
〈 nκ00 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 n
κj
j 〉> ∧ 〈 nγ+e(δ+β)·(1+α) 〉> ∧ 〈 (n + 1)δ+β 〉> ` χ
and 〈 nκ00 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 n
κj
j 〉> ∧ 〈 nγ+e(δ+β)·(1+α) 〉> ∧ 〈 (n+ 1)δ+β 〉> ∈ MNF.
Let χ′ ∈ MNF such that χ′ ≡ χ. Then, with the help of Proposition 3.3.10 we
get that:
〈 nκ00 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 n
κj
j 〉> ∧ 〈 nγ+e(δ+β)·(1+α) 〉> ` χ′.
Finally, notice that
〈 ne(β)·(1+α) 〉ψ ` 〈 nκ00 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 nκkk 〉> ∧ 〈 nγ+e(δ+β)·(1+α) 〉>.
This way, 〈 ne(β)·(1+α) 〉ψ ` 〈 nκ00 〉> ∧ . . . ∧ 〈 n
κj
j 〉> ∧ 〈 nγ+e(δ+β)·(1+α) 〉>
and so
〈 ne(β)·(1+α) 〉ψ ` χ′
i.e. 〈 ne(β)·(1+α) 〉 ϕ ` χ.
1Observe that this subset may be empty.
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CHAPTER 6
The Bracket Calculus
The content of this chapter is focused on the relation between provability
logics and the ordinal notation systems that emerge from them. As raised
in the introduction, Beklemishev introduced an ordinal notation system for
the Feferman-Schu¨tte ordinal Γ0 based on the autonomous expansion of prov-
ability algebras (see [7]). In this chapter we shall present the logic BC (for
Bracket Calculus). The main feature of BC is that it is based on a signature
that extends Beklemishev’s brackets notation system to a strictly positive
modal language. Thus, unlike other provability logics, BC does not rely
on using modalities indexed by some ordinal given a priori but it is built
up from a purely modal signature signature. Moreover, since the order be-
tween these notations can be established in terms of derivability within the
calculus, the inferences in this system can be carried out without using any
external property of ordinals. In this sense, we say that BC provides an au-
tonomous provability calculus that to the best of our knowledge, yields the
first ordinal notation system presented as a purely modal deductive system.
The presented logic is proven to be equivalent to RCΓ0 . The main results
of this chapter can be found in [21].
6.1. Beklemishev’s bracket notation system for Γ0
Before we introduce the full bracket calculus, let us review Beklemishev’s
notation system from [7]. We start by defining the set of bracket expressions.
Definition 6.1.1. By W() we denote the smallest set such that:
1. > ∈W();
2. if a, b ∈W(), then (a)b ∈W().
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By convention we shall write ()a, for a ∈ W() to the denote (>)a ∈
W().
We can define a translation ∗ : W() →W in such a way that the elements
in W() will denote the ordinals indexing the modalities in W:
1. >∗ = >
2.
(
(a)b
)∗
= 〈 o(a∗) 〉b∗.
Therefore, we can also define o∗ : W() → Γ0 as o∗(a) = o(a∗). Thus
the worm 〈0〉> becomes () and o∗(()) = 1, 〈1〉> becomes (()) with
o∗
(
(())
)
= ω, 〈ω〉> becomes ((())) that corresponds to the ordinal ε0,
etc.
Next we make some observations about how the ordinals represented by
worms in W() can be bounded in terms of the maximum number of nested
brackets occurring in them. With this purpose, we introduce the following
two definitions.
Definition 6.1.2. For a ∈W(), we define the nesting of a, N(a), as the maximum
number of nested brackets. That is:
1. N(>) = 0;
2. N((a)b) = max
(
N(a) + 1, N(b)
)
.
Definition 6.1.3. We recursively define the function h : N→ Γ0 as follows:
1. h(0) = 0;
2. h(n + 1) = eh(n)1.
Note that limn→∞ h(n) = Γ0.
In the following proposition we can find upper and lower bounds for
any ordinal o∗(a), with a ∈W(), according to the nesting of a.
Proposition 6.1.4. For a ∈W(), if N(a) = n, then h(n)≤ o∗(a)< h(n + 1).
Proof. By induction on n. If n = 0 then we must have a = >, hence h(0) =
0 = o∗(a)< 1 = h(1).
For n = n′+ 1, we have that a = (a0) . . . (am) for some m ∈ ω. More-
over,
1. N(ai)≤ n′ for i, 0≤ i≤m;
2. there is aJ such that N(aJ) = n′.
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Thus by the I.H. we get that a∗ = 〈α0〉 . . . 〈αk〉> such that:
1. For each i, αi < h(n′ + 1);
2. there is αJ ≥ h(n′).
By Lemma 1.4.14,
o(〈h(n′)〉>)≤ o(a∗)< o(〈h(n′ + 1)〉>);
but by Theorem 1.4.13 o(〈h(n′)〉>) = eh(n′)1 = h(n), while o(〈h(n′+ 1)〉>) =
eh(n)1 = h(n + 1), as needed.
As a consequence of this last proposition, we get the following corollar-
ies.
Corollary 6.1.5. For a ∈W(), if N(a) = n, then a∗ ∈Wh(n).
Corollary 6.1.6. For a, b ∈W(), o∗(a)≥ o∗(b) ⇒ N(a)≥N(b).
Proof. We reason by contrapositive applying Proposition 6.1.4.
6.2. Signature
The set of BC-formulas, F(), is defined by extending W() to a strictly
positive signature.
Definition 6.2.1. By F() we denote the set of formulas built-up by the following
grammar:
ϕ := > | p | ϕ ∧ ψ | (a) ϕ for a ∈W().
Similarly to RC, BC is based on sequents, i.e. expressions of the form
ϕ ` ψ, where ϕ, ψ ∈ F(). In addition to this, we will also use a b, for
a, b ∈W(), to denote that either a ` () b or a ` b are derivable. Analogously,
we will use a b to denote that the sequent a ` ()b is derivable.
Definition 6.2.2. BC is given by the following set of axioms and rules:
Axioms:
1. ϕ ` ϕ, ϕ ` >;
2. ϕ ∧ ψ ` ϕ, ϕ ∧ ψ ` ψ;
Rules:
1. If ϕ ` ψ and ϕ ` χ, then ϕ ` ψ ∧ χ;
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2. If ϕ ` ψ and ψ ` χ, then ϕ ` χ;
3. If ϕ ` ψ and a b, then (a) ϕ ` (b)ψ and (a) (b) ϕ ` (b)ψ;
4. If a b, then (a) ϕ ∧ (b)ψ ` (a) (ϕ ∧ (b)ψ).
Although BC and RC look quite similar, there is a main difference be-
tween them. As we can see, in BC there is no external reference to ordinals,
and thus, every derivation is carried out within the calculus. Let us consider
the following example.
Let n ∈ N. The sequent 〈ω 〉> ` 〈 n 〉> is derivable in RCΓ0 by a simple
application of Axiom 4 together with the fact that ω> n. However, this last
fact is something that we check outside the calculus. If we would like to
mimic this derivation within BC1, we could make use of Rule 3. By Axiom
1, we have that > `BC >, so it suffices to give a derivation of “ω> n′′ within
BC.
For n = 0, we need to check that (()) ` (). By Axiom 1, we obtain that
the sequents () ` > and > ` > are derivable in BC. Thus, we can combine
this with the following reasoning:
() ` > > ` >
(Rule 3)
(()) ` ()
If n = 1, we need to check that (()) ` ()(). First, we can extend the
previous reasoning as follows:
() ` > > ` >
(Rule 3)
(()) ` () (()) ` (())
(∗∗) (Rule 1)
(()) ` ()∧ (()) () ` ()
(Rules 4 and 2)
(()) ` (())
(
()∧>
)
Moreover, we have that
()∧> ` () () ` ()
(Rule 3)
(())
(
()∧>
)
` (()) ()
Combining these two derivations we obtain that
(()) ` (())
(
()∧>
)
(())
(
()∧>
)
` (()) ()
(Rule 2)
(()) ` (()) () () ` >
(Rule 3 and 2)
(()) ` () ()
1in previous section we shall make precise how to interpret BC-formulas into RCΓ0 -
formulas and vice versa
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In general, by iterating n-times this last part of the derivation from where
we made an introduction of the conjunction (∗∗), we obtain that
(()) ` () . . . () ()︸ ︷︷ ︸
n+1-times
i.e., “ω> n′′. In a similar fashion, applying Rule 3 together with this last
derivation we get that
((())) ` ( () . . . () ()︸ ︷︷ ︸
n+1-times
)
i.e., “ε0 > en(1)′′. These examples illustrate how the required relations be-
tween ordinals can be derived within BC without any help of external ref-
erences.
6.3. Translation and preservability
In this section we introduce a way of interpreting BC-formulas as RCΓ0-
formulas, and prove that under this translation, both systems can derive
exactly the same sequents.
Definition 6.3.1. We define a translation τ between F() and FΓ0 , τ : F() → FΓ0 ,
as follows:
1. >τ = >;
2. pτ = p;
3. (ϕ ∧ ψ)τ = (ϕτ ∧ ψτ);
4. ((a) ϕ)τ = 〈 o∗(a) 〉ϕτ.
Note that for a ∈ W(), aτ = a∗. From this and a routine induction, the
following can readily be verified.
Lemma 6.3.2. Given ϕ ∈ F() and α ∈ S(ϕτ), there is a subformula a ∈W() of
ϕ such that α = o∗(a).
The following lemma establishes the preservability of BC with respect to
RCΓ0 , under τ.
Lemma 6.3.3. For any ϕ, ψ ∈ F(): ϕ `BC ψ =⇒ ϕτ `RCΓ0 ψτ.
Proof. By induction on the length of the derivation. We can easily check
that the set of axioms of BC is preserved under τ. Likewise, the cases for a
derivation ending on Rules 1 or 2 are straightforward. Thus, we only check
Rules 3 and 4.
Regarding Rule 3, we need to prove that if a  b then both sequents
〈o∗(a)〉ϕτ ` 〈o∗(b)〉ψτ and 〈o∗(a)〉〈o∗(b)〉ϕτ ` 〈o∗(b)〉ψτ are derivable in
RCΓ0 . We can make the following observations by applying the I.H.:
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1. Since a  b, we have that either aτ ` 〈0〉bτ or aτ ` bτ are derivable in
RCΓ0 . Therefore, o(a
τ)≥ o(bτ). Since o∗(a) = o(a∗) = o(aτ) and the
same equality holds for b, we have that o∗(a)≥ o∗(b).
2. We also have that ϕτ `RCΓ0 ψτ and thus, by Rule 3 of RCΓ0 we obtain
that 〈o∗(a)〉ϕτ ` 〈o∗(a)〉ψτ and 〈o∗(a)〉〈o∗(b)〉ϕτ ` 〈o∗(a)〉〈o∗(b)〉ψτ
are derivable in RCΓ0 .
On the one hand, by these two facts together with Axiom 4 we obtain that
〈o∗(a)〉ϕτ `RCΓ0 〈o∗(b)〉ψτ. On the other hand, we can combine Axioms 4
and 3 to get that 〈o∗(a)〉〈o∗(b)〉ϕτ `RCΓ0 〈o∗(b)〉ψτ.
We follow an analogous reasoning in the case of Rule 4. By the I.H. we
have that aτ `RCΓ0 〈0〉bτ. Therefore o∗(a)> o∗(b) and by Axiom 5, 〈o∗(a)〉ϕ∧
〈o∗(b)〉ψ `RCΓ0 〈o∗(a)〉
(
ϕ ∧ 〈o∗(b)〉ψ).
With the following definition we fix a way of translating FΓ0-formulas
into formulas in F(). However, since different words in W() might denote
the same ordinal, we need a normal form theorem for W().
Definition 6.3.4. We define N ⊂ W() to be the smallest set of W()-words such
that > ∈ N and for any (a)b ∈ W(), if a, b ∈ N and
(
(a)b
)∗ ∈ BNF, then
(a)b ∈ N.
Every element of W() has a unique normal form, as shown by L. Bek-
lemishev in [7].
Theorem 6.3.5 (Beklemishev). For each α ∈ Γ0 we can associate a unique aα ∈ N
such that o∗(aα) = α.
Proposition 6.3.6 (Beklemishev). The ordering
(
N, <0
)
is a well-ordering of
order type Γ0.
Now we are ready to translate FΓ0-formulas into F()-formulas.
Definition 6.3.7. We define a translation ι between FΓ0 and F(), ι : FΓ0 → F(),
as follows:
1. >ι = >;
2. pι = p;
3. (ϕ ∧ ψ)ι = (ϕι ∧ ψι);
4. (〈α〉 ϕ)ι = (aα)ϕι.
The following remark follows immediately from the definitions of τ and
ι.
Remark 6.3.8. For any ϕ ∈ FΓ0 , (ϕι)τ = ϕ.
With the next definition, we extend the nesting N(a) of a∈W() to F()-
formulas.
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Definition 6.3.9. For ϕ ∈ F(), we define the nesting of ϕ, Nt(ϕ), as the maximum
number of nested brackets. That is:
1. Nt(>) = Nt(p) = N(>);
2. Nt(ϕ ∧ ψ) = max (Nt(ϕ), Nt(ψ));
3. Nt((a) ϕ) = max
(
N((a)), Nt(ϕ)
)
= max
(
N(a) + 1, Nt(ϕ)
)
.
The upcoming remark collects a useful observation concerning the nest-
ing Nt(ϕ) of a formula ϕ and its subformulas. This fact can be verified by
an easy induction.
Remark 6.3.10. For any ϕ ∈ F() with ϕ 6= p, there is a subformula a ∈W() of ϕ
such that Nt(ϕ) = Nt(a). Moreover, if Nt(ϕ)≥ 1, there is a subformula a ∈W()
of ϕ such that Nt(ϕ) = Nt(a) + 1.
For each RCΓ0-formula ϕ, we can define the signature of ϕ as the set of
ordinals occurring in any of its modalities.
Definition 6.3.11. For any ϕ ∈ FΓ0 , we define the signature of ϕ, S(ϕ), as
follows:
1. S(>) = S(p) = ∅;
2. S(ϕ ∧ ψ) = S(ϕ) ∪ S(ψ);
3. S(〈 α 〉ϕ) = {α} ∪ S(ϕ).
With the help of this last definition we can make the following observa-
tion:
Lemma 6.3.12. For any ϕ, ψ ∈ FΓ0 :
1. If S(ψ) 6= ∅ and ϕ ` ψ, then maxS(ϕ)≥ maxS(ψ);
2. If S(ϕ) = ∅ and ϕ ` ψ, then S(ψ) = ∅.
Proof. By an easy induction on the length of the derivation of ϕ ` ψ.
The following lemma relates the derivability in RCΓ0 under τ, and the
nesting of formulas in F().
Lemma 6.3.13. For any ϕ, ψ ∈ F():
ϕτ `RCΓ0 ψτ =⇒ Nt(ϕ)≥Nt(ψ).
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Proof. Suppose that ϕτ `RCΓ0 ψτ. If S(ψτ) = ∅ then it is easy to check
that Nt(ψ) = 0 and there is nothing to prove, so assume otherwise. Then,
by Lemma 6.3.12.1, maxS(ϕτ)≥ maxS(ψτ). Using Lemma 6.3.2, let a ∈
W() be a subformula of ϕ such that o∗(a) = maxS(ϕτ). Moreover, since
S(ψτ) = ∅, then Nt(ψ)≥ 1. Therefore, with the help of Remark 6.3.10
we can consider b ∈ W(), a subformula of ψ such that Nt(ψ) = N(b) +
1. If we had N(a)<N(b) then it would follow from Corollary 6.1.6 that
o∗(a)< o∗(b), contradicting maxS(ϕτ)≥ maxS(ϕτ). Thus N(a)≥N(b) and
Nt(ϕ)≥N(a) + 1≥Nt(ψ), as needed.
With the following theorem we conclude the proof of the preservability
between BC and RCΓ0 .
Theorem 6.3.14. For any ϕ, ψ ∈ F():
ϕτ `RCΓ0 ψτ ⇐⇒ ϕ `BC ψ.
Proof. The right-to-left direction is given by Lemma 6.3.3, so we focus on the
other. Proceed by induction on Nt(ϕ). For the base case, assume Nt(ϕ) = 0
and ϕτ `RCΓ0 ψτ. By a subsidiary induction on the length of the derivation
of ϕτ `RCΓ0 ψτ, we set to prove ϕ `BC ψ. If the derivation has length one
it suffices to check RCΓ0-Axioms 1 and 2, which is immediate. If it has
length greater than one it must end in a rule. The case for RCΓ0-Rule 1
follows by the I.H.. For RCΓ0-Rule 2, we have that there is χ ∈ FΓ0 such that
ϕτ `RCΓ0 χ and χ `RCΓ0 ψτ. By Remark 6.3.8 and Lemma 6.3.13, we get that
ϕτ `RCΓ0 (χι)τ and (χι)τ `RCΓ0 ψτ with Nt(χι) = 0. Thus, by the subsidiary
I.H., ϕ `BC χι and χι `BC ψ and by BC-Rule 2, ϕ `BC ψ.
For the inductive step, let Nt(ϕ) = n + 1. We proceed by a subsidiary
induction on the length of the derivation. If ϕτ `RCΓ0 ψτ is obtained by
means of RCΓ0-Axioms 1 and 2, then clearly ϕ `BC ψ. If ϕτ `RCΓ0 ψτ is an
instance of RCΓ0-Axiom 3, then we have that ϕ
τ := 〈 o∗(a) 〉〈 o∗(b) 〉χτ and
ψτ := 〈 o∗(c) 〉χτ for some χ ∈ F() and a, b, c ∈ W() such that o∗(a) =
o∗(b) = o∗(c). Hence, there are A, B, C ∈ W such that a∗ = A, b∗ = B
and c∗ = C, and so A `RCΓ0 B and B `RCΓ0 C. Since Nt(w)< n + 1 for
w ∈ {a, b, c}, by the main I.H. we have that a `BC b and b `BC c. Thus, we
have the following BC-derivation:
χ ` χ b ` c
(Rule 3)
(b)χ ` (c)χ a ` b
(Rule 3)
(a)(b)χ ` (b)(c)χ
χ ` χ b ` c
(Rule 3)
(b)(c)χ ` (c)χ
(Rule 2)
(a)(b)χ ` (c)χ
If ϕτ `RCΓ0 ψτ is obtained by using RCΓ0-Axiom 4, then ϕτ := 〈 o∗(a) 〉χτ
and ψτ := 〈 o∗(b) 〉χτ. for some χ ∈ F() and a, b,∈W() with o∗(a)> o∗(b).
Therefore, there are A, B ∈ WΓ0 such that A `RCΓ0 〈 0 〉B, a∗ = A and
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b∗ = B. Since o∗(a)≥ o∗(()b), by Lemma 6.3.12, Nt(()b)≤Nt(a) and since
ϕτ := 〈 o∗(a) 〉χτ, we have that Nt(a)<Nt(ϕ). Thus, by the main I.H. a `BC
()b and by BC-Rule 3, (a)χ `BC (b)χ. If ϕτ `RCΓ0 ψτ is an instance of
RCΓ0-Axiom 5, then we have that ϕ
τ := 〈 o∗(a) 〉χτ0 ∧ 〈 o∗(b) 〉χτ1 and ψτ :=
〈 o∗(a) 〉( χτ0 ∧ 〈 o∗(b) 〉χτ1 ), for some χ0, χ1 ∈ F() and a, b ∈ W() with
o∗(a)> o∗(b). Therefore, there are A, B ∈ WΓ0 such that a∗ = A, b∗ = B
and A `RCΓ0 〈 0 〉B. By Lemma 6.3.12 together with the main I.H. we obtain
that a `BC ()b and by applying BC-Rule 4, (a)χ0 ∧ (b)χ1 ` (a)
(
χ0 ∧
(b)χ1
)
. Regarding rules, RCΓ0-Rule 1 is immediate and RCΓ0-Rule 3 follows
an analogous reasoning to that of Axiom 4. This way, we only check RCΓ0-
Rule 2. Assume ϕτ `RCΓ0 ψτ is obtained by an application of RCΓ0-Rule 2.
Then, there is χ ∈ FΓ0 such that ϕτ `RCΓ0 χ and χ `RCΓ0 ψτ. By Remark 6.3.8
together with Lemma 6.3.13 we obtain that ϕτ `RCΓ0 (χι)τ and (χι)τ `RCΓ0
ψτ with Nt(χ)≤ n + 1. By the subsidiary I.H. ϕ `BC χι and χι `BC ψ and
hence, by BC-Rule 2, ϕ `BC ψ.
With this we obtain our main result: an autonomous calculus for repre-
senting ordinals below Γ0.
Theorem 6.3.15. For a, b ∈ N define a C b if and only if a `BC ()b. Then, C is a
strict linear order of order-type Γ0.
Proof. By Theorem 6.3.14, a C b if and only if aτ `RCΓ0 〈 0 〉bτ if and only
if o∗(a)< o∗(b). Moreover if ξ< o∗(a) then there is some B <0 aτ such that
ξ = o(B), hence ξ = o∗(Bι). Thus by Lemma 1.2.4 o∗ is the order-type
function on N. That the range of o∗ is Γ0 follows from Proposition 6.1.4
which tells us that o∗(a)< h(N(a) + 1)< Γ0 for all a ∈ W(), while if we
define recursively a0 = > and an+1 = (an), Theorem 1.4.13 and an easy
induction readily yield Γ0 = limn→∞ h(n) = limn→∞ o∗(an).
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Future Work
In this last chapter we shall collect some of the future directions in which
the work presented in this dissertation can be extended. For the most part,
the ideas discussed in this last chapter are work in progress and so, they
will not be presented in full detail. However, we deem the open problems
that came up during the withing of the thesis to be worth mentoning.
Extensions of TSC
In Chapters 4 and 5, we examine the relations between MNF’s and `-
sequences. As we saw, formulas in monomial normal form and `-sequences
of the form 〈 x0, . . . , xk, 0 〉 can be related. Thus, having finite support is
essential. However, when working in a signature with Λ> ε0, we shall
come across sequences that do not converge to zero e.g. the sequence
〈 ε0, ε0, . . . , ε0, . . . 〉.
Non-finitely supported `-sequences cannot be defined by means of a
modal formula. However, we can provide a natural arithmetical interpreta-
tion of these sequences.
Given a `-sequence of the form 〈 εα, εα, . . . , εα, . . . 〉, it can be associated to
the Turing progression ⋃
n<ω
(EA+)εαn .
Thus, the natural candidate to represent this theory in our modal setting
would be ∧
n<ω
〈 nεα 〉>,
which requires to allow infinite conjunctions.
Another solution to this situation involves extending our current modal
signature and making use of the conservativity results about transfinite in-
duction and Turing progressions established by Schmerl in [34].
Let TI(α) be the transfinite induction scheme up to ordinal α and TIn(α)
the restriction of TI(α) to Π0n+1-formulas. By [EA
+ ]εα we denote the theory
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EA+ + TI(εα) and, analogously, by [EA+ ]εαn we denote the theory EA+ +
TIn(εα).
The following result captures how transfinite induction can be approxi-
mated by means of Turing progressions.
Proposition. For any n<ω, provably in EA+:
1. (EA+)εαn ⊆ [EA+ ]εα ;
2. [EA+ ]εαn ⊆ (EA+)εαn+2;
3. [EA+ ]εα ≡n (EA+)εαn .
Therefore, taking back our previous example, we have that⋃
n<ω
(EA+)εαn ≡ [EA+ ]εα .
A way of making TSC capable of capturing theories like these ones, but
at same time, not requiring infinite conjunctions, would be by extending
FTSC with a new modality [εα]:
Definition. By F+TSC we denote the smallest set such that:
i) > ∈ F+TSC;
ii) If ϕ, ψ ∈ F+TSC then (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∈ F+TSC;
iii) if ϕ ∈ F+TSC, n<ω and α<Λ then 〈 nα 〉ϕ ∈ F+TSC;
iv) if ϕ ∈ F+TSC and εα<Λ then [εα]ϕ ∈ F+TSC;
The goal of this new modality is to capture the transfinite induction
schema up to some ε-number. Thus, formulas of the form [εα]ϕ are intended
to be arithmetically interpreted as Thϕ + TI(εα).
The additional axioms and rules that should be added to TSC to obtain
a complete calculus capable of generating all the principles that govern the
behavior of such theories, remains as an open problem. However, there are
some principles that should be derivable in this new system.
First of all, in this setting we are allowed to build progressions over
base theories which might have transfinite induction available. To this end,
the following conservativity result should be expressible within this new
system:
Lemma. For any εα, β ≺ Λ and n<ω, provably in EA+:
([EA+ ]εα)
β
n ≡n (EA+)εα·(1+β)n .
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Proof. Reasoning in EA+, since [EA+ ]εα ≡n+1 (EA+)εαn+1, by a combination
of Corollary 3.2.12, Proposition 3.2.5, Item 3.2.5 and the fact that ωεα = εα,
we obtain that ([EA+ ]εα)βn ≡n (EA+)εα·(1+β)n .
Thus, there are some modal principles that should be derivable:
[εα]> ` 〈 nεα 〉> for any n<ω;
〈 nβ 〉[εα]> ` 〈 nεα·(1+β) 〉>;
[εα][εβ]> ≡ [εmax(α,β)]>.
On the other hand, since Schmerl Axioms are the keystone of TSC, we
are confident that a modal version of the following formulation of the fine-
structure formula for theories [EA+ ]εα might play the role of the Schmerl
Axioms for this extended version of TSC.
Proposition. For any εα, β,γ ≺ Λ, and n<ω, provably in EA+:
1. ([EA+ ]εα)βn+1 ≡n ([EA+ ]εα)e
1(εα·β)
n ;
2. (([EA+ ]εα)βn+1)
γ
n ≡n ([EA+ ]εα)e
1(εα·β)·(1+γ)
n .
Proof. Item 1 follows from Item 2 for γ = 0. Thus, we only prove Item 2.
Reasoning in EA+ we have that
([EA+ ]εα)
e1(εα·β)·(1+γ)
n ≡n (EA+)εα·
(
e1(εα·β)·(1+γ)
)
n .
We can observe that e1
(
εα · β
) · (1+ γ) = εαβ · (1+ γ). Therefore,
εα ·
(
e1(εα · β) · (1+ γ)
)
= εα ·
(
εα
β · (1+ γ)) = e1(εα · (1+ β)) · (1+ γ).
On the other hand, we have that:
([EA+ ]εα)
β
n+1 ≡n+1 (EA+)εα·(1+β)n+1
and
(([EA+ ]εα)
β
n+1)
γ
n ≡n ((EA+)εα·(1+β)n+1 )γn ≡n (EA+)
e1
(
εα·(1+β)
)
·(1+γ)
n .
Combining all these facts we get that
(([EA+ ]εα)
β
n+1)
γ
n ≡n (EA+)e
1
(
εα·(1+β)
)
·(1+γ)
n ;
≡n (EA+)εα·
(
e1(εα·β)·(1+γ)
)
n ;
≡n ([EA+ ]εα)e
1(εα·β)·(1+γ)
n .
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From the relational semantics point of view, this new modality seems to
have a natural interpretation in our frame J :
J , x  [εα]ϕ iff there is y ∈ I such that J , y  ϕ and ∀n<ω xRεαn y.
This interpretation allow us to relate non-finitely supported `-sequences
to modal formulas and ultimately, to arithmetical theories in the obvious
way:
〈 ε0, ε0, . . . , ε0, . . . 〉 [ε0]> [EA+ ]ε0
〈 ε0 · 2, ε0, . . . , ε0, . . . 〉 〈 01 〉[ε0]>
(
[EA+ ]ε0
)1
0
〈 ε02, ε0 · 2, . . . , ε0, . . . 〉 〈 11 〉[ε0]>
(
[EA+ ]ε0
)1
1
〈 ε02 · 2, ε0 · 2, . . . , ε0, . . . 〉 〈 01 〉〈 11 〉[ε0]>
((
[EA+ ]ε0
)1
1
)1
0
In a different vein, in Chapter 3, Section 3.3 we introduce Corollary 3.3.1
to be the only tool to obtain non-derivability in TSC. We have chosen to
do so since Corollary 3.3.1 can also be obtained via relational semantics.
Consequently, we shall be able to generalize the entire purely modal results
of this dissertation to a setting where we work with ordinal modalities where
the base elements are also transfinite ordinals.
BC
In Chapter 6 we gave a purely syntactical analysis of BC which leaves
room for a semantical treatment. The equivalence between our system and
RCΓ0 allows us to make use of the relational semantics for RCΓ0 presented in
[17, 9], but we leave the question of whether it is possible to define natural
semantics that work only with BC expressions and do not directly reference
ordinals. Moreover, [20] suggests variants of the brackets notation for rep-
resenting the Bachmann-Howard ordinal and beyond. Sound and complete
calculi for these systems remain to be found.
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